Capital punishment : a comparative study, with emphasis on Saudi Arabia by Al-Shalhoub, Badr
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT A COMPARATIVE STUDY WITH 
EMPHASIS ON SAUDI ARABIA 
BADR AL-SHALHOUB 
This thesis is submitted to the University of Wales in fulfilment of the requirement 
for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
1996 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I wish to express my profound gratitude to my dear wife and children for 
the patience which they had to bear whilst this research was being 
prepared. I am also indebted to my parents who have given me every 
encouragement and support. 
I am also grateful to the staff of the University of Wales, particularly the 





Chapter One - Introduction 1 
Chapter Two- The Concept of Punishment 19 
Chapter Three - The Death Penalty Through Human History 79 
Chapter Four - The Scio-Religious Dimension of Capital 
Punishment 119 
Chapter Five- Death Penalty Around the World 151 
Chapter Six - Islamic Law - Shar'ah 192 
Chapter Seven - Application of Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia 233 
Chapter Eight - Findings and Conclusion 270 
Bibliography 278 
Abstract 
This study is a modest investigation into the Islamic understanding of capital 
punishment. The main areas covered are the historical antecedents of the death 
penalty in human history; a review of death penalty across the world; death penalty 
in Islam; death penalty in Saudi Arabia. The thesis also examines the pros and 
cons of the death penalty debate. In addition to the argument of deterrence. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Nature of the Study 
The issue of capital punishment has, in recent years, been the subject 
of much debate. Execution, that deliberate act of society which 
deprives a person of life because of an alleged act of major, and 
usually violent, deviance, has tended to evoke the deepest of human 
emotions. Those who have experienced a direct effect in their lives due 
to a major crime, those who work at the formulation and enforcement 
of laws, and especially those who work in the judicial processes 
which lead to the ultimate sanction of law--the death penalty-- are 
often quite willing to express an opinion regarding this issue. Not 
merely those who are directly affected by crime and punishment but 
every citizen of society has an interest, realized or not, in the capital 
punishment debate. Recent news accounts have reflected the ongoing 
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nature of the debate. For example, the latest U. S. Supreme Court 
ruling held that, under proper procedural guidelines, the death penalty 
is constitutional. Consequently, it is almost certain that some of the 
nearly 600 prisoners under sentence of death will soon be executed, 
ending a nine-year moratorium on the use of capital punishment. In the 
U. S. this development has generated increased interest among 
Americans in the pros and cons of the debate because of the Oklahoma 
bombing. ' Elsewhere in the world, the murders of young children in 
Britain, political prisoners in Iran, and the recent death sentences for 
dissenters in Nigeria (to cite only a few cases) have attracted 
international interest in the issue. 
Many people have contributed to the discussion surrounding capital 
punishment including scholars who are competent in the legal 
dimensions of the question and those with training in other disciplines. 
Legal scholars have been most concerned with the death penalty as it 
relates to the rationality of legal codes and the functional quality of 
legal sanctions. Criminologists and sociologists have sought to 
apprehend a comprehensive picture, based on facts and statistics, of 
1 "The Death Penalty Revived, " Time, July 1995, 
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the social processes surrounding capital punishment. Those scholars 
of the humanities who have approached the subject have been 
concerned with the meaning of the death penalty for human life, 
individually and collectively. Each of these perspectives is necessary 
since each contributes to a comprehensive understanding of capital 
punishment. Assuming the desirability and necessity for 
interdisciplinary input into the formulation of public policy regarding 
capital punishment, one might ask what insights can be gained from the 
study of religion. Since religious scholarship concerns itself with 
symbolization, religious action, and religious institutions, questions 
arise regarding the relationship of these aspects of religion to capital 
punishment. Where religion and capital punishment overlap, the social 
implications of this relationship are paramount. The scholarly burden 
of this specific question falls to the sociology of religion, that 
discipline which strives to understand the place of religion within the 
complex of social processes of which capital punishment is a part. The 
sociology of religion contributes to the general understanding of 
capital punishment in a number of ways. For example, in its analysis 
of society's definition of deviance (e. g. sin, crime) as indicative of a 
value -hirerarchy, the sociology of religion offers a certain under- 
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standing of the function and significance of maximum sanctions. It is 
this scholarly discipline which perhaps most effectively blends the 
perspectives of social science and humanities in a view of capital 
punishment. 
This study will attempt to contribute to such a view by analysing the 
religious origins and dimensions of capital punishment. It will do so by 
tracing, historically and cross culturally, the relationship of religion and 
capital punishment within the conceptual framework and vocabulary 
of the sociology of religion. The study will address itself to three 
questions which arise regarding the religious dimensions of capital 
punishment: 
(1) What theoretical insights into the relationship of religion and 
capital punishment in society are available from the perspective of 
sociology of religion? 
(2) In what sense is capital punishment related to the religious 
phenomenon of propitiation? 
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( 3) How has capital punishment developed historically, especially in 
the modern secular era, as a social mechanism which serves to 
maintain collectively defined sacred reality? 
1.2. The Socio-Religious Definition of Capital Punishment. 
Capital punishment is the response of society to what is perceived as 
a major deviation from normative behaviour on the part of the criminal. 
Major deviant behaviour poses a threat to socially defined reality; the 
degree of the threat determines the social definition of the degree of 
deviance. Therefore, the definition of crime is directly related to what 
is valued as "real" in a given society. This explains the fact that 
different societies have set different limits on the behaviour of their 
individual members; in short, crime is culturally relative. ' The socially 
defined reality often operates quite implicitly, standing behind the 
laws and sanctions which appear as a part of everyday life. 
Examination of the limits of human behaviour in a given society is thus 
'Knudten, R. D. Crime in a Complex Society, Dorsey Press, 1970, pp. 54-55 
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a clue to its assumed view of reality. The definition of deviance 
establishes the "social boundaries" of behaviour which are keys to a 
"society's normative structure and value-hierarchy. " Major deviance 
demands a response from society since the very core of its self-identity 
is threatened by the transgression of these boundaries. There is a very 
strong fear that insufficient or inappropriate response to deviance will 
threaten the basic structure of the social organization: 
"The central issue has always been one of social control, behind which 
lay the fear that if crime (as well as other forms of deviance) were not 
controlled through effective action there will be societal breakdown 
and ethical standards will break asunder. "3 
Religion has a dual role in the social process which results in the 
definition of deviance and the response to deviance. Religion serves to 
provide the ultimate rationale for a society's definition of reality. Thus, 
laws are either seen to issue directly from the divine sphere or at least 
to receive legitimation therefrom. This first aspect of the role of 
religion in the social process is called the "word-construction" 
'Erikson, K. T. The Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance, John Wiley, 
1966, p. 20. 
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function. 4 
The second aspect of religion's role in the social dialectic, that of 
helping to maintain the socially defined reality in the face of threats 
such as those posed by major deviance, deviance which calls into 
question the reality concept of a society creates a collective marginal 
situation. The marginal situation demands an explanation, or 
legitimation, which guards against the perceived breakdown of 
"reality" and avoids the disintegration of the plausibility structure. 
According to Peter Berger, the administration of capital punishment 
occurs in response to collective "marginal situations" in which reality, 
as defined by a social group, is put in question or threatened. Religion 
functions to maintain "the socially defined reality by legitimating 
[such] marginal situations in terms of an all-encompassing sacred 
reality. "5 Religion therefore provides the justification for the 
deprivation of the life of the violator. But the action of executing a 
member of society, albeit a deviant member, itself creates a marginal 
situation, since death is the most mysterious and ultimate threat to the 
4Einstadter, W. J. "Introduction", to Heinrich, 0., The Rationale of Punishment, Patterson 
Smith, 1975, p. xii. 
'Berger, P. The Sacred Canopy, Anchor Books, 1969,25ff. 
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reality or plausibility structure. Religion functions to legitimate the 
marginal situation created by the anticipated execution. It does so by 
giving a cosmic meaning to the "official exercise of violence, " by 
providing the executioner with an identity as a "role-carrier, " and by 
providing for religious symbolisations and religious actions to be 
employed in the executione6 
"Killing under the auspices of the legitimate authorities has... been 
accompanied from ancient times to today by religious paraphernalia 
and ritualism... men are put to death amid prayers, blessings, and 
incantations. The ecstasies of fear and violence are, by these means ýl 
kept within the bounds of "sanity, " that is, of the reality of the social 
world. "' 
The sociology of religion, therefore, provides a principal category for 
an understanding of the relationship of religion to capital punishment. 
That category is the function of world-maintenance in the face of a 
marginal situation. Those religious symbolisations and religious actions 
6ibid. p. 44 
7 ibid. p. 114. 
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which accompany executions, it will be shown in the subsequent 
chapter, are most adequately explained with reference to the religious 
phenomenon of propitiation. This was especially true in ancient times 
when societies manifested the full integration of religion with public 
life, the sinner or criminal was considered accursed and was executed 
in the name of the god (s) in a ceremony involving symbols and rites 
in terms of which the killing was justified. 
This propitiatory death of the violator was necessary for the 
maintenance of certain sacred, social constructions of reality. Thus, in 
the earliest historical eras, it is found that religion was directly 
involved in the social process which leads to execution. In later 
historical stages, it will be shown in the subsequent chapter, there is 
an evolution of the phenomenon of capital punishment corresponding 
to changes in the socially perceived reality. The role of religion also 
changed with this evolutionary process, it was decreasingly involved 
in the actual ceremony of execution while remaining as a principle 
legitimating agent. The world-maintenance function still summarizes 
the role of religion with regard to capital punishment. Furthermore, the 
process of secularization in the modern era has resulted 
in the partial 
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transposition of the world-maintenance function and the legitimation 
of capital punishment from the sphere of the influence of religion to 
that of the state and its political ideology. Secular justifications for the 
death penalty tend to predominate. The narrowly "religious" or 
ritualistic aspects of capital punishment fade away, yet, the world- 
maintenance function and legitimations remain. 
The socio-religious definition of capital punishment is, therefore, 
1) a social response to a marginal situation which is created by major 
deviant behaviour defined as a boundary of sacred reality and, 
2) a collective action which is legitimated by religion as a necessary 
protection of the plausibility structure which is the base of this sacred 
reality. There are, of course, other possible definitions of capital 
punishment from the perspective of law, criminology, and other 
disciplines. However, the sociology of religion offers an 
understanding based on the function of religion in world-construction 
and world-maintenance. The significance of religion's role in the 
legitimation of capital punishment has been expressed by Albert 
Camus. Camus pointed out that the maximum sanction goes against the 
human solidarity against death; therefore, it must be justified by a truth 
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or principle "superior to man... only religious values... can serve as a 
basis for the supreme punishment. "8 Camus argued eloquently against 
capital punishment and other forms of killing and violence which are 
justified by a socially conceived reality: "Those who cause the most 
blood to flow are the same ones who believe they have right, logic and 
history on their side. "9 
1.3. Central Thesis 
The definition of capital punishment offered by the sociology of 
religion, " as elaborated above, informs the central thesis of this study. 
If the maintenance of a sacred reality sometimes requires the legal 
taking of human life in order to appease the wrath of the god (s) then 
this act may be seen in religious terms. Specifically, therefore, the 
thesis of this study is that capital punishment, in its origins, 
development, and present ideological dimensions, is a type of 
8Camus, A., "Reflections on the Guillotine, " reprinted in Resistance, Rebellion, and 
Death, Vintage Books, 1974, p. 222. 
9ibid. p. 227. 
'qt should be noted that the particular sociology of religion reflected in this study follows 
the conceptual framework and terminology of Peter Berger's The Sacred Canopy. 
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propitiatory rite which serves to maintain a socially constructed reality. 
In simplest terms, capital punishment is a propitiation for the sake of 
a social order. 
1.4. Method of the Study 
In order to fulfil the purpose of this study, to analyse the relationship 
of religion and capital punishment, the examination of available 
literature and the integration of different aspects of the issue were 
necessary. Therefore, the methodology involved the examination of the 
literature on the philosophy of punishment and capital punishment to 
discover and expose those aspects of the question which reflect socio- 
religious dimensions. " This approach included the construction of a 
thorough bibliography on capital punishment and the selection of 
those sources which are most relevant to ideological, religious, and 
sociological aspects of capital punishment. 
"The selection of literature was based on a certain understanding of the term "socio- 
religious. " Throughout this study the term is intended to signify those aspects of religion 
which directly contribute to the social process. Since such aspects, along with political 
aspects, contribute to the ideological characteristics of societies, the term "socio-religious" 
is close in meaning to the term "politico-religious. " 
12 
The literature on the philosophy of punishment from the most ancient 
times to the present has been vast and varied. The pros and cons of 
capital punishment are first mentioned with regard to specific cases of 
individuals or groups whose actions were subjected to public scrutiny. 
Opposition to the use of the death penalty was stated in terms of 
certain mitigating circumstances or for the sake of mercy. Modern 
philosophical discussion of capital punishment was sparked by the 
Italian jurist Cesare Beccaria in his classic eighteenth-century work, 
On Crimes and Punishments (1764). 12 Beccaria's opposition to the 
penalty of death attracted immediate and widespread interest among 
the avant-garde of Europe and America. Kant, Hegel, and others 
contributed to the debate by defending capital punishment. The 
principal source regarding the role of religion in the origins and 
justifications of capital punishment is Heinrich Oppenheimer's The 
Rationale of Punishment (1913 ). 13 In the twentieth century, there has 
been an abundance of religious debate over capital punishment. This 
literature primarily concerns the ethical arguments regarding the 
issue. 
"See translation by Henry Paolucci, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. 
"Originally published by Hodder and Stoughton for University of 
London Press. 
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For example, liberal Protestantism, in its desire for social reform, has 
sometimes argued against capital punishment and sought its abolition. 
The best recent contribution to the religious and philosophical 
discussion, from an existentialist perspective, is Albert Camus's 
Reflections on the Guillotine ( 1957 ). 14 The literature of this century 
which seeks to relate religion and capital punishment is rich in ethical 
insights. Camus and others, in providing ethical treatments of the 
issue, have occasionally hinted at certain socio-religious dimensions 
of capital punishment. But, although many15 have noted a close 
relationship between capital punishment and certain religious 
phenomena no one, to this researchers knowledge, has explored this 
relationship from the perspective of the sociology of religion. 
The limitations of this study arise from the availability of the sources 
and the nature of the study itself. The literature upon which the study 
is based has been drawn from that which is available in English from 
the library of the University of Wales. Undoubtedly, the prodigious 
amount of literature available from earlier historical eras and in other 
14Camus, A. op. cit. 
"Scott, R. G. The History of Capital Punishment, Torchstream Books, 1950, pp. 21-22. 
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languages would offer valuable details for a general socio-religious 
understanding of capital punishment. But the full and detailed story of 
the relationship of religion and capital punishment is beyond the scope 
of this type of study. Furthermore, the generality of the subject matter 
of this study did not allow the reading of all related literature, since 
this would include the entire bibliography of capital punishment. 
Therefore, the selection process employed in the integration of diverse 
ideas and facts was crucially important. 
The delimitations of this study have been chosen in order to fulfill the 
purpose of exposing the socio-religious dimensions of capital 
punishment. Therefore, although a conscious attempt has been made 
to achieve an integrative and interdisciplinary perspective on capital 
punishment, certain aspects of this subject have received less emphasis 
in order to emphasize those aspects, mentioned above, which are of 
primary importance. Receiving less emphasis are: 1) the study of the 
details of various Islamic legal codes and their mutual influence 
historically; 2) the close empirical analysis of the facts regarding 
executions in Saudi Arabia, which is, unfortunately, only available 
for 
relatively recent times and only in certain jurisdictions; and 
3) the 
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evaluation and criticism, based on formal logic, of the various ethical 
arguments regarding the death penalty. In addition, the attempt to 
focus on those aspects of capital punishment which are related to 
religion has resulted in a de-emphasis of certain secular understandings 
and legitimations of capital punishment. Yet a deliberate effort has 
been made in the seventh chapter to illustrate the enduring Islamic 
socio religious dimensions of capital punishment after the historical 
unfolding of the secularization process. 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
This introductory chapter presents the purpose, methodology, and 
rationale of the inquiry. The second chapter examines the concept of 
capital punishment; the third chapter straces origins of capital 
punishment in ancient times, giving special attention to the view that 
the first executions constituted a type of propitiatory rite administered 
by priest-executioners. The phenomenon of propitiation as a religious 
category is shown to be directly related to the processes of world- 
construction and world-maintenance as aspects of socially defined 
reality. The evolving place of religion within society is related to the 
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changing theoretical and practical aspects of capital punishment. The 
fourth chapter explores the socio-religious dimensions of the subject 
in the secular era; the fifth chapter examines the developmental shift 
in capital punishment throughout the world; the sixth chapter looks at 
the Islamic religion and capital punishment after the rise of the modern 
secular state which begins to take over the world construction, world- 
maintenance, and legitimating functions of religion. The seventh 
chapter gives an overview of the application of capital punishment in 
Saudi Arabia. In the final chapter the findings and conclusions of the 
inquiry are summarized. 
Finally, implications for further debate and research, with specific 
emphasis on the ethics of capital punishment, are proposed. It is the 
objective of this study to approach the subject of capital punishment, 
about which much has been written, from a new perspective, namely, 
that of religion. Within this conceptual framework and vocabulary it is 
hoped that those with a previous interest in capital punishment will 
find fresh insights on the subject. For those who are already aware of 
sociological theories of religion, this essay will hopefully present 
capital punishment as a case study of society's (and religion's 
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legitimation) of official violence to maintain the particular hierarchical 
distributions of wealth and power which define its "reality. " Thus, the 
present study is relevant not only to the academic study of religion but 
also to the broader range of interdisciplinary studies by which public 
policy should be informed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPT OF PUNISHMENT 
2.1. Aims of Punishment 
Some philosophers have confused the aims of punishment with its 
nature, or have defined punishment at least partially of its supposed 
aims. This can be misleading, for by packing into its definition those 
aims of which one approves, one can refuse to allow behaviour that 
has some other aim to be called punishment, even though such 
behaviour is quite generally considered to be a form of punishment. 
Such question-begging techniques and attempts at persuasive definition 
do not resolve questions. They merely add to the confusion that 
already exists. It is best, therefore, to consider the aims of punishment 
separately from its nature. 
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The aims or goals of punishment have traditionally fallen into the 
following categories: 
1. Protection of society from the depredations of dangerous persons. 
2. Reform of the offender, or deterring the offender from future 
violations. 
3. Deterring persons other than the offender. 
4. Vengeance, retribution, or righting the scales of justice. 
2.1.1. Protection Of Society 
In addition to all of the preceding motives, one of the most important 
is that of affording the innocent members of society protection from 
the depredations of dangerous persons. One of the major purposes of 
establishing and maintaining governments is the need of all persons to 
band together to protect one another from all forms of danger. The skin 
of man is soft and easily pierced. Whether the danger is from tooth or 
claw, or from the knives or bullets of members of his own species, 
man is susceptible to attack. He lacks the instincts and the built-in 
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capacities of some of the lower animals that provide them with 
protection against the predators that would feed upon them. Men have 
therefore had to learn to work together with other members of their 
own kind for mutual protection. 
The enjoyment of the earth's bounties is impossible, then, to men 
who live in a state of anarchy, where all men are in perpetual terror 
that their lives may be brought to a sudden end. In such a state, there 
is no true freedom, for there is no security. As Hobbes said long ago, 
in state of anarchy. 
"there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: 
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation nor use of the 
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; 
no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much 
force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no 
arts, no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear 
and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short. "16 
16 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, Chapter 13. Library of Liberal Arts ed. p. 107. 
21 
Our ancestors, then, in ages far more remote than historical records 
go, must have organised themselves into bands or troops or tribes, at 
least partly because of their instinctive drive for self-preservation. 
And this same instinctual drive undoubtedly brought them to the 
conclusion that when a man became a threat to the community or to the 
individuals within it, the community or its members had the right to 
use all means necessary to protect themselves from him, including 
banishment or death, where other means failed. For by violating the 
primary purposes for which the group had constituted itself, he 
literally made himself an outlaw - that is, one who is outside the law. 
By repudiating the discipline of the group, either through his words or 
through his actions he placed himself outside the group, and thus lost 
the immunities that membership in the group conferred upon him, 
including immunity from physical harm by other members of the 
group. 
2.1.2. Reform 
It is easiest to secure general agreement on the use of punishment to 
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secure reform of the offender. If the infliction of a certain degree of 
harm will induce a person to conform to standards of behaviour that he 
has previously tended to ignore or to violate, and if his violation of 
those standards is harmful to others, then it might be reasonable to 
inflict that harm upon him. Presumably from the painful experience of 
being punished, he will emerge a "better" man than he was before, 
less likely to engage in unacceptable behaviour. Having been punished 
once, the fear of another penalty - even more severe than the first, 
perhaps - may suffice to deter him from future offences. 
Reform by punishment often goes hand in hand with efforts at 
rehabilitation, but the two should not be confused. Out of humane 
considerations, and a desire to offer the convict the opportunity to find 
a useful place in society once he has paid his debt to society, modern 
penal institutions commonly provide educational and vocational 
services, as well as facilities for religious services, recreation, and so 
on. But, though these services may serve the same long-term goal as 
the penalty that is inflicted upon him, and though they may be 
administered by the same persons who administers the penal 
institution of which they are a part, they are not part of the penalty 
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itself. If a prisoner had been sentenced to forty lashes, and if, after the 
penalty was inflicted, the authorities provided him with bandages and 
soothing ointments, no one would suppose that the bandages and 
ointment were any part of his punishment. The recreational and 
educational programs of penal institutions should not be considered 
a part of the punishment of their inmates, but a separate enterprise that 
may be intended to achieve the same overall results. 
2.1.3. Deterrence 
People learn from the experiences of others as well as from their own. 
Reading reports of one or two tragic automobile accidents that have 
resulted from heavy drinking is sufficient to persuade some people not 
to drive after they have been drinking, or not to drink if they intend to 
be driving. It is not necessary for them to go through such a tragic 
experience themselves. Similarly, reading a 
few reports of the 
penalties inflicted upon persons who have broken the 
law is enough to 




As a general rule, as the penalty becomes more severe, people become 
less likely to engage in the proscribed conduct. If the fine for overtime 
parking is $1, many people will feel that it is worth the risk, because 
in the long run, it may turn out to be less expensive than utilising 
private parking lots. If the fine is raised to $5, fewer people are likely 
to take the risk. If it is raised to $15, violators will be fewer still. As 
the fines go up, the propensity to risk having to pay them goes down. 
And as other penalties, such as jail terms, corporal punishment, and 
death are imposed, one may assume that people will become even 
more reluctant to subject themselves to the suffering and deprivation 
that these entail. Punishment, then, may serve not only to reform those 
who have violated the rules, but also to deter those who might 
otherwise be tempted to violate them. 
2.1.4. Vengeance or Retribution 
There is widespread feeling that justice requires that no man should 
be allowed the advantage that accrues to him from 
his misdeeds; that 
any man who has committed a crime should somehow pay 
his debt to 
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society, regardless of whether he is reformed by having to do so and 
regardless of the deterrent effects such payment may have upon 
others. By his wrongful act, it is said, the offender has tipped the 
scales of justice out of balance, and it is necessary to rectify the 
imbalance by taking from him what he has taken from others. 
Some thinkers have said that when injustice has been committed in 
the world, there is a stain that must somehow be washed away. The 
Hebrew bible and the tragedies of ancient Greece are full of incidents 
that seem designed to illustrate this concept. Once Oedipus has 
violated the moral law by committing patricide and incest, misfortune 
comes to his kingdom and remains until his guilt is expiated. In the 
Hebrew Bible many passages clearly presume that the earth itself is 
stained by the guilt of the murderer, and that nothing can cleanse it of 
this stain but punishment of the guilty or some form of expiation. 
Thus, after Cain has murdered his brother Abel, God says to him, 
"What have you done? The blood of your brother is crying out to me 
from the ground! Now you are cursed by the earth that has opened its 
mouth to swallow the blood of your brother that you have spilled. "" 
17 Genesis 4: 10-11. 
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And again, in connection with the need to punish the murderer, God 
commands the children of Israel by saying, "You must not defile the 
land in which you reside, but blood defiles the earth; and there is no 
way to cleanse the earth of the blood that has been spilled upon it but 
by the blood of him who has spilled it. "'$ 
In modem times, the popular demand for retribution is often expressed 
when the public, informed of a particularly brutal crime, demands 
revenge, feeling that justice is served only when the guilty party has 
been punished. Many of those who advocate the return of the death 
penalty argue that murderers should be put to death because they 
deserve to die for their crimes. The popular demand for punishment is 
often unaccompanied by any thought of reform or deterrence; rather, 
it seems to be activated by the thought that the criminal ought to get 
what is coming to him or get what he deserves. There is little evidence 
of any popular feeling that the earth has been defiled by spilt blood. 
But some expressions, such as, the victim of this crime will not rest 
easy until her killer has been caught and justice has been done, reveal 
an underlying sentiment that derives from the same source. 
There 
18 Numbers 32: 33. Cf. Also Deuteronomy 21: 1-9, et passim. 
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seems to be a feeling, too, that one who commits a crime owes a debt 
that he must pay, and that so long as that debt remains unpaid, there is 
an imbalance in the community or in the universe, a kind of state of 
being - injustice - that can be rectified only with the punishment of 
the wrongdoer. 
One of the most respected moral thinkers of modern times, Immanuel 
Kant, maintained that from a moral point of view, punishment is 
primarily retributive. In discussing the problem he went so far as to say 
that if the world were about to come to an end, and it was therefore 
evident that no one would benefit from punishment of prisoners, 
those prisoners who has been sentenced to death should be executed 
nevertheless, in the interest of righting the balance of justice. 19 
Thus far, it has been discussed in this chapter the various aims of 
punishment without attempting to evaluate them. It is necessary now 
to turn to that task. 
First, it should be noted that each of the justifications or aims 
19 Kant, I. Philosophy of Law, TAT Clark, 1887, p. 198. 
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discussed above has in fact been considered by respectable 
philosophers and moralists to be a proper goal for particular penalties 
or for punishment in general. Furthermore, each of them has a certain 
plausibility of its own. Whether one considers criminal punishment or 
the kinds of penalties that parents impose upon their children or that 
referees assess against ballplayers, the same kinds of rationale seem 
to be involved. Consider a game for a moment, and see how penalties 
are exacted and the reasons that might be given for them. 
In hockey, a player can be sent to the penalty box for high-sticking. 
By sitting in that box for a certain period of time, he is, in a sense, 
subjected to a kind of humiliation that may help to deter him from 
breaking the rules of the game as he has done. Because his penalty is 
also a penalty against his team, he has an even greater incentive to 
reform, for a player who consistently sits in the penalty box is less 
valuable to his team than one who is out on the ice scoring goals. 
When one man is excluded from playing, the entire team is weakened, 
so that the other players have a stronger reason than usual 
for 
refraining from engaging in behaviour that might be construed 
by the 
referees to be rule infractions. Thus, there is both a reformative effect 
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and a deterrent effect in the imposition of penalties upon hockey 
players. 
In addition, there is a clear sense in which the penalty constitutes a 
righting of the unbalanced scales of justice. When members of one 
team engage in high-sticking, or when they play off-side, they gain an 
advantage over the other team that ought to be rectified. They should 
be deprived of their unfair gain, and the other team should be 
compensated, somehow, for the loss that it incurred as a result of the 
unfair playing of their opponents. Thus, in basketball, the victimised 
team gets a free throw, in football the offending team loses yardage, 
and so on. 
Players who commit grave offences may be assessed heavy fines, in 
professional play, and if their offences are so serious as to warrant 
even more serious action, they may be suspended from the league or 
the association, or be forbidden to play altogether. Thus, the 
association of players outlaws the offender, removing 
him entirely 
from the society of participants in that game, on the ground that to 
permit him to continue to play constitutes a danger, either 
to the 
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personal safety of the other participants or to the respectability of 
their sport as a whole. 
Some people have insisted that some of these justifications for 
punishment are really no justification at all. The one that has come 
under the strongest and most consistent attack is the third one, 
retribution. Some philosophers, particularly those associated with the 
utilitarian tradition, maintain that only forward-looking penalties ( that 
is, penalties that are principally intended to have some effect upon the 
future well-being of mankind) ought to be imposed, and that any 
sanction that is imposed primarily to settle a score for something that 
has already taken place is unworthy of a civilised society. 20 If no good 
can reasonably be expected to result from the imposition of the 
penalty, they say, it is barbarous to impose it. Some (like Hobbes) 
have gone so far as to say that any penalty that is not forward-looking 
is no punishment at all, but naked hostility or brutality. 21 
Although these views have some plausibility, they are also subject to 
20 Acton, H. B. The Philosophy of Punishment, St. Martin's, 1969. p. 34. 
"Hobbes, op. cit. 
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serious objections. Popular acceptance or rejection of a theory is not 
necessarily an indication of its correctness, but it is nevertheless a 
factor that may not be overlooked. As we have already noted, many 
people accept the view that punishment is at least partially retributive, 
though few would go so far as Kant went in his extreme formulation 
of the retributive theory of punishment. The popularity of the 
retributive view, in spite of powerful attacks upon it over a number of 
centuries, may be attributed, in part, to a strong feeling on the part of 
many people that justice is not done unless a criminal suffers for his 
crime. The sense. of justice, or the sense of injustice, may be 
overlooked. As Edmund Cahn once observed, 
"The evolutionary connectedness of human life and of man's relations 
is the root fact of law..... Justice, as many attempted definitions have 
rather clearly demonstrated, is unwilling to be captured in a formula. 
Nevertheless, it somehow remains a word of magic 
evocations....... Perhaps the human mind does contain self-evident 
truths concerning justice, from which legal norms less obvious in their 
nature may be deduced. "22 
22 Cahn, E. The Sense of Injustice: An Anthropomorphic View of Law, New York Univ. 
Press, 1949. p. 12. 
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When a murderer is convicted of a murder he did not commit, or a 
gangster who cannot be convicted of any of the crimes that everyone 
knows he did is convicted of income tax evasion, there is little feeling 
that injustice has been done, because there is a feeling that somehow, 
they have gotten what they deserved. Such feeling cannot be 
overlooked by the philosopher. 
Suppose that reform and deterrence are the only goals thought to be 
worth entertaining in so far as punishment is concerned, and that 
retribution is thought to be irrelevant or uncivilised. It then becomes 
possible to conceive of circumstances in which one might be able to 
justify the punishment of innocent persons; that is, of persons whose 
guilt has not been established in accordance with proper procedures in 
a court of law. Suppose, for example, that there is a serious not and 
that the entire fabric of society is threatened with destruction. Suppose 
further that the lives and property of thousands of innocent persons 
are at stake and that the authorities are unable to apprehend those 
responsible for the insurrection. Finally, suppose that the authorities 
have good reason to believe that if one or two of the insurrectionists 
are brought to justice, the others will be shocked into submission and 
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that the insurrection will thus be brought to an end. In order to deter 
others from continuing with their unlawful activity, then, it becomes 
imperative that at least one person be hanged for his part in the 
insurrection. However, because the authorities do not know the 
identity of any of the insurrectionists, they have only one choice: to 
select someone at random, to stage a trial for him, to convict him of 
complicity in the insurrection, and to execute him in such a way that 
the loosely knit band of revolutionaries abandons its violent tactics, 
thus restoring relative tranquility to the state. 
Because, according to the supporters of the utilitarian theory, the 
purpose of punishment is reform or deterrence, and because the 
settling of old scores or the righting of the unbalanced scales of 
justice has nothing to do with punishment, it is difficult to see why 
only the guilty should be punished. For deterrence, at least, it is quite 
obvious that the punishment of the innocent will work quite as well. 
And if reform is the aim, it might be argued that one who has been 
punished once, even for a crime that he has not committed, will be 
even less likely to commit it than he would have been had he never 
tasted the lash or known what it is to be deprived of his liberty, unless 
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the punishment is hanging, in which case there is no point to any talk 
of reform, whether the punished party is innocent or guilty. 
It would seem, then, that unless some considerations other than reform 
or deterrence are brought to bear, it is possible to justify the 
punishment of the innocent -a conclusion that is scarcely likely to 
commend itself to those who reject retribution on the ground that it is 
barbarous and uncivilised. On the contrary, it would seem that some 
element of retribution must be involved if we are to make sense of the 
theory that only the guilty ought ever to be punished. 
Some people confuse the retributive theory of punishment with certain 
moral views of what are and what are not proper attitudes to hold 
toward those who have committed various kinds of wrongful acts. It 
is proper they say, to be forgiving, and it is uncharitable to be 
vengeful. Retributive punishment is therefore morally wrong, though 
punishment inflicted for reform or deterrent purposes might be 
acceptable since it is more concerned with the future well-being of 
mankind than with the past misdeeds of a single individual. 23 
23 Barnes, H. The Repression of Crime, Montclear, 1969, pp. 126-134. 
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This objection is open to several objections. First of all, one may 
claim that it confuses legal punishment with moral vindictiveness. 
There is a sense in which legal punishment may be bound up with 
moral vindictiveness, but it is necessary to sort out the various 
functions being served and the persons who are operating in the legal 
system in order to find out just where such vindictiveness may lie, if 
it exists at all. One might say, for example, that the judge who 
sentences the defendant is being vindictive; but clearly there is a 
difference between a judge carrying out the duty prescribed for him by 
law -a duty that may be very unpleasant both for him and for the 
defendant who must suffer the penalty he pronounces - and the same 
person (i. e., the judge) in his private capacity, as a citizen seeking 
vengeance against someone who has wronged him. A person who, 
acting in an official capacity, performs an act that is required of him 
by the laws, rules, or regulations governing his performance in his job, 
may sometimes not be said to have the attributes that he would be said 
to have if he did the same thing as a private citizen. For example, a 
person who dispenses large sums of money to the poor may properly 
be described as generous and charitable. But if he is the director of a 
welfare agency, though he is distributing large sums of money to the 
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poor, that fact alone is not sufficient to justify calling him either 
generous or charitable. It is not his money, after all, that he is 
distributing; it is his job to distribute it; and, though one might say that 
the government is generous in its welfare program, it would be 
incorrect to say that the agent who signs the cheques is generous and 
charitable ( though he might be both, of course, in his private life). In 
the same way, the judge who dispenses harsh sentences required by 
law may not be a harsh man at all. But feeling bound to do what he is 
required to do by conditions imposed upon him by the position he 
holds in the structure of government, he regretfully hands down harsh 
sentences. It might be appropriate to say that the laws are harsh, or 
that the government that passed the laws is harsh; but it is not strictly 
correct to say that the judge who administers those laws is harsh. 
Still, a plausible case can be made for the view that the welfare clerk 
and the judge are generous and vindictive men, respectively. One 
might point out that either man could find another job, and that both 
men probably took the jobs that they have because of the kinds of 
people they are. The judge swears to uphold the law so long as he 
remains on the bench; but it is always open to a judge to resign his 
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position if he finds that he cannot stomach the laws he is asked to 
support. If the laws are harsh and vindictive, then, one may argue that 
a judge who rules in accordance with them, rather than stepping down 
or finding some loophole, is a harsh and vindictive man. 
Still another might point out that more than one judge has ruled in 
accordance with a law or a precedent of which he strongly 
disapproved, but remained on the bench because he felt that his 
presence there enabled him to perform an important and valuable 
public service. Weighing all the factors and the alternatives, he might 
conclude that he would have a greater opportunity to make the 
administration of justice less harsh from his position in the judiciary, 
even though he might occasionally have to make rulings that went very 
much against his own convictions, than he would as a private citizen. 
Similarly, the welfare clerk might have taken his job precisely because 
he was a man of generous spirit, wanting to have a part in distributing 
money - even if it had to be other people's money - to those who were 
in need of it. The moral quality of the individual who acts in an official 
capacity is obviously not amenable to simple solution. This has been 
of central importance in discussions of war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity. 
A second objection against those who maintain that retributive 
punishment is wrong because it is proper to be forgiving and charitable 
rather than vengeful is based upon the fact that it is not at all clear 
what it would be like to be forgiving in the criminal law. Does it make 
any sense to speak of anyone forgiving the criminal but his victim? The 
district attorney, the judge, the jailer, all of these have jobs to do. 
Their jobs require that they administer the law. If a person has 
committed a crime, it is the district attorney's job to prosecute him, 
the judge is supposed to preside over his trial, and, if he is convicted 
and sentenced to a prison term, it is the jailer's duty to attend to him 
for the duration of his stay in prison. None of these people, though, 
has been harmed by the offender; at least, none of them has been 
harmed more than any other citizen has. It makes no sense, then, to 
suggest that any of these officials or employees of the government 
might forgive him, for only those who have been injured by him can 
forgive him. " 
24 Blumberg, A. S. Criminal Justice, Quadrangle Books, 1967, p. 89. 
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There is a sense in which he might be forgiven by the prosecuting 
attorney or the judge; that is, if the former decided to abandon the 
prosecution of his case, or if the latter decided to dismiss the case in 
spite of the evidence pointing to the defendant's delinquency. But 
strictly speaking, the state and its officials do not have the power to 
forgive, though they may excuse certain forms of wrongful behaviour 
under appropriate circumstances. 
A disposition to forgive is not to be confused with the virtues of mercy 
or compassion. Though no one but the victim may forgive the criminal 
who has harmed him, anyone - whether he is victim, judge, 
prosecuting attorney, or interested bystander - may have compassion 
for the man who has been found guilty in a criminal court. In a 
criminal case, no one but the judge may be merciful toward the 
defendant who has been found guilty, for none but the judge is in a 
position to dispense mercy by mitigating the sentence. Even the judge 
may be unable to be merciful toward the guilty party, despite any 
compassionate feelings he may have for him, because his discretionary 




There is no reason to suppose that the world be significantly improved 
if judges were allowed wider discretion than they are. One of the 
purposes of law is to take certain important matters of public interest 
out of the hands of individuals and to provide a certain regularity and 
uniformity of expectation for all the members of the society. This aim 
would be defeated if judges were given wide powers of discretion in 
individual cases. 
Third, the effect that one man's punishment may have on others, by 
way of example, is not an adequate reason for punishing him. If it 
were, penalties could be adjusted by determining how severe they 
ought to be to deter potential offenders. But in fact, penalties are made 
more or less severe depending upon the seriousness of the crime that 
has been committed. And so it ought to be. No man should be deprived 
of his life, his liberty, or his property simply in order that others might 
be deterred from committing a crime in the future, or in other words, 
that John should be punished for the crime that Joe might commit. 
This scarcely seems to be consonant with the sense of justice that 
enjoins against punishing one for the crime of another, and even more 
against punishing one man for the possible future crime of some other. 
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In actual practice, all of these motives enter into the treatment 
accorded to criminal offenders. In some parts of the criminal law 
there seems to be greater concern for reform or deterrence, and in 
others for retribution. The legislators's quandary, when he considers 
changes in the penal code, rests upon the kinds of confusions that have 
been discussed. Should the penalty be more or less severe? If it is 
more severe, will it be too harsh for the crime committed? Consider 
the drug problem as an example. Many legislators seem to feel, rightly 
or wrongly, that the use of certain drugs is a practice that ought to be 
discouraged by the law. The penalties for such use are severe, but 
they could be more severe or more lenient. There is a demand on the 
part of some people that penalties for drug use be made more lenient. 
If they are, the opponents argue, the drug problem will increase, for 
fewer people will be deterred. If they are not, say advocates of reform, 
our society is guilty of inflicting a harm upon certain persons far out of 
proportion to the gravity of the offense that they have committed. 
Notice that the one is arguing on deterrent grounds, the other on 
retributive. Notice too that retributivists can argue for less severe 
penalties on retributivists principle, in spite of their reputation for 
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heartlessness and lack of compassion. 26 
2.2. Excusing Conditions 
In law and in morals it is recognised that no person should be held 
responsible or be blamed for any act over which he has no control, as 
in the following mock case. 
The Knife-Wielding Mother 
A rare form of epilepsy causes its victims to repeat, automatically and 
blindly, certain forms of behaviour that can result in great harm to 
others. In one case, a young mother was slicing a loaf of bread when 
she was suddenly stricken by an attack of this form epilepsy. In a 
trance, completely unaware of what she was doing, she wandered 
about the kitchen, continuing to make the slicing motions that she had 
been making when the attack struck her. When she recovered, she was 
horrified to discover her baby's slashed and mutilated body. 
26 Cahn, L. Confronting Justice, Little Brown, 1966, p. 245. 
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There is no meaningful sense in which this unfortunate woman can be 
considered to be guilty of causing her baby's death. Where there is no 
intention to cause harm, and no negligence, there is no guilt or 
responsibility. Nevertheless, the state has the right to protect other 
persons against the harm that a person suffering from such a malady 
might unwittingly inflict upon them in similar circumstances. To be 
sure, the woman in this case was sick and should not have been 
punished for the death of her infant. But the state may institutionalise 
her until it is quite certain that she is cured of her illness, or that her 
illness is so completely under control that she no longer poses a 
serious threat to anyone, just as it may quarantine a person with a 
dangerously infectious disease. 
The law recognises a number of excusing conditions that are sufficient 
to render a person immune to criminal punishment. All of them 
presuppose that the defendant could not have helped doing what he 
did or that he could reasonably have been expected to foresee the 
consequences of his actions, and that he ought not, therefore, to be 
held responsible for the action or its consequences. They all entail the 
absence of mens rea, the intention that is necessary as part of any 
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criminal act. Generally, actions that are not preceded or accompanied 
mens rea (criminal intention) are not criminal acts. Thus, it is possible 
to distinguish between murder that is committed by using an 
automobile as the weapon and an accident, he has no intention to kill 
the pedestrian. 
These excusing conditions are known as mistake, accident, 
provocation, duress, and insanity. In addition, some persons, such as 
very small children, are presumed to be incapable of forming the 
intention to commit a criminal act. 27 
Suppose a person is charged with manslaughter because he lit a match 
in a place whose atmosphere was permeated with gas fumes and 
thereby caused a violent explosion that took the lives of several 
persons. Suppose also that he lit the match with the intention of 
lighting a cigarette, completely unaware of the presence of the 
explosive fumes which had entered the atmosphere undetected from a 
leak in a gas main. It would be quite unreasonable for the law to hold 
him responsible for the deaths of the victims of the explosion, 
for he 
27 Hart, H. L. Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford Univ. Press, 1968, p. 56. 
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had no knowledge of the presence of the dangerous gas; he performed 
an act that was in itself completely innocent and without malice, and 
no reasonable person could have expected him to foresee the 
disastrous consequences of igniting a match in that place at that time. 
Because his action was not malicious, there were no evil inclinations 
( none that are revealed by his act of lighting the match, at any rate) 
that punishment might rid him of. Because neither he nor anyone else 
in similar circumstances could foresee the consequences of lighting a 
match, no punishment, no matter how severe, could deter others from 
similar acts in the future. It is hard to see in what sense he might be 
guilty of the deaths of the victims of this tragic accident. 
One should not be misled into thinking that mens rea is narrowly 
construed in the law. It is not. For example, it is sometimes assumed 
that "malice aforethought" and "premeditation" exclude the possibility 
of a man's being convicted of murder if he fires a gun on a sudden 
impulse. This is not the case. A man may be convicted of first degree 
murder in some jurisdictions even if his intention to fire his weapon 
was formulated only a split second before he fired it , or, as the 
law 
sometimes puts it, "if the time that separated the intention from the act 
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was that that separates one thought from the next. Furthermore, for a 
conviction of first-degree murder, it is not necessary for the defendant 
to have intended to kill his victim. If he intended only to wing the 
person at whom he was shooting, and if, when the bullet struck the 
victims's arm, it shattered his bones in such a way that bone fragments 
pierced his chest, causing fatal wounds, the defendant may be guilty 
of first-degree murder in some states. 28 In New York, for example, the 
Revised Penal Code of 1967 states that a person is guilty of murder 
when under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human 
life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another 
person. In some cases a person may be guilty of murder even when he 
did not pull the trigger himself and never intended to participate in an 
action that would cause serious injury to another person. Thus, in the 
state of New York, a person may be found guilty of murder if he is 
engaged in an attempt to commit robbery, burglary, or any one of a 
number of other crimes and if, while engaged in that crime, he, or 
another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other 
than one of the participants. 
zs ibid. p. 153 
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It is obvious, therefore, that in the criminal law, the concept of 
intention, or mens rea, is not identical with the common-sense 
definition of the term that one might encounter in daily, nontechnical 
conversation. Although the notion of criminal responsibility is closely 
related to common-sense conceptions of responsibility, it is not 
identical with them. In the course of its growth and development, the 
law has evolved special, technical uses of terms that are also 
employed in nontechnical ways by laymen. It can be dangerous for the 
layman to confuse the technical and the nontechnical uses of such 
terms. 
2.3.1. Strict Determinism 
Strict determinism is not so much a means of defining an excusing 
condition under which some persons may be absolved of criminal 
responsibility as a theory which, if accepted, would lead to the 
conclusion that all persons should be excused of whatever allegedly 
criminal misconduct they might have engaged in. It holds that no one 
is genuinely free, no one can chose his own actions, everyone's actions 
are determined by pre-existing conditions over which no one has 
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control. It concludes, therefore, that no one ought to be punished or 
blamed or held responsible for any acts in which he might have 
participated. 29 
If this theory were true, the conclusion that no one should ever be 
held responsible for anything would certainly follow. Because 
excellent treatments of the deterministic theory abound, the following 
points will suffice for our purposes. 
1. If determinism were true, it would follow that no one should ever 
be rewarded for his good deeds, as well as that no one should ever be 
punished for his evil deeds. People should not be held responsible for 
their behaviour, whether it is admirable or totally abominable. 
2. If the advocates of determinism were consistent, they would have 
to admit that it is not appropriate to blame the judges and other officers 
of the state for punishing the criminals who came their way. For the 
actions of the judges and the jailers and the executioners are as much 
the inevitable outcome of their genetic heritage and upbringing as the 
"Madden, E. Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, C. C. Thomas, 1968, pp. 187- 
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criminal behaviour of their victims is of theirs. But determinists 
generally tend to condemn the behaviour of judges and other officers 
of the state. If the criminal cannot help fulfilling his destiny, the jailer 
and the executioner cannot help fulfilling theirs. A fully consistent 
determinist would have to refrain from criticism of political leaders, 
even when the latter plunge their nation's into unjust wars. But those 
who advocate merciful treatment of criminals on deterministic grounds 
are often merciless in their denunciations of presidents, secretaries of 
state, and secretaries of defense. 3ß 
3. If determinism were true, the statements made by determinists 
would actually not be statements at all. If a statement is merely a 
automatic product of a long sequence of events, it is not an intelligent 
statement, but merely another event, a brute fact. If strict determinism 
were true, the statement made by determinists would be such brute 
facts and would have no more meaning than the exclamations of 
parrots and the grunts of hogs. Determinism, too, would merely 
be 
fulfilling their destiny by uttering their so-called theories (how can a 




would no more be entitled to be heeded than would a parrot trained to 
utter the same sounds. Indeed, it would make no sense to speak of 
heeding the determinist, because, according to his own theory, 
everyone does what he is programmed to do anyway. 
2.3.2. All Criminals are Sick. 
One often hears that all criminals are sick and that instead of 
subjecting them to the brutal treatment that is entailed in punishment, 
whatever form that might take, a civilised society ought to provide 
some form of treatment for them as it does for all its sick and disabled 
members. The criminal, it is said, is unable to do other than he does. 
He is the unfortunate victim of the heredity with which he was 
endowed and the environment into which he was thrust. He chose 
neither. Yet both his heredity and his environment have made him 
what he is. If only he had been raised in other circumstances, he would 
not have become what he did infact become. If only he had been born 
to parents other than his own, or if only the chromosomes that made 
up the germ plasm from which he came had had slightly different 
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genetic coding, he would have been a very different kind of person 
from the one that he is today. He is much the master of his own actions 
as the epileptic is of his when he trashes about in a grand mal 
seizure. It makes as much sense to punish the murderer as it does to 
punish the epileptic or the insane; and, indeed, it was not so very long 
ago that the latter were treated much as the criminal is treated today. 
Samuel Butler, in his remarkable novel Erehwon, pictured a society 
where criminals were provided with special hospitals where they might 
be treated, but persons suffering from various forms of illness were 
hauled into court and subjected to increasingly severe penalties, 
according to the severity of their illness. Thus, for a common cold, a 
man might be required to pay only a moderate fine, but for pneumonia 
he might be sentenced to several years in prison. The burglar, the 
rapist, and the arsonist, however, were given the benefit of the latest 
medical advances and once their treatments were completed they were 
sent on their way, because they were cured. 
Butler's point is obvious. He is suggesting that there is no significant 
difference between the kinds of conditions that we call illness and the 
kinds that we call criminal behaviour, and that the form of treatment 
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accorded to each ought to be similar. He suggests that it is no more 
sensible to subject a burglar to fines or prison sentences than it would 
be to subject persons suffering from gout to such treatment. Thus, for 
example, John Hospers, after describing an incident in which a 
woman refused to do what was necessary to save the life of her child 
until it was too late, concludes: 
c 
"Was she responsible for her deed? In ordinary life, after making a 
mistake, we say, `Chalk it up to experience. ' Here we should say, 
chalk it up to the neurosis. ' She could not help it if her neurosis forced 
her act this way - she didn't even know what was going on behind the 
scenes, her conscious self merely acted out its assigned part. This is 
far more true than is generally realized: criminal actions in general are 
not actions for which their agents are responsible; the agents are 
passive, not active - they are victims of a neurotic conflict. Their very 
hyperactivity is unconsciously determined. "31 
Hospers goes on to explain that this is not to say that society should 
punish criminals. He explains that for societys own protection, it must 
31 Hospers, J. "Free will and Psychoanalysis, " in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 1950. 
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remove them from societys midst so that they can no longer molest and 
endanger organised society. But such means of self-defense are not 
quite what is meant by punishment. They are a form of preventive 
detention. The criminal is not punished for his crime, under this 
scheme, but for the danger he poses to society. In this respect, his 
treatment does not differ at all from the detention enforced upon the 
epileptic in our earlier example, or from the victim of tuberculosis, 
who can legally be required to be hospitalised and quarantined until all 
danger of infection has been eliminated. 
This theory, that all criminals are sick, sounds suspiciously as though 
it might be guilty of begging the question. What definition of sickness 
entitles one to claim that criminal behaviour is necessarily 
symptomatic of some form of illness? Is it not possible that some 
criminals are actually quite in possession of all their faculties, but that, 
unlike most persons, they have chosen to achieve their ends by illegal 
means rather than by the conventional, legal means that most persons 
use? In another mock case. 
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The Man who Blew Up His Mother 
A young man once purchased a large insurance policy on his 
mother's life just before she boarded an airliner that was about to 
depart from Denver's airport. He had previously placed a bomb in 
one of her suitcases. The bomb exploded, causing the plane to crash, 
killing its entire crew and all its passengers, including the young 
man's mother. He collected the insurance money, but as a result of 
a careful investigation, he was finally apprehended. Many people are 
inclined to believe that no one who is in full possession of his 
faculties, and who is not seriously deranged, would be capable of 
such monstrous crime. But the psychiatrist who was assigned to the 
case concluded that the defendant knew perfectly well what he was 
doing, that he planned and executed his scheme as carefully as any 
merchant might have done if he were embarked on a major business 
enterprise, and that it was impossible to diagnose any particular 
mental illness as being responsible for his bizarre behaviour. The 
defendant was accordingly found guilty and was executed in 
Colorado's gas chamber. 
Those who say that all criminals are sick often have in mind those 
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offenders who have engaged in the most brutal forms of crime - rape, 
armed robbery, murder, and the like. There is little reason to doubt 
that some people who commit such crimes are sick. Some of them are 
subject to uncontrollable fits of rage and passion, others are known to 
be subject to delusions and hallucinations. Whether the usual 
procedures of the criminal law should be brought to bear upon such 
persons, and whether they should be subject to punishment in the usual 
sense, has been discussed previously. But the proponents of the 
theory now under discussion tend to forget another very important 
class of criminals - those who clearly do not act in fits of passion, but 
with due deliberation, carefully and methodically working out their 
plans of action, sometimes alone, but often in concert with others. 
Their motives are frequently the same as those of perfectly normal 
persons. They want the better things in life; they want the leisure to 
enjoy the benefits of their prosperity; they want to provide their 
families with nice homes, nice clothes, and the little amenities that our 
society provides and that most people consider to be good and 
desirable. The manner in which they attempt to achieve those goals, 
however, is not legal. Ordinarily, those who engage in such illegal 
activities do so with the hope that they will not be caught. 
They are 
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often quite clear-headed about the entire business. They seldom 
become involved because of paranoid delusions or schizophrenic 
flights from reality. And interestingly enough, they seldom receive the 
attention of the press or become the objects of campaigns of citizens 
demanding that they be considered the unfortunate victims of 
circumstances. Consider the embezzler, for example, and the 
businessman who is convicted of income tax evasion. Consider also 
the corporation executive who engages in illegal restraint of trade or 
monopolistic practices, and the food processor who allows his 
products to become contaminated. And finally, consider the logger 
who deliberately encroaches upon national park land, felling trees that 
will not be replaced for generations, if ever; and the operator of a steel 
mill who knows that his smokestacks and the sewer lines of his plant 
are pouring out effluents that are poisoning the atmosphere and the 
water supplies of the town down-river. If these persons were called 
to account for their lawless behaviour, for their callous disregard of 
the public welfare and their duties as citizens, and for their unjust 
encroachments upon the property of the state and their depredations 
against their fellow citizens, it is unlikely that those who argue so 
vehemently on behalf of the rights of murderers and rapists would form 
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committees to secure lesser penalties for these businessmen; and it is 
even less likely that they would urge the public to think of these men 
as the victims of their genetic heritage and their environment, or that 
they would plead that they were unable to choose to do other than 
they did and that they should therefore be given medical treatment 
rather than the full penalties prescribed by law. 
Those who urge that criminal punishment be abandoned in favour of 
some form of medical treatment tend to forget about such crimes as 
fraud, forgery, counterfeiting, perjury, bribery, graft, corruption of 
public officials, and contempt. It is difficult to see how a case be made 
for the view that such crimes are exclusively the products of diseased 
minds or of persons who are incapable of behaving other than they do. 
The con artist who sets up an elaborate plot to persuade an old widow 
to hand over to him her life's savings acts with as much deliberation 
and foresight as the scientist who sets up a new experiment in his 
laboratory, the public official who plans a new election campaign, the 
sales manager of a large firm who sets up an elaborate advertising 




The laws governing pleas of insanity are among the most seriously 
disputed of all. According to the M'Naghten Rules, which still govern 
many cases, insanity is defined as a state in which, if true, would 
relieve him of responsibility, or is so deranged that the commission of 
his act is the natural consequences of his delusion. When any of these 
conditions is present, the perpetrator of the act is regarded as insane 
and is not criminally responsible. In some jurisdictions, the Durham 
Rule, which provides that the accused is not criminally responsible if 
his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or mental defect, 
has been adopted. 32 
Under the older and more widely accepted M'Naghten Rules, the jury 
had the onerous task of determining whether the accused was capable 
of distinguishing right from wrong at the time he committed the act in 
question. Under the Durham Rule, the existence of a state of mental 
disease or mental defect at the time of the crime is treated as an 
objective fact upon which expert testimony can be given. 
32 Mueller, S. O. Crime, Law, and the Scholars, Univ. of Washington, 1969. 
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In spite of the liberalization of the rule governing the definition of 
insanity, relatively few cases end with a verdict of insanity. Not the 
least of the reasons is the confusion of the experts themselves. For 
every psychiatrist that the defense is able to produce, the prosecutions 
is able to produce twenty who are prepared to testify that the 
defendant may be malingering, feigning mental illness. And finally, 
there is the utter absurdity of the views of some of the psychiatrists 
who are called upon to testify in criminal trials. For example, one 
noted psychiatrist, explaining why prostitutes steal money from their 
clients, offered the following explanation: "A prostitute is by the 
nature of her occupation a robber of men's strength. She steals their 
virility. Unconsciously, therefore, she seeks continuously to carry out 
this robbery of men, though in another form. " He called this form of 
larceny a "castration complex. " One critic wondered whether the 
explanation might be somewhat simpler. Perhaps, he said, prostitutes 
take money from the pockets of their clients because they like 
money! 33 




man who pleaded guilty to a charge of indecent assault. He testified 
that the lad had defective eyesight, and that this handicap was the 
cause of certain emotional disturbances which were the real cause of 
the man's behaviour. The psychiatrist advised the court that what the 
prisoner really needed was not punishment for the crime of rape, but 
a new pair of eyeglasses! 
Such ludicrous opinions scarcely serve the interests either of 
defendants or of justice. They do serve to indicate how far the 
practitioners of psychiatry may really be from having any scientific 
justification for being given the last word on the dispensation of 
criminal justice. This is not intended to deny the importance of 
psychiatric testimony in some cases. It is merely to suggest that we are 
a very long way indeed from the day when we should be prepared 
uncritically to accept any psychiatrist's claim that all criminals are so 
ill at the time when they commit their crimes as to deserve to be 
declared innocent by reason of insanity. 
Nevertheless, there are cases in which the accused are clearly 
suffering from serious mental diseases which so impair their judgement 
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or functioning as to render them totally incapable of making reasoned 
decisions or of behaving in any way other than in a violent and 
destructive one. Such persons should not be punished for their acts, 
for the latter are as little responsible for their acts as they would have 
been if they had occurred by accident or by mistake. The most serious 
problem is the difficulty of proof. How does one distinguish between 
a person who has suffered from an irresistible impulse and one who 
has simply not resisted the impulse that he had? There are cases where 
the evidence is so strong that it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that the defendant could have acted other than he did. From the 
existence of doubtful cases, one should not conclude that there are no 
meaningful criteria for distinguishing between situations where the 
defendant is lying or malingering and those where he is not. Clearly, 
much work remains to be done in this area. It will not do, however, to 
conclude out of hand either that all persons who have committed 
criminal acts are criminally responsible or that none of them are. 
2.4. Imprisonment 
From the early Middle Ages until relatively modern times, punishment 
was as much for the salvation of the sinner's soul as 
it was for the 
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protection of the innocent and the deterrence of crime. If nothing else 
would bring the sinner to cry out to his Lord for mercy, the lash, the 
rack, the gallows, or the flames could be counted upon to convince him 
to do so. 34 
Some groups of Puritans concluded that a long stretch of absolute 
silence, combined with isolation, the stench of human excreta, vermin, 
and a starvation diet would encourage those who did the work of Satan 
to repent. Thus, for the glory of God, they built sanctuaries of 
penitence which were called, appropriately, penitentiaries. 35 
In the late eighteenth century, and on into the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, movements for prison reform have been a constant feature 
of the social and political scene in England and in North America. The 
argument has generally centered upon the wisdom of coddling 
criminals by allowing them to live in quarters that had at least minimal 
3a Conrad, J. Crime and its Correction, Univ. of California, 1965, p. 203. 
35 ibid 
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standards of hygiene and comfort. At times, too, the debate has been 
devoted to the question of the kind of treatment that ought to be 
accorded prisoners in the penitentiaries. Should they be forced to 
engage in hard labour, labour that was basically useless, serving no 
function other than its supposed "softening" effect upon the criminals 
themselves? The inmates of some prisons have been forced to work at 
splitting rocks, forever having to start a new pile when the old one was 
depleted. Others have had to walk treadmills or turn cranks that merely 
plowed through piles of sand - backbreaking, degrading, 
dehumanising labour. 
In some prisons, inmates were confined in long rows of steel cages. 
They were cut off, not only from the rest of humanity, but even from 
the world of nature. In some prisons the sanitation was so primitive 
that disease was rampant, sometimes spreading to the general 
community through delivery men, visitors, and released prisoners. The 
sanitation system consisted of buckets and were left in each cell. These 
were emptied by the prisoners once a day into open holes or trenches 
that carried the waste out, whenever they were not blocked. 36 
36 ibid. p. 265. 
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Over the years, reformers have managed to overcome some these 
Christian sentiments, and have brought some measure of humanity to 
the administration of a few prisons. The addition of medical treatment 
for the sick, wholesome food, opportunities for education, libraries, 
meaningful work, and counselling services have done much to alleviate 
the suffering of hundreds of thousands of men and women who are 
consigned to spend years in penal institutions. 37 
Nevertheless, there remain many vestiges of the primitive and 
barbaric prisons of the eighteenth century. In the United States a third 
of all prisons in use were built in the last century, more than seventy 
years ago. Those that are in use sometimes house two, three, or even 
four times as many prisoners as they were built to accommodate. 
Small cells became crowded dormitories. Experiments have repeatedly 
demonstrated that rats forced to live in overcrowded conditions go 
mad, becoming vicious and destructive and exhibiting the symptoms 
of schizophrenia. The same thing happens to men, but the lessons 
seems to have made no difference in prison architecture or in the 
budgets allotted by state legislatures to the penal system. Nor has 
17 Lindner, R. M. Stone Walls and Men, Doubleday, 1958, p. 67. 
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knowledge of this fact had much effect upon the thought of those who 
continue to believe that prison sentences are suitable penalties to inflict 
upon men who have committed crimes against society. 
When a man is sent to prison, what is the penalty that is being imposed 
upon him? Clearly, it must be the deprivation of the liberties that are 
taken away from him. He is taken away from his wife, from his 
parents, from his children. He is deprived of every opportunity to 
engage in useful work. He is unnaturally deprived of every possible 
normal outlet for his sexual impulses, and is thus left with no 
alternative but homosexual relations and masturbation to relieve 
himself of the agony of sexual starvation. He cannot choose his own 
associates, but must live in close quarters with every manner of 
derelict. His conversation may be confined to talk about sex, crime, 
and money, for lack of anyone with whom to discuss other topics. He 
may be subjected to sexual assaults by fellow inmates, to physical 
assaults by inmates or guards, and to a constant psychological 
conditioning that renders him outwardly subservient and dependent 
while he rages inside. After several years of such torment, he is 
supposed to emerge from his cell a grateful member of the society 
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which condemned him to it. It is hardly surprising that of every 
thousand persons in maximum security prisons in Canada, five either 
commit suicide or attempt to do so. This nearly five times the rate for 
all Canadians. 3ß 
When he comes out, his job is gone, his wife may be gone, his family 
life is destroyed. He must learn to be independent again, to find his 
own way, to make his own meals, to find gainful employment and to 
stay out of trouble. But his criminal record follows him everywhere, 
making it impossible in most instances to find a decent job. Try as he 
may, he may not be able to find an employer who is willing to hire an 
ex-con, to trust him with his goods or to give him access to his money. 
How, then, is it possible that people are surprised when they read the 
sorry statistics that reveal that more then half of all the men and 
women released from prison are back again within five years? These 
are the ex-prisoners who are caught and convicted! No one knows how 
many are not, though they too may have returned to a life of crime 
because nothing else was open to them. 39 
38 Morris, P. Prisoners and their Families, George Allen Unwin, 1965. pp. 34-67. 
" ibid. 
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In spite of the efforts of some foresighted penologists, too many 
institutions today are still too small, too crowded, and too backward 
in their treatment of the criminal offender. Though they claim to be 
principally interested in reform, they still function as if they were 
primarily interested in vengeance. Clearly, when a man's is condemned 
to a prison sentence, his punishment is the deprivation of liberty itself. 
The prison is not a place which is supposed to add to this most 
fundamental deprivation by degrading him and de-humanising him and 
taking away every vestige of human dignity that is left to him. To pile 
punishment upon punishment day after day is neither humane nor 
civilised. Many prisons are no better than the old slave ships, though 
if anyone were to propose that the latter be returned to service, an 
outraged howl of protest would immediately - and rightly - be raised. 
No one who has ever read an account of a Siberian prison camp 
written by a former inmate would suppose that it is a civilised form of 
penal institution. It is cruel and inhuman. But in some respects, it is 
superior to the American prison. For one thing, convicts sent to Siberia 
are frequently allowed to bring their wives along, so that they are able 
to maintain some degree of sexual normalcy in their lives and are not 
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completely separated from their families. 4o 
In a few parts of the United States, arrangements are made for prison 
inmates to spend some time alone with their wives. Parcham Prison in 
Mississippi, for example, has cottages on the prison grounds that 
married men may occupy on weekends with their wives. In this way, 
the men are able to maintain some semblance of a normal sex life, and 
their wives are able to do so as well, without resorting to adultery or 
divorce. But such facilities are available to a very small percentage of 
all the prison inmates in the United States. 41 
In a few institutions, weekend passes are available; in others, it is 
possible for inmates who are nearing the end of their terms to work on 
the outside, returning to the institution at night and on weekends . 
Thus, 
the men begin their rehabilitation before they leave their prison cells 
for good. Elsewhere, there are halfway houses or other rehabilitation 
centres that devote their efforts to making the transition from prison 
life to life outside the prison walls a little easier. 42 
4' Glueck, S. Crime and Correction, Cambridge, Mass. 1952. pp. 97- 105. 
41 ibid p. 89. 
42 Lindner, op-cit. 
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It must be pointed out once again that one ought not to confuse 
rehabilitation with punishment, at least from a purely philosophical 
point of view. Nevertheless, if one is concerned about the long -run 
results of the penal system and its moral justifications, then one must 
consider both the effects that imprisonment has upon the prison 
population and the extent to which prison conditions are degrading and 
dehumanising to those persons who are subjected to them. 
Vocational training, an important aspect of the rehabilitation work of 
any modem prison, is often handicapped by lack of skilled instructors 
and even more by opposition from unions and industries who object to 
competition from prison labourers. More than one farsighted project 
has been scuttled by just such opposition on the part of powerful 
forces within the community. 43 
Mental health services, so obviously important to any meaningful 
rehabilitation of that very large proportion of prison inmates who are 
mentally ill, are quite minimal. It is not likely that they will be 
improved significantly, in view of the extreme shortage of trained 
43 Conrad, op. cit. 
70 
personnel and the general unwillingness of lawmakers to allocate large 
sums of money to such programs. 44 
Most personnel in these systems (some 80% in the United States) are 
concerned solely with custodial duties. 45 In short, they are guards and 
maintenance personnel who supervise the prisoners while they are in 
custody. The remainder perform the many other tasks that make the 
penal system, including the so-called rehabilitative tasks, parole 
supervision, and the like. Because there are so few of them, and 
because they must supervise such large numbers of prisoners or 
parolees, it is impossible for them to give meaningful attention to any 
of the convicts who come under their jurisdiction. When they are 
saddled with a myriad of other tasks in addition, it becomes all but 
impossible for them to do more than give token attention to the 
rehabilitation of the men and women whom they are supposed to help. 
The so-called rehabilitative function of the prison system is, for the 
most part, purely fictitious. Prisons breed contempt for the entire legal 
a4 Glueck, op. cit. 
45 ibid 
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system in the minds of those who must serve time in them. When a 
man is sent to jail, he knows as well as anyone that he is being sent 
there not because society is genuinely interested in making him a 
better man, in giving him a new opportunity to remake his life, but 
because society wants to punish him for a crime that he has been found 
guilty of having committed. He knows as well as anyone that his 
punishment is to consist of a multitude of deprivations. But no one can 
ever anticipate the genuine reality of prison life unless he has to live 
through it himself Far from being the hotel that so many conservative 
critics say it is, even the most modern prison facility is still a 
penitentiary -a place where men are supposed to repent but where 
instead they learn more about techniques of crime as they are 
brutalised and degraded by the institution. If education consists at least 
partially of character building, then prisons must be considered 
antieducational institutions, because they serve so often to destroy 
character and to instil hatred, anger, and brutality in those who enter 
them. 
Some contemporary reformers argue in favour of the indeterminate 
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sentence. 46 By setting up an upper limit, they believe that the judge is 
able to permit the introduction of a degree of flexibility into the penal 
system that ultimately will result in better administration of justice and 
better treatment of the offender; for the latter will be able to win his 
release much earlier by cooperation with the authorities. There is some 
reason to doubt, however, whether placing such power in the hands of 
prison officials or parole boards is necessarily beneficial. How is the 
system improved if the sentencing is done, in effect, by a prison 
official or a parole board, rather than a judge? Will they have 
meaningful information on the chances of a particular prisoner's 
returning to a life of crime that the judge does not possess? Are they 
more or less likely to be influenced in their decisions by such 
considerations as the administrative burden of maintaining an 
overcrowded prison facility, or by personal whims and prejudices? 
How meaningful can such a proposal be when one of the strongest 
advocates of the indeterminate sentence admits that the cunning of 
some prisoners is such that even the most skilled professional prison 
officials can be fooled by them? In the next breath he admits that we 
know most prisoners who are released will commit more crimes. 
46 Thomas, D. A. Principles of Sentencing, Heineman, 1970, p. 165. 
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The prisons, as it exists in the modern democracies, is an archaic relic 
of an outmoded and cruel religious and social ethic. The thesis that 
life in prison is somehow a more desirable fate than death in the gas 
chamber is dubious at best. Most penal institutions are inhumane 
places where men are deprived, not only of their liberties, but even of 
such elementary rights as will enable them to preserve their human 
dignity. Prisoners may be stripped of their rights as citizens, including 
the right to return to the practice of their occupations, once they have 
paid their debts to society. How, then, have they been helped along the 
way to repentance or atonement? 
One common rejoiner is this: no one is to blame but the criminal 
himself He knew the price of his misbehaviour before he misbehaved. 
It was his own mischief that brought this fate down upon him. Now let 
him suffer the consequences. 
But this answer is too facile. It will not do under the reformative 
theory, under the rehablitative theory, or for that matter, even under the 
deterrent theory. If the aim of punishment is reform or (as some people 
incorrectly suppose) rehabilitation, then clearly a form of treatment 
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that demonstrably fails to perform either function can hardly be 
appropriate for such functions. As for deterrence, one would hope not 
only that other potential criminals would be deterred from further 
offenses. Any treatment that actually increases both the number and 
the quality of offenses (as the school of criminals manifestly does) can 
hardly serve as a model of deterrence. When even the men who have 
been to prison are not deterred by the fear of being returned there from 
committing further crimes, one may suspect that its deterrent effects on 
others may be quite minimal. 
As for the retributive theory, there is nothing in the theory itself that 
would justify such cruel and unrelenting forms of punishment. A 
retributivist can quite properly advocate the death penalty, but insist 
that prison is too cruel and inhuman to be tolerated in a civilised 
society. He might add the observation that under his theory, if a man 
has been punished for his crime once, there is no justification for 
punishing him further. If a man has been deprived of all his liberties for 
a period of time, it is unjust to deprive him of anything, including any 
of the rights he might have enjoyed in society if he had never been 
convicted of a crime, once he has been punished. Having paid his debt, 
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he should not be asked to continue to pay. The exaction of interest 
upon such a debt is the worst of usury imaginable. 
During the Middle Ages, men and women were sometimes "immured" 
as a form of punishment for the worst sorts of crimes. They were 
forced to stand in a given spot, and a brick wall was then built all 
around them. Once the last brick was laid in place, it was not long 
before they would die of suffocation - or, if the wall was not airtight, 
of thirst and starvation. Prisons, however, were unknown, except for 
certain relatively small institutions that were used for the incarceration 
of suspects and criminals prior to their trials and executions. In ancient 
times, prisons were used on occasion, as we can see in the Biblical 
story of Joseph, but those occasions seem to have been quite rare. The 
ancestors of many races generally executed criminals, mutilated them, 
or lashed them and sent them home. They sometimes sent them off to 
exile or enslaved them. According to the Talmud, in ancient Israel, 
when a man was convicted of a noncapital crime, he was fined or 
flogged if the law called for that kind of punishment. Otherwise, he 
was sold into slavery for a period not to exceed six years. 
During that 
six-year period, he was permitted to engage in any occupation that was 
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suitable to his station in life prior to his conviction. If he were a 
physician, for example, he might continue to practice medicine. If he 
were a skilled labourer, he would continue to do the kind of work that 
he was trained to do, and all of his earnings would go to the family of 
the person who had been harmed by his violation of the law. No one, 
however, could be sent to prison, or stripped of his dignity as a human 
being. In some Scandinavian countries, men convicted of criminal 
offenses are permitted to return to their families and to do their jobs, 
unless they are deemed to be too dangerous to themselves or to others 
that they must be institutionalised, but a portion of their earnings is 
turned over to the victims of their crimes. Thus, the offender is not 
required to pay his debt to society by being deprived of rights or 
liberties. Instead, he must literally pay the debt he owes to the person 
whose rights he violated. He must compensate him for the harm he has 
done. Compensation is not punishment, though the two bear some 
resemblances to one another. If one is prepared to give up punishment 
altogether, for some crimes, at least, then some 
form enforced 
compensation would seem to be a reasonable substitute. 
It is certainly 
less damaging to the offender and his family, and thus to society, in the 
long run, than the prison system with all its manifest evils. 
And it has 
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the further advantage that those who are hurt most by the criminal's 
behaviour - his victims and their families - are compensated, to some 
extent, at least, for the losses they have suffered. The criminal whose 
life is wasted away in prison can contribute nothing to the alleviation 
of the suffering of his victims. Instead, suffering is added to suffering 
with no evident advantage to society, which not only loses a 
potentially productive member, but must provide for all his needs in an 
expensive custodial institution, and then suffer from his further 
offenses once he is released. It is difficult to conceive of a form of 
punishment that has more disadvantages - socially, economically, and 





THE DEATH PENALTY THROUGH HUMAN HISTORY 
The idea of the death penalty is of recent development. There is no 
explicit mention of the death penalty in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle, nor does this concept appear anywhere in the ancient 
records, in the philosophy and religion of India, Persia, Rome, or other 
early civilizations. What is now called "the death penalty" was 
referred to by primitive societies and people in the Middle Ages as 
"vengeance". The classical 17th and 18th century's concept of the 
death penalty traced its legal lineage to the doctrine of retaliation, the 
intellectual origins of which are rooted in Hammurabi's criminal code, 
and later, in the moral teachings of the three major religions; Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam. This chapter will trace the concept of the death 
penalty through human history. It will also present the contemporary 
arguments for and against the death penalty. 
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3.1. The Death Penalty in Early Civilizations 
Before starting to trace the concept of the death penalty, there is a 
need to first understand the meaning of the death penalty. According 
to the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, "death 
penalty" means "the officially authorized execution of the death 
penalty on persons determined by appropriate legal procedures to 
have committed a criminal offence". 47 
The idea of legal procedures governing human relations in society 
exerted considerable influence on social thinkers from ancient history 
to the Christian era. Scholars believed that the "law" was that which 
everyone was aware of, and through which everyone became 
conscious within himself of what was right and wrong. However, 
because of the absence of an established order of the law, people 
usually took the law in their own hands. Indeed, historical records 
show that man's first drive was to punish his enemies through the 
infliction of retaliatory measures. This was the norm in primitive 
societies. 
47 International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 1 &2, Macmillan, pp. 
290 
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In primitive and savage societies, revenge was the only way to get 
even with the offender, and it was done individually. Later on, men 
lived as collective groups (many families) together, but separate from 
the other groups. Consequently, any attack on any member of any 
specific group was considered an attack on the entire group. All 
members of that group would assist its wronged member against the 
outsider. Thus, the concept of revenge changed from individual 
revenge to collective revenge. This sort of action "contain [ed] a rough 
notion of justice, " and sent a clear message that "no one can intrude 
upon the rights of another suffering the consequences. "48 It was out 
of these feeling of revenge that the idea of justice by a community 
emerged, and it has become "the specific form of punishment to which 
[society] lends its sanction or its aid. "49 
Indeed, the purpose of community justice in primitive societies was to 
make the wrongdoers pay for their crimes. "The lex _talionis; or 
principle of equivalence in punishment ... 
is found in the idea of life 
for life, wound for wound, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. "50 The natural 




tendency was to establish order and to create an atmosphere of equity 
which developed into the law "an eye for an eye" or "wergeld. " 
Indeed, blood-revenge for murder was considered as a sacred and 
moral duty, which it [was] disgraceful and irreligious to avoid. Besides 
revenge, there was the concept of blood-money, in which the offender 
paid money to the victim's family. This method originated in the 
custom of paying blood-money to the relatives of a murdered man. s1 
3.1.1. Hammurabic 
While the execution of justice among primitive societies was left 
largely to the individual or to his family to deal with, the execution of 
justice during Hammurabi's regime was unified and centralized. In the 
year 2,250 BC, Hammurabi established codes of civil and criminal 
laws. Such laws were allegedly the first attempts at legal codification 
on a multinational level. Within the Babylonian Empire were the 
Elamites, Canaanites, Chaldeans, Persians, Amorites, Arabians, and 
Armenians. Each nation had its own specific customs and traditions. 
Controlling such a diversity of cultures and peoples together under one 
51 ibid, p. 252. 
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central government and one legal system was but the genius of the 
Babylonian legislator. Thus, the codes of Hammurabi applied the death 
penalty to various offenses ranging from the safety and the integrity of 
a man, such as false accusation of killing and false accusation of 
sorcery, the property of a man, such as theft, house breaking ... and 
assisting a palace slave to escape. Furthermore, there were other 
offenses punishable by death, such as a soldier hired a substitute, and 
infidelity and incest. 52 
3.1.2. Greco-Roman 
According to the most important literary records, early Greek law 
shows that retaliation was the norm and many crimes continued to be 
treated as in primitive communities, as wrongful acts done to an 
individual, for which he was entitled to claim compensation. 
However, later on, a new religious influence had grown up, strong 
enough to modify completely the Greek conception of murder. 53 
52 ibid. P. 273. 
53 ibid. p. 274. 
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Consequently, execution of justice was no longer in the hands of the 
individual avenger, but was prescribed by the state, and the death 
penalty became a part of Greek law. One can say the same thing about 
Roman Law. 
Early Roman law reveals the same attitude as held by the ancient 
Greeks toward crime in general and murder in particular. Criminals 
were "left to the vengeance of heaven. "54 Like Greek law, Roman 
criminal law evolved from single-family to tribal, and from tribal to 
state. Thus, "the state recognizes as offenses against itself only a few 
acts--treason, aggravated murder, arson, theft of grain from the soil, 
lampooning, and possibly false witness. "55 
According to the "Code of Decemvirs known as the `Twelve 
Tables"' (450 BC), these offenses carried the death penalty. But unlike 
Greek law, the Roman legal system guaranteed to criminals the right 
of appeal. During the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ, the 
death penalty was hardly ever exacted, but later on, the execution of 
54 ibid. p. 296 
ss ibid. p. 296 
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criminals was a frequent occurrence. Indeed, in the first two centuries 
the death penalty became more and more common, and the number of 
offenses to which [it was] allotted was continually increased. 56 
Likewise the methods of punishment also changed. The old method 
was that the criminal was usually beheaded. Later on, they used new 
methods, such as crucifixion, starvation, or burning, and the most 
common execution method was throwing the criminal into the arena to 
face "wild beasts. "57 
Before the fall of the Roman Empire, Christianity became the empire's 
religion. Thereafter, religion was no longer considered to be a private 
privilege, so Roman criminal law was expanded to include heresy as 
an offense punishable by death. In fact, the code of Theodosius (AD. 
438) specified over eight crimes punishable by death . 
Thus, many 
people accused of heresy were often condemned and punished by 
death. 
56 Ibid 
" ibid. P. 300 
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3.1.3. Judaic and Christianity 
After the Babylonian Empire disintegrated, the nations which had 
grown powerful under its protection continued to administer its laws. 
They exported them to the nations with which they came in contact, 
including those of the Semitic tribes. Canaan and all Western Asia 
were from an early period, dominated by Babylonia; the conquests of 
Saigon I of Akkad (c. 1700 BC ) extended to the Mediterranean, so that 
the institutions of Canaan were partly shaped by Babylonian 
influence. 58 
Moses, the leader of the Hebrew tribes in their exodus from Egypt, 
formulated a code of laws for his people, who were the descendants 
of Abraham, a Chaldean chieftain. Mosaic law reflected the theocratic 
nature of Hebrew society. All crimes were moral deviations and 
punishable only as transgressions against the will of God. The death 
penalty was widely employed. The Torah indicates that all crime was 
regarded as sin against God, and that the administration of justice 
rested on Divine authority. Moses selected what he regarded as the 
58 ibid p. 283 
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best of the laws of other nations, particularly the laws of Babylonia 
and E it. Like Hummurabi, who received his laws from the Sun-god, 
Shamash, Moses received his laws from God. Consequently, the 
actual legal system of Israel was regarded as a Divine institution. 59 
Before the discovery of Hammurabi's code of laws, the Mosaic laws 
of "life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for 
foot, burning for burning and stripe for stripe, "60 were accepted not 
only as divine laws delivered to Moses, but also as being without 
precedent. 
A comparison of the two codes of law shows many striking similarities 
between them. Hammurabi's law stated: "if a son strikes his father, his 
hand shall be cut off, if a man puts out the eye of another man, his eye 
shall be put out, if he breaks another man's bone, his bone shall be 
broken; and if a man knocks out the teeth of another man, an equal 
number shall be knocked out. "61 The death penalty, as it emerged in 
Judaism, presupposed a system of criminal law to prevent the 
repetition of the offense by other parties, and acted as a deterrent, and 
s9 ibid p. 282. 
60 Exod 11 21: 23-26. 
61 Encyclopaedia of the Religion and Ethics. p. 282 
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to secure the extinction of the crime itself and of its consequences: 
cc Thou shall put away the wrong from the midst' ; and all Israel shall 
hear and shall sin no more. "62 Thus, the Covenant code of the 
Hebrews not only did authorize the death penalty, but it specified the 
methods of execution: lapidation (stoning), burning, decapitation, 
strangulation, and crucifixion. The Torah also specifies the death 
penalty for offenses such as incest, sodomy, bestiality, blasphemy, 
idolatry, sorcery, Sabbath- breaking, the cursing of parents, 
intercourse with a betrothed virgin, the inviting of others to adultery, 
the perverting of a whole city, the practice of magic, rebellious son, 
murderers, a false prophet, and the bearing of false witness against 
a priest's daughter. 
Christianity tended to subsume crime under ecclesiastical law, treating 
sin and crimes as of the same nature and substance. Sexual offenses 
were severely punished. Although the martyrdoms that marked the 
early part of Christian history had left an abhorrence of such 
punishments as crucifixion and stoning, the church showed no aversion 
to execution by burning or decapitation. As might be expected, heresy 
62 ibid p. 282 
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ranked high on the list of crimes. 
The Bible also specifies the methods of execution for each crime. For 
example, in Leviticus 24: 16, we read: 
"And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put 
to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the 
stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth the name 
of the Lord, shall be put to death. " 
The death penalty is also specified for cursing one's parents and for 
adultery. 
" For every one that curseth his father or his mother shall be surely put 
to death: he hath cursed his father or his mother; his blood shall be 
upon him. " (Lev. 20: 9). 
"And the man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even 
he that committeth adultery with his neighbour's wife, the adulterer 
and the adulteress shall surely be put to death. "(Lev. 20: 10). 
89 
The Biblical view of the crime of murder is very clear. The Bible 
emphasizes the fact that any crime is a sin against God. No human 
legislature has any control over the subject in so far as the crime of 
murder was concerned, and the repeal of the law would be offensive 
to God and unsafe for the community. Christ spoke of hate and 
murder: "You have heard that it was said to the men of old, `you shall 
not kill; and whoever kills shall be liable to judgment [death penalty] .' 
But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be 
liable to judgment [death penalty]". 63 
It is obvious that Jesus was not condemning the established law 
concerning the death penalty, but was actually saying that hate 
deserves the death penalty. Certainly, one can draw the conclusion 
from this statement that God has ordained the infliction of the death 
penalty for murder; the murderer must receive the equivalent to his evil 
deed. The Bible says "whosoever strikes a man so that he dies shall 
be put to death ... 
If a man willfully attacks another to kill him 
treacherously, you shall take him from my altar that he may die. "64 In 
63 Matt. 5 : 21-22. 
64Exod 21: 12-14. 
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Leviticus 24: 17 we read, - "He who kills a man shall be put to death. " 
In another passage we read in more detail on the subject: "If any one 
kills a person, the murderer shall be put to death on the evidence of 
witnesses; but no person shall be put to death on the testimony of one 
witness. Moreover, you shall accept no ransom for the life of a 
murderer who is guilty of death; but he shall be put to death.... You 
shall not thus pollute the land in which you live; shed the blood for 
blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be made for the land, for 
blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of him who shed it. You 
shall not defile the land in which you live in, the midst of which I 
dwell; for I lord dwell in the midst of people of Israel. "65 (Compare 
Deut. 17: 6-7 and 19: 11-13. ) 
Indeed, this divine ordinance embraces all mankind, regardless of 
time, space, race or any other earthly consideration. The basis for 
this assumption is found in the Noahs Ark Covenant between Noah 
and Jehovah, following the flood, in which the Lord is recorded as 
having said: "And God went on to bless Noah and his sons and to say 
to them ... and, 
besides that, your blood of your souls shall I ask 
65 Numbers 35: 30-34. 
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back. From the hand of every living creature shall I ask it back; and 
from the hand of man, from the hand of each one who is his brother, 
shall I ask back the soul of man. Anyone shedding man's blood, by 
man will his own blood be shed, for in God's image he made man. "66 
In looking closely at the death penalty in both Judaism and 
Christianity, one finds that Christianity tends to be more lenient than 
Judaism. One needs to remember that Jesus Christ was a Jewish 
teacher who meant to mitigate the hardship of certain Mosaic laws as 
they were being interpreted in his time. In a dispute of a man 
dismissing his wife without recourse on her part, Jesus said: "For the 
hardness of your heart Moses imposed on you this commandment. "67 
In Matthew it is reported of Jesus: "You have heard that it was said, 
an eye for an eye, and a tooth for tooth; however, I say to you: Do not 
resist him that is wicked, but whoever slaps you on your right cheek, 
turn the other also to him. "68 Therefore, Jesus' intention was to 
mitigate the rigidity of the Mosaic laws of retaliation. Those would 
include the laws requiring punishment for injuries and the death 
penalty for homicide. 
66 Gen. 5: 6 
67 OT 24.1-4. 
68 Matt. 5.38-39. 
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3.1.4. Persian 
The criminal law of the ancient Persians was very lenient. Most of the 
crimes were punishable by a certain number of stripes. "The number 
of such stripes prescribed for different crimes ranges between five and 
ten thousand. "69 Although homicide was punishable by 90 stripes  
burying, burning, and eating of dead matter, and sodomy were 
punishable by the death penalty. 
3.1.5. Byzantine 
In contrast to the medieval West, where a relatively loose, atomized 
feudal system obtained, Byzantium, for most of the period, had a 
highly centralized state organization with a well-developed penal 
system--a type of government in which virtually all activities were at 
the command of the emperor. 
69 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, p. 294 
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Contrary to common belief, the evolution of Byzantine law did not 
cease with the reign of Justinian. Because of the great social changes 
which came about in the empire, the code of laws had to be modified 
and even expanded by the Macedonian dynasty in the 10th century, at 
which time all laws were systematically reshaped in Greek. 
In the early stages of the Byzantine Empire, the death penalty was 
widely practiced. Indeed, many capital crimes were treated as they had 
been in primitive societies--as wrongful acts done to an individual ý 
who was entitled to retaliation as well as compensation. Yet later on, 
the proscription of any crime, including homicide, was conducted by 
the state through the court system. Besides the death penalty for 
voluntary homicide, there was a new punishment for involuntary 
homicide. For example, "killing of a slave, a resident alien, or a 
foreigner 
... and a non-citizen" was punishable 
by banishment, a long 
period of exile. 70 
70 ibid p. 274. 
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3.1.6. Indian 
Crime, strictly speaking, is an offense against religion under Indian 
law. The purpose of punishment is to keep the whole world in order. 
Although compensation was the most common punishment, the death 
penalty in various aggravated forms, such as impaling on a stake, 
trampling to death by an elephant, burning, roasting, cutting to pieces, 
devouring by dogs, and mutilations, were also frequently inflicted, 
even for a comparatively light offence. 71 Killing a Brahman 
(clergyman) as well as the killing of a cow, the sacred animal of the 
Hindus, were punishable by death. 
3.1.7. Arab 
Retaliation and compensation for criminal acts were practiced by the 
Arabs during the pagan period. During that period, there was no 
central government or competent court to which an individual could 
resort in case of being ill-treated. Only those serious cases 
in which 
71 ibid. p. 284 
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clans were involved could be entertained by a sort of arbitrary council. 
The clan became the basic organ of society. Every tent represented a 
family. A number of clans grouped together composed a tribe. All 
members of each clan considered themselves as one brotherhood and 
submitted to the authority of one tribal chief. If a member of a clan, 
murdered another person within the clan, he would not be defended 
by his fellow clansmen. In case of escape, he became an outlaw. If a 
member committed a crime of murder outside the clan, everyone in the 
clan was morally and legally bound to defend that member even to the 
point of forfeiting his own life, without asking whether the accused 
was right or wrong. During the heathen period, according to Arabian 
customary law, the call for revenge was a conventional right. A blood- 
feud might last for decades. The conventional rules of the clan 
demanded limitless and unconditional loyalty to fellow clansmen. The 
revenge of the injured party or the members of his family or tribe 
extended not only to the guilty person who had killed or injured any 
one, but also to all who belonged to the same family or tribe. 
72 
There were no divine law and no codified rules to follow except the 
72 ibid. P. 290. 
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custom and the tradition of the society. Hence, among pre-Islamic 
Arabians, like many other primitive societies, their judgments were 
compatible with natural laws and human instinct. 
Pre-Islamic Arabians believed that the soul resided in the blood, and 
when death came the soul escaped through the mouth in the form of 
breath. In case of murder, the soul of the deceased was imagined to 
flutter around the tomb in the form of an owl crying with thirst. It 
would not cease doing this until vengeance or compensation took 
place. Blood-guiltiness was something bought off by means of great 
numbers of camels, but the acceptance of such a price of blood ( diya) 
was often regarded as a humiliation. " 
With the advent of Islam, the old system was subject to change, at 
least in principle and ideology. 74 As a religion, Islam appeared first in 
Makka, and remained there for 13 years, yet its legal system was not 
shaped until after the Prophet Muhammad's migration to Medina, as 
a religious and political leader, the Prophet had to determine his 
73 ibid pp. 290-291. 
74 Hitti, pp. 9-20. 
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position toward the established system of law and order. As he began 
to enforce the Islamic legal system, he accepted the status quo of 
prevailing customary law, at least in principle. At the same time, he 
introduced a number of modifications which thenceforth characterized 
the Islamic legal system. In Islam, therefore, retaliation remained 
permissible, though with important restrictions. The Justifiable 
institutions of the old penal system, such as retaliation (qisas) and 
compensation (diyah), were in any case adopted. When anyone kills 
a believer and the evidence is clear, he is liable to be killed in 
retaliation unless the representative of the murdered man is satisfied 
with a payment of diyah. The Holy Quran clearly supports this pre- 
Islamic method of punishment with its pecuniary indemnity. The Quran 
points out that life is absolutely sacred. It must not be destroyed by a 
believer deliberately, although it can sometimes happen on the part 
of a believer through error. When such unfortunate incidents take place 
in society, the family of the deceased is entitled to compensation 
unless they freely remit it. The Holy Quran reads: 
"Never should a believer kill a believer, but if it so happens by 
mistake, compensation is due; if one kills a believer, it is ordained that 
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he should free a believer slave and pay compensation to the deceased's 
family, unless they remit it freely. If the deceased belonged to a people 
at war with you and was a believer, the freeing of a believing slave is 
enough. If he belonged to a people with whom you have a treaty of 
mutual alliance, compensation should be paid to his family. A 
believing slave should also be freed. For those who find this beyond 
their means, a fast of two months is prescribed. "75 
Retaliation (qisas) has been divinely promulgated to the new Muslim 
society. The Holy Quran reads: - "0, ye who believe, the law of 
equality is prescribed to you in case of murder, the free[man] for the 
free [man], the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman. But if 
any remission is made by the brother of the slain. Then grant any 
reasonable demand and compensate him with handsome gratitude; this 
is a concession and a mercy for your Lord. After this, however, 
he who 
exceeds the limits shall be in grave penalty. "76 
75 Verse: 4: 92. 
76 Verse-. 2-178. 
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The Quran in the same chapter emphasizes the fact that "in the law of 
equality (qisas) there is saving of life to you, 0 ye men of 
understanding that ye may reatrain yourselves. " Obviously, the 
compensation (diyah) can only be paid if the deceased belongs to a 
Muslim society or to a non-Muslim society which is in peacful 
alliance with Muslim society. Also clear is that "redemption of the 
blood-feud" was permitted for Muslim, and the acceptance of the 
compensation instead of retaliation was made as a religious duty. 
While Islam used the concept of retaliation ( gisas) as a framework, 
it did not admit its details as it was applied in ancient Arabia. The 
words of the verses quoted above contain three important factors: 
First, the acceptance of the retaliation ( qisas) as a part of the Islamic 
penal system; second, the abrogation of unjust practices which 
prevailed in the pre- Islamic era, such as killing innocent people other 
than the murderer himself and the failure to take into consideration the 
motive of the offender, or the reasons for and circumstances in which 
the offense in question was committed. This is the first time that Arabs 
came to recognize that retaliation ( qisas refers to murder only and 
is not applicable to manslaughter due to mistake or accident. Prior to 
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the advent of Islam, any homicide was considered to be a murder. 
Vengeance on the offender and his kinsmen was exercised 
accordingly, regardless of any reasons or justifications. According to 
Islamic law, there would be no capital punishment; the compensation 
( diyah ) was applicable in its place. 
The third factor is that the quoted verses carry the spirit of 
reconciliation between the parties involved, as opposed to the then- 
prevailing custom in which everything, after the occurrence of murder, 
was calculated to escalate the enmity between the families involved. 
Thus, Islamic law abolished the old Arabian practice of the private 
vengeance of tribal retaliation. 
The law of retaliation ( qisas) under the Islamic legal system allows 
the aggrieved party to receive the right of private vengeance. 
Consequently, the life of the culprit can be saved as well, but only 
through the aggrieved party can the murderer's life be saved. Neither 
the judge nor the head of the state is allowed to entertain any 
intercession on behalf of the murderer or to alter or mitigate the 
divinely described punishment if the appeal does not come from the 
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victim's next of kin. All the rules and regulations concerning the legal 
punishment are written in the Holy Quran and are contained in the 
tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sunnah; both played a 
significant role in respect to the abolition of the institution of blood 
revenge. These two sources of Islamic law were able to eradicate the 
roots of the old Arabian customary law within less than 10 years, or at 
least to alter the values upon which such customary law was based. 
3.2. Contemporary Arguments For and Against the Death Penalty. 
Debate over the merits of the death penalty continues unabated. Many 
people argue whether their nation should or should not have the death 
penalty. Not surprisingly, a myriad of statistical, moral, religious, and 
ethical arguments characterise these debates. 
Proponents of the death penalty defend it for many reasons. One of the 
strongest arguments put forward by the proponents of the death 
penalty is that of deterrence (discouragement of others from doing the 
same thing). By imposing the death penalty, one can deter others from 
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committing any crime which has this extreme penalty as a sanction. If 
the perpetrators of homicide are executed, there will never be any risk 
that they will ever again be free to commit similar crimes. Proponents 
believe that the death penalty is a fitting punishment for murder, and 
executions maximise public safety through deterrence. 
Retribution is not be confused with a narrow concept of revenge. 
Retribution reflects society's determination to reject the kind of 
horrible crimes that necessitate the death penalty; it reflects society's 
determination simply not to tolerate these kinds of crimes. Proponents 
respond to the notion that the death penalty can be equated with the 
murders which it aims to punish by saying that. the death penalty is 
different from murder in that the person being executed committed a 
vicious crime, was tried and found guilty of it, and deserves to be 
punished. They also believe that the murderer preys upon the innocent 
people, and that the idea of any comparison between lawfully carried 
out execution, after a fair trial and appeal, and a murder committed by 
a criminal disputes the very foundations of a civilised society. 
In addition, the people who support the death penalty argue that there 
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is no evidence that shows that the penalty is not a deterrent. After all, 
rational men fear death more than anything else. Consequently, the use 
of the death penalty has a potentially greater general deterrent effect 
than any other punishment. It would be foolish to expect to find that 
punishment of any sort deters. The fact is, crime pays and criminals 
know it, and they act accordingly. 
Furthermore, the supporters of the death penalty, do not see it as a 
barbaric way to eliminate crimes. To them, the death penalty must be 
the only way to punish crimes of cold-blooded murder cases in which 
any other form of punishment would be inadequate and, therefore, 
unjust. Certainly, the death penalty strengthens the value of human life. 
Life is sacred, and the death penalty helps to affirm this fact. Many 
who support the death penalty offer many quotations from the Bible to 
prove that the death penalty is divinely prescribed. "Whoever strikes 
a man so that he dies shall be put to death.... If a man wilfully attacks 
another to kill him treacherously, You shall take him from my alter that 
he may die. "" Also, in another passage of the Bible, "He who kills a 
77 Exod. 21: 12,14 . 
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man shall be put to death. "" 
Finally, proponents believe that the death penalty does influence those 
who are rational enough to be influenced. They strongly believe that 
the death penalty has been very effective, precisely because very few 
murders are committed by rational persons. 
The opponents of the death penalty, on the other hand, reply that there 
is no evidence that the murder rate fluctuates according to the 
frequency with which the death penalty is used. They argue that there 
is not one bit of strong evidence that the death penalty deters capital 
crimes or any other crime, for that matter. The death penalty, 
according to them, is a vindictive hateful, irrational, and unfair 
response to the serious problem of crime in a free society. They also 
object that lex talionis (law of retaliation, or a life for a life) is not a 
sound principle of criminal justice. 
The basic arguments of death penalty opponents is that justice 
demands that murderers must be punished and common sense demands 
'g Leviticus 24: 7. 
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that society must be protected from them. But neither justice nor self- 
preservation demands that we must kill them. Opponents claim that the 
death penalty is barbaric; they cite many tales of lingering death upon 
hanging at the gallows, of faulty electric chairs, or of agony in the gas 
chamber. Furthermore, they argue that an innocent person might be 
executed by mistake, and they say that history is full of examples of 
innocent persons falsely condemned and sentenced to death. Judeo- 
Christian history affirms that for the state to assume the power of 
absolute judgement is to assume a power that belongs only to God. 
The risk of executing innocent persons is simply not worth taking, 
because the death penalty is not the only punishment available for 
violent crime. 
Furthermore, another issue that concerns death penalty opponents is 
that of the value of life. The death penalty, to them, cheapens the value 
of human life. They are especially concerned with what the death 
penalty does to a society that inflicts it. In denying the humanity of 
those that society put to death, even those guilty of the most terrible 
crimes, society denies its own humanity and life is further cheapened. 
Nothing good is achieved by taking one more life or adding one more 
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victim. By inflicting the death penalty, society sinks to the same level 
of violence and cruelty which it rejects in criminal behaviour. 
Finally, opponents claim that the death penalty is state-sanctioned 
murder. The state, acting as an agent, kills the accused murderer in the 
name of the victim. By claiming that, indirectly they are saying that 
the state is no better than the murderer. 
3.2.1. Religious General Arguments 
Retaliation and compensation in response to criminal acts are not 
practiced only under Islamic penal law, they are also commonly 
practiced throughout the world. Indeed, retaliation in criminal cases is 
a universal system documented in the Old Testament and modified, but 
not abrogated, in the New Testament. It was revealed to the Prophet 
Moses and accepted as divine law by Jews almost 3,000 years ago, 
and it is still part of their Scriptures. Likewise, retaliation is not an 
alien concept to the Christian community. Therefore, those who adhere 
to the three revealed religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
should respect the divine penal systems as applied in some forms. 
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Renouncing the concept entirely could lead to renouncing all divine 
scriptures. 
3.2.2. Humanistic Arguments 
In response to the atrocities that some nations committed against 
humanity during the second world war, and in the hope of creating an 
international framework for preserving world peace, on December 10, 
1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. In this document the members of United Nations committed 
themselves to the "promotion of universal respect for and observance 
of human rights and fundamental rights and fundamental freedom" 
(Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble). Despite this 
agreement and the widespread belief in human rights, many human 
rights, including some of the most basic ones, are too often violated. 
When it comes to the death penalty, the United Nations' position is a 
product of compromise between those nations who want it completely 
abolished, those who want it limited to very serious crimes, such as 
murder or treason, and those who want it left up to each nation to 
decide. The following statement on the death penalty was included in 
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the 
United Nations' General Assembly passed in its Resolution 220 of 
December 16,1966. Article 6 of the agreement reads: 
1. Every human being has the inherent (is born with) right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
(killed without a trial) of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence 
of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes.... This 
penalty can only be carried out ... 
by a competent court. 
3. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or 
commutation (life impriosonment instead of death) of the sentence. 
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be 
granted in all cases. 
4. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on 
pregnant women. 
110 
General Assembly Resolution 2857 of December 20,1971, observed 
that: 
In order to gurantee fully the right of life, provided for in Article 3 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the main objective to be 
pursued is that of progressively restricting the number of offenses for 
which capital punishment may be imposed, with a view to the 
desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries. 
The latest report of the Secretary General on the death penalty (Feb. 8, 
1980) noted that: 
"The United Nations has gradually shifted from the position of a 
neutral observer concerned about, but not committed, on the question 
of the death penalty, to a position favoring the eventual abolition of the 
death penalty. From the moral standpoint, the United Nations has 
followed the guidance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
From the practical or utilitarian point of view, [the United Nations has] 
called only for the eventual abolition of capital punishment. " 
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3.2.3. Socialist Argument 
When it comes to the death penalty and the attitude of the Socialists, 
one can say without any hesitation that the Socialists, although 
theoretically they support its abolition, they use it frequently. Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels had pointed out that "crime was a product 
of a social system based on private property and that it could be 
eradicated only by social reform. "79 Furthermore, these socialists, 
for political purposes, before the revolution, "formulated a minimal 
program: abolition of the death penalty for all political offenses. "80 
Indeed, when the communist party took over in 1917, the leadership 
of the new revolution considered it prudent to abolish the death penalty 
in one of its decrees, on March 12,1917. Yet four months later, the 
same government had issued another decree in which the death 
penalty became one of the ways to cover up its counter- revolution 
policies. Strangely enough, four months after the restoration of the 
death penalty, the Soviet of People's Commissars (Sovanarkom) 
voted to abolish capital punishment on November 8,1917. However, 
the leaders of the revolution, especially Lenin, used many ways and 
79 Jankovic, p. 110. 
I 80 ibid p. 11. 
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justifications to issue many decrees to resume the death penalty, for 
instance in an amendment of the decree of February 12, he opposed 
that an authorized possession of weapons be punished by death . 
And 
8 finally, Lenin reinstated the death penalty on July 16,1918.1 
Although many people made many attempts to abolish the death 
penalty, they failed miserably. In fact, some of them were put to death. 
Later on, Lenin made it very clear that the government must resort to 
the death penalty in order to survive. 
"The revolutionary who does not want to be a hypocrite cannot reject 
capital punishment . 
There has never been a revolution or a civil war 
without shootings .... 
It is a bad revolutionary who, in the heat of 
"82 fierce struggle, stops before the majesty of the law. 
Yet, in January 1920, Lenin himself gave instructions to his aides that 
the death penalty must be abolished under the justification that Soviet 
victories in the civil war had reduced the dangers threatening the 
" ibid p. 117. 
S2 ibid. p. 115. 
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Soviet state and made it possible to reduce repression. This order did 
not live long though. Four months later, specifically May 22,1920, the 
death penalty was restored once again. 
During Stalin's regime (1930-1953), the death penalty was very 
common. In fact "a secret instruction was issued by the VICK and 
Sovnarkom, there was to be no hesitation in applying the most 
extreme measure of punishment [shooting] against Kulaks .. ones 
who were active counter-revolution. "83 Obviously, all the offenses that 
were punishable by the death penalty were political crimes. After 
Stalin's death in 1953, use of the death penalty once again grew 
rapidly and the list of offenses that were punishable by death increased 
tremendously. For example, treason, espionage, counterfeiting money, 
taking of bribes by an official, and theft were all punishable by death. 
[I ]t was the first time that murderers were subject to execution. 
Generally speaking, Socialists maintain that the revolution was a 
sacred entity against which the individual must not rebel. Therefore, 
such states inflict great penalties, including the death penalty, on 
83 ibid p. 117 
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individuals who rebel against the state (revolution). Socialists relate 
offenses to politics and economics, no more no less. They believe that 
a society which suffers from economic disorder cannot foster virtues. 
Therefore, criminals should not be punished. Consequently, criminals 
could commit capital crimes against the community and could get 
away with it, but when it came to individual aggression against the 
state--revolution--the punishment must be death [shooting] Socialist 
attitudes, generally, were erratic. 
3.2.4.. Islamic Argument 
Westerners too often ask, "Why do the Muslims apply today the same 
barbarous punishments which were applied 14 centuries ago in the 
desert? " Is it permissible to use the death penalty in the 20th century? 
As has been pointed out previously, retaliation ( qisas) is not part of 
the Islamic system alone; it is part of Judaism and Christianity as well. 
Those who reject retaliation ( qisas) punishment are rejecting divine 
revelation as a whole. Moreover, the objections raised 
by the 
opponents of retaliation (qisas) are not well informed; rather, the 
objections contain deceptive words which hide the truth. 
It is amazing 
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to hear that the normal values of the 20th century are "advanced and 
progressive. " 
The heartlessness shown by the "civilized" man of our century to his 
fellow human beings hardly finds a parallel, not even in the darkest 
ages of history. He does not punish by stoning to death, but he can kill 
indiscriminately with the atom bomb. Muslims did not initiate the first 
World War, which claimed over 30 million lives. They did not drop 
an atom bomb on Hiroshima, burning innocent men, women, and 
children with chemicals, and gas. In fact, those who object to the 
application of retaliation (gisas) as it is described in the divine legal 
system are either prejudiced of its proponents or ignorant of the basic 
concept of punishment in this system, indeed, the basic premise of 
Islamic penal law is that crime is a case of individual aggression 
against the society and that the task of law is to protect the society 
from such aggression. The concept of crime and punishment is closely 
attached to the socio-cultural life of society and to its perspective on 
the relationship between the individual and society. Not surprisingly, 
Western nations are heavily inclined towards respecting the rights of 
the individual. They tend to regard the individual as the centre of 
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human social life and to value his personal interests and welfare highly. 
Consequently, their legal systems incline toward the interests and well- 
being of the individual even if he is a criminal. That is why the 
Western nations treat criminals with great sympathy, and it is the 
reason that crimes against morality are often not punishable. For 
example, homosexual acts may not be a punishable crime. They can be 
viewed as part of the exercise of personal freedom. Premarital sex is 
not against the law as long the parties involved are consenting adults. 
According to Islamic law, however, these are serious crimes. The 
Islamic judicial system maintains the balance of justice and examines 
all conditions and circumstances involved or connected with the 
offense. Thus, the Islamic judicial system imposes preventive 
punishments which, if viewed superficially, may appear cruel and 
brutal. However, if they are viewed carefully and closely, they can be 
seen to reflect equity and impartial justice. 
To examine the Islamic penal system under the aspect of fairness, 
consider the victim whose eye is gouged out. Is it fair to him to 
live the 
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rest his life one-eyed while the offender enjoys his two eyes? It might 
be argued that it is in the interest of the community to sustain one - 
eyed person instead of two. But the facts, based on experience, prove 
that it is delinquency in executing deterrent punishment which 
monopolies the victims, not the other way around. Some opponents of 
retaliation ( gisas) imagine that such punishments have no practical 
significance. This is not true. In prescribing these deterring 
punishments, the Islamic judicial system meant to accomplish two 
objectives. One of these is to protect the society from the crime by 
imposing upon the criminal such severe punishment that he will not 
commit the same or a similar crime again, nor will those who saw or 
heard about such punishment. The second objective is to satisfy the 
feelings of the victim by enabling him to retaliate or to receive just and 
equitable treatment. Thus, opponents of the implementation of the 
(qisas) often give evidence of not having studied the Islamic concept 
of crime and punishment. Because of this fact, they consider the 
punishment prescribed to be cruel and degrading to human dignity. 
They imagine that the execution of the death penalty is conducted on 




THE SOCIO-RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE SECULAR ERA 
As a social process, capital punishment can be explained with 
reference to the socio-religious categories of world-construction and 
world-maintenance. Throughout much of the history of our world, 
religion has been intimately involved in both of these functions of the 
social process. Therefore, religion has, historically, been partially 
responsible for the definition of capital crimes and for the justification 
of capital punishment. But, ever since ancient times, when the divine 
king embodied both the religious and the political power, a bifurcation 
of the social process has developed. This was first reflected in the 
differentiation of the political-military elite from the cultural-religious 
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elite. Depending on the particular historical situation, capital 
punishment has been administered under the auspices of either one of 
these elite groups with the other group acting in a secondary 
legitimating capacity. In most recent times the principle agency of 
capital punishment has tended to be the political-military elite as 
embodied in the modem nation-state. Religion has continued to 
supply legitimations for the death penalty, but its involvement has 
tended to remain secondary to that of secular politics. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to examine the phenomenon of capital punishment as 
an aspect of a social reality which has become less dependent on 
religion for its construction and maintenance. This will entail a certain 
sociological understanding of what is called the process of 
secularisation. 
Of the many "catchword" phrases which have been employed to 
convey the meaning of the term "secularisation", two are most 
appropriate for the discussion of capital punishment: 1) the 
disengagement of politics from religion and 2) the transposition of 
religious beliefs and institutions. The first phrase refers to a process 
already discussed with regard to historical changes in the relationship 
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of religion and capital punishment. 84 In this sense, secularisation is by 
84 
no means a new historical development and the term "secular era" 
cannot be applied only to modern times. If the process of 
secularisation originated with the first disengagement of politics from 
religion then it began the first time a priest-king failed to monopolise 
both aspects of socially defined authority. Secularisation, as the 
disengagement of politics from religion, is a process which leads to a 
change in the conceptualisation of social reality. Thomas O'Dea has 
described this ideational change: 
GC Secularisation may be said to consist fundamentally of two related 
transformations in human thinking. There is first the "desacralization" 
of the attitude toward persons and things - the withdrawal of the kind 
of emotional involvement which is to be found in the religious 
response to the sacred. Secondly, there is the rationalisation of 
thou t- the withholding of emotional participation in thinking about 
the world. Rationalisation implies both a cognitive attitude relatively 
free of emotion, and the use of logic rather than an emotional 
symbolism to organise thought. The secularisation of culture, 
See chapter III 
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combining both desacralisation and rationalisation, means that a 
religious world-view is no longer the basic frame of reference for 
thought. "$5 
85 
The disengagement of politics from religion manifests itself in the 
social conception of reality no longer exclusively dependent on the 
terminology of the sacred. But the social construction of reality, in 
order to remain plausible, must appeal to some ultimate symbol 
system. Therefore, the functions of world-construction and world- 
maintenance shift, at least partially, from the sphere of the religious to 
that of the secular. Hence, the second phrase which describes the 
secularisation process is "the transposition of religious beliefs and 
institutions". 
The second aspect of the definition of secularisation conveys the 
positive counterpart of the disengagement of politics from religion. If 
the social reality is no longer defined with reference to an ultimate, 
sacred world-view, it must stand on another ultimate, secular world- 
view. Therefore, the religious functions of world construction and 
Thomas O'Dea, The Sociology of Religion, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall, 1966, p. 81 
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world-maintenance must be transposed to the secular sphere. Berger 
has proposed a brief definition of secularisation as "the process by 
which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination 
of religious institutions and symbols". 86 Alternate institutions and 
symbols are necessary in the secular society for the definition and 
maintenance of a particular reality. That sector of society which is 
involved in the punishment of crime has found alternate symbols such 
as law and order, rehabilitation, and the death penalty. 
86 
Capital punishment in the secular era, as in earlier eras, is 
administered as a response to the marginal situation which major 
deviance creates. Those acts which constitute a threat to the secular 
reality are designated as capital crimes. With the process of 
secularisation it is no longer possible to ascertain the boundaries of 
human behaviour by referring to specifically religious symbolisations. 
It is the nature of modern religion to function as only one symbol 
system among others; "the symbolisation of man's relation to the 
ultimate conditions of his existence is no longer the monopoly of any 
Berger, p. 107 
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groups explicitly labelled religious". " The symbolisation of 
behavioural boundaries in the secular era is primarily the function of 
the political order. Therefore, the designation of capital crimes is the 
responsibility of the state. Capital crimes are those actions which 
most threaten the secular reality, that is, the predominance of the 
nation-state. The modem shift towards the political definition of 
capital crime began at the end of the period of religious hegemony in 
Europe. An increasing awareness of broad political affiliations and a 
growth in the incidence and power of national monarchies contributed 
to the shift from religious to political predominance. This shift meant 
a" (substantial change in the structure of the criminal law with political 
crimes displacing religious ones, particularly on the list of capital 
offences. Death was still the punishment for those who challenged the 
basis of authority in society but the secular state had displace the 
Church as the authority that might be offended. 88 One aspect of the 
shift from religious to political crimes was the essential redefinition of 
crimes against dogma. 
87 
88 
Bellah, p. 80 
Bowers, pp. 167-168. 
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The process of secularisation was partly responsible for a decrease in 
the number of executions for apostasy and heresy. In fact, the rulers 
of numerous jurisdictions had been heretics themselves in rebelling 
against the old order and seeking independence from ecclesiastical 
control. Of course, new authorities often continued to employ the 
maximum sanction against what they defined as heresy. The capital 
nature of acts of apostasy is evident even into the nineteenth century. 
In England, for instance, it was still a capital crime to associate with 
gypsies. 89 But, secularisation brought about a new understanding of 
crimes against dogma. Dogma was given a political definition so that, 
in the secular era, it became a capital crime to espouse a political 
ideology that was abhorrent to those in power. Political leaders 
executed their rivals for power in great numbers; these purges were 
responses not only to overt acts of treason but also to the advocacy of 
treasonous ideological views. At times the line between overt acts and 
"dogmatic" crimes has become blurred. Thus, Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg, according to their sons, were execute by the United States 
government in 1953 on trumped-up charges of conspiracy to commit 
espionage and were actually only "guilty" of holding subversive 
89 Block, p. 16 
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opinions. 90 Crimes against political "dogma" merge with crime against 
power; executions of political prisoners are performed in the nem of 
a particular ideological reality. In such situations the functions of 
world-construction and world-maintenance have been transposed from 




By no means does religion disappear altogether from involvement in 
the secular administration of capital punishment. Residual religious 
symbolisations and legitimations are carried forward even to today. 
Some aspects of the modern execution are similar to what were 
originally religious phenomena. At this point the distinction between 
expiation and propitiation becomes blurred, the execution reflects a 
sacrificial mode. The condemned person is give a special diet and, if 
necessary, is forced to eat it because "the animal that is going to be 
killed must be in the best condition". 91 Like the preparation of an 
Robert and Michael Meeropol, We Are Your Sons, New York: Ballantine Books, 
1976, pp. xvii, 3,36fß, 267. If in fact the Rosenbergs were innocent of the 
charges for which they were executed, then they were not the only condemned 
persons to have died unjustly. See Jerome and Barbara Frank, Not 
Guilty, Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, 1957 and Arthur Koestler, Reflections on Hanging, 
New York: Macmillan 1957. 
Camus, p. 201 
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part of the ritual .... (the) last meal". 
92 A further aspect of the ritual 
preparation of the condemned prisoner is the putting on of a new set 
of clothes which will serve their function of covering a living person 
for only a few hours. There is a customary last visit by a member of 
the clergy. The role of the priest has evolved somewhat from the 
earliest times when the priests performed the execution itself. Now 
the priest can but offer the traditional religious legitimations for the 
impending event, perhaps some words about repentance and salvation. 
Interesting in this regard is the story related by Camus of the Russian 
prisoner on the verge of execution. The condemned man rebuked the 
priest saying, "Go away and commit no sacrilege". 93 Understood in the 
context of capital punishment as a type of propitiatory rite, these 
words carry a special religious meaning: "do not follow tradition by 
making religion a party to this unholy sacrifice". 
After the material and spiritual preparations have been made the 
criminal is led to the place of execution. The secular executioner 
Barry Satlow, "Witness at an Execution", Juris Doctor, 2 (November 1971), 
No. 2, p. 13 
Camus, p. 224 
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represents not the deity but every member of the society which has 
passed the judgement. Hence, the curious custom of concealing the 
identity of the executioner in order to avoid the mysterious power 
released in the killing of another person. The "black mask" has been 
replaced in the secular execution by multiple mechanisms for the 
activation of the electric current or lethal gas. Not even the 
executioners themselves know exactly who has done the killing. 
Similarly, one of the members of a firing squad is secretly supplied 
with a blank cartridge. Anthony Amsterdam, an opponent of the 
death penalty, has likened the ritual of the "blank cartridge" to the 
larger social process of modem capital punishment. Amsterdam sees 
94 
95 
a "diffusion of responsibility" given the fact that lawyers, jurors, 
judges at various levels of appeal, and executives at different levels of 
government all have a part in the contemporary American execution; 
"at the end somebody's dead and nobody killed him". 94 Finally, a 
physician is present at the execution to pronounce the final words of 
the ceremony, "This man is dead". 95 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, "The Case Against the Death Penalty", Juris Doctor, 2 
(November 1971), No. 2, pp. 11-12. 
Satlow, p. 13 
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The execution having taken place, the religio-magical mode of capital 
punishment is continued through the use of "ritual language" used in 
public communications. This language includes stereotyped phrases 
(e. g. "He has atoned for his sins") and a certain "timidity" of 
expression which conveys a sense of awe, a psychological awareness 
of the mysterium tremendum implied in death. 96 In the secular era, 
capital punishment is explained with a combination of religious and 
political legitimations. Sometimes, the religious legitimations are 
explicit, with a view of both the crime and the punishment as having 
a religious quality. Thus, a bishop appearing before the British House 
of Lords spoke of murder as a "profane" act. "Human life is sacred; 
he who wilfully destroys it commits sacrilege. His impious act is fitly 
countered by a punishment which also has some `numinous' 
character. "97 Religious understandings of crime and punishment are 
not usually so recognisable, however. In most cases, the traditional 
religious legitimations have undergone a transformation to blend with 
the unwritten corpus of popular knowledge. Regarding such implicit 
legitimations, Camus referred to capital punishment as a "primitive 
96 
97 
Camus, p. 176 
Sir Walter Moberly, The Ethics of Punishment, Hamden, Connecticut: Arcon 
Books, 1968, pp. 285-286. 
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rite" the survival of which depends upon "the thoughtlessness and 
ignorance of the public which reacts only with the ceremonial phrases 
that have been drilled into it". 98 
98 
The socio-religious dimensions of capital punishment have been 
manifest on many different levels in the secular era. First, there have 
been residual religious symbols and actions which originated in a time 
of much greater religious power but which have been inherited by the 
execution ceremony of today. Second, religious legitimisations have 
continued to function as one aspect of the maintenance of social 
reality. But, for the most part, both the world-construction and world- 
maintenance components of the process of capital punishment have 
been transposed from the religious to the political sphere. This means 
that the role once played by religion with regard to capital punishment 
is now fulfilled by secular means. Executions in the secular era have 
now become almost the exclusive concern of the political sector of 
society. The over-arching reality which was once defined in terms of 
the sacred is now based on this-worldly foundations. The national god 
is replaced by the nation itself in demanding the execution of the 
Camus, p. 177 
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criminal. Society has become an ultimate symbol and the nation-state 
fulfills the world-construction and world maintenance functions in its 
name. Thus, the secular society defines its capital crimes with the aid 
of legislatures and courts. The vengeful god(s) and the earthly 
representatives of deity in the earlier era have been replaced by one 
social entity, the state. The secular state is both the ultimate symbol 
in the name of which criminals of today are executed (e. g. "For the 
sake of law and order") and the agent of the execution itself, the 
executioner. It is in the understanding of secularisation as 
cc transposition", namely, the displacement of religion by the state as 
both deity and executioner, that capital punishment in our day can be 
best understood. 
4.1. The Deification of the State as Executioner 
One aspect of the process of secularisation has been the decline of 
religion and the religious world-view or sacred reality. Religion's 
ultimate symbols which once served as nomizing devices for socially 
perceived reality have been replaced in the secular era by other 
symbols. The predominant symbol of this era is the state. 
To further 
131 
the interests of one's nation has often been praised but to oppose the 
state has constituted an act of major deviance, many times requiring 
the death penalty. According to Camus, society has sought, since the 
nineteenth century, for a "substitute for religion" and has found it in 
itself "as an object of adoration"; it has adopted an absolute value in 
the idea of a future "political utopia", thus it is a "sacrilege" to stand 
in society's way. 99 The absolutising of society accounts for the 
elevation of state to the ultimate position of power and sanctity. To 
threaten the power of the nation-state is to commit the cardinal sin of 
secular times. A clue to the importance of the state can be found in 
the fact that the term "state", like "god", is often capitalised, "State". 
It is the state which defines capital crimes and the state which imposes 
the ultimate penalties. 
99 
In defence of the state it is often said that the state acts against crime 
for the sake of higher ideals than its own self-preservation and 
interests. If the state could strive for such self-transcendence it might 
be applauded but, in fact, it seldom sees beyond itself as absolute. 
Witness the case of conflicting claims to the authority to execute. An 
Camus, p. 226 
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Eskimo tribal council had convicted a murderer under due process of 
tribal law. The sentence of death was carried out, then a short time 
later the executioners were arrested and charged with murder. Under 
Canadian law, the execution was illegal; the two Eskimo executioners 
were themselves hanged for murder. '°° This story illustrates the 
absolute demand of the nation-state to control the world-construction 
and world-maintenance functions within the territory which it 
possesses. 
100 
The death penalty has been used as a tool of the state to eliminate 
those who constitute a threat to political power-spies, subversives, 
revolutionaries, opposition party leaders etc. Crimes against the 
authority of the state have been severely punished, especially in times 
of dramatic political change. In Russia, for example, revolutionary 
periods reflected striking increases in the use of capital punishment. 
More than 500 executions per year were carried out for the period 
1906-1909 with a peak of 1,340 in 1908. Then in the period of the 
resurgence of the revolutionary spirit (1917-1922) approximately 
Lewis Lawes, Man's Judgement of Death, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 
1924), p. 3 The story, of course, involves the whole question of the definition of 
"community". At issue is the ability of the state to discern the legitimacy of 
subcultures within its borders. 
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600,000 persons were executed. Even after the revolution mass 
executions were not unknown; tens of thousands were put to death 
during the purges of 1929-1935.101 Situations of intense political 
conflict tend to lead to the absolutising of certain ideological goals. 
"One kills for a nation or a class that has been granted divine status - 
or for a future society". 102 This "divine status" is what leads the state 
to the point of employing unquestioned means to achieve its ends. 
One might expect that the excesses of the Inquisitions and the 
religious wars brought on by the Reformation were worse than 
anything the secular era might have seen. But it is only in the 
twentieth century that there were mass executions of the proportions 
witnessed in such places as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. 
Political differences have often combined with racial tensions to create 
a social rationale for mass executions. 103 In the secular stage of history 
the racial factor has replaced the religious factor in defining the 
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the nation are perceived as a serious threat and punished accordingly 
104 
105 
by the state. "' 
In secular society, there are residual manifestations of capital 
punishment as a religious rite; but, more significantly, the death 
penalty has retained a "religious" meaning, if this term is understood 
to signify the concern with ultimates or absolutes. Society, not deity ý 
now lays claim to absolute power and authority. The absolute nature 
of the power of the state legitimates its use of the absolute punishment; 
cc to assert ... that a man must 
be absolutely cut off from society 
because he is absolutely evil amounts to saying that society is 
absolutely good, and no one in his right mind will believe this 
today"). 105 In the minds of citizens the state is an awesome force which 
imposes its wrath on those who attack the basis of its power. The 
state is not above the use of the most violent means to insure this 
power. "Heads are cut off not only to punish but to intimidate, by a 
frightening example, any who might be tempted to imitate the 
Particularly pertinent in this regard is the abundance of information about racial 
discrimination in capital punishment for rape in the southern United States. See 
Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape", in 
Bowers, pp. 109-120 
Camus, pp. 225-226. 
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guilty" 106 The deification of the state provides the socio-religious 
basis for the use of capital punishment in a secular society: "capital 
punishment represents all that is violent and irrational in our society. 
It shows our terrible propensity to deal with complex social problems 
by violence". "' Violence and killing exercised by society itself for 
the maintenance of the social reality are, thus, established as necessary 
parts of the human, social enterprise. "Once killing is sanctioned by 
the State and Society, it tends to become accepted as a legitimate 
solution to extreme difficulties". 108 Killing is the solution of the 
deified states for extreme threats to the continuation of the political 
status quo. The state and those who control it profit, in terms of both 
power and wealth, from maintaining the social structures with minimal 
change. But the status quo includes social conditions which actually 
contribute to the development of crime and criminals. "' Camus noted 
the high incidence of alcohol related crimes of violence and the fact 
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spirits industry were the same ones who signed execution orders. "' 
110 
111 
Capital punishment is legitimated in the secular era not by reference 
to religious symbolisation but by appeal to the ultimate concern of the 
secular society, the politically defined reality. The kind of religious 
concerns which occasionally led to the tempering of the official 
exercise of violence in the past no longer seem to offer a challenge to 
the right of the state to execute. The state, the executive, and the 
executioner have merged into one symbol: 
cc Whoever thinks he has omniscience imagines he has omnipotence. 
Temporal idols demanding an absolute faith tirelessly decree absolute 
punishments. And religions devoid of transcendence kill great 
numbers of condemned men devoid of hope. "111 
By "transcendence" Camus does not mean the ontological and 
cosmological doctrine which evolved in religion to offer a legitimation 
of capital punishment as a means of salvation. Rather, he means the 
Camus, p. 207 
Camus, p. 228 
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quality or awareness of self-criticism which allows one to question 
every absolute. This critical view has been crucial for many who have 
opposed the state in its most violent and dehumanising aspects. It is 
this self-transcendent and self-critical view which accounts for those 
attempts from within religion to challenge the state's authority to 
execute. 
One final, but not insignificant, result of the process of secularisation 
with regard to capital punishment is the opposition to the death penalty 
which has been voiced in some sectors of religion. Given the origins 
of capital punishment as a means of maintaining the sacred reality, this 
is a startling and ironic occurrence, a reversal of the usual relationship 
of religion and capital punishment. Berger has described the effect 
upon religion itself of secularisation as: 
cc 
.... a sever rupture of 
the traditional task of religion which was 
precisely the establishment of an integrated set of definitions of reality 
that could serve as a common universe of meaning for the members of 
society. The world-building potency of religion is thus restricted to 
the construction of sub-worlds, of fragmented universes of 
138 
meaning. ' 112 
112 
113 
In the secular world, the "common universe of meaning" is 
established by political definitions of reality while religion is free to 
establish 
cc 
sub-worlds" which may differ from the larger view of 
reality. One such sub-world is the attack on capital punishment which 
has been launched by some religious groups. By no means have all 
religious groups or persons suddenly abandoned the traditional 
religious legitimations of the death penalty. But some sectors of 
religion, once religion was relieved of the primary social responsibility 
of world-maintenance, began to see the ultimate penalty in a new light. 
Even such an Establishment-type denomination as the Episcopal 
Church reflects this dramatically new religious perspective; Richard 
Werkheiser and Reverend Arthur Barnhart present the opinion that, 
while secular thinkers may defend capital punishment with the 
protection-of-society argument, the Christian's "basic concern is not 
the perpetuation of the State, but the transformation, the redemption, 
of all human relationships". 113 The concept of redemption 
has been 
Berger, p. 134. 
Werkheiser and Barnhart, p. 4 
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mentioned elsewhere as disallowing previous moral legitimations of 
the death penalty. John Yoder compares capital punishment to slavery 
as a practice which some societies allow but which does not conform 
to the gospel; "I have come that they might have life was not spoken 
only of mens souls". "' Elsewhere critics of capital punishment have 
cited as support the Sixth Commandment, "Thou shalt not kill", 115 the 
creation (imago dei) , and the command of Jesus, Judge not, that ye be 
not judged". "' Of course, numerous other religious concerns have 
been suggested by critics of capital punishment. 117 It is instructive 
with regard to the secularisation process that recent religious thinkers 
would re-evaluate ancient scriptural texts and develop arguments 
against the use of the death penalty. Up until fairly recent times 
religion, at least in its institutional manifestations, was so closely allied 
with those social progresses which functioned to construct and 
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whose actions threatened that reality. But, in an era when the state has 
become an ultimate symbol, religion has occasionally taken on 
different, perhaps more prophetic, responsibilities. 
4.2. Ideological Flux and the Future of Capital Punishment 
The sociology of religion provides a certain understanding of the 
social process which can inform speculation about the future of capital 
punishment in Western societies. Based on the thesis of this study, 
that capital punishment is a propitiatory rite for the maintenance of the 
socially constructed reality, one might conclude that the death penalty 
will continue to be used in a way which is concomitant to the 
development of social reality. In other words, those actions which 
present the most serious threat to the reality of future social groups 
will evoke the maximum punishment. If the power and social 
predominance of the nation-state continues as it is or increases, we 
might expect the definition of capital crime to match the salient 
features of the politically defined reality. It is easy to imagine that 
treason, for instance, will be a capital crime, at least in theory, long 
after other acts are not. Political assassinations and terrorist activities, 
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as well, seem to evoke most rigorous responses from contemporary 
societies. In 1957, Camus noticed an apparent shift towards the use 
of capital punishment as a political mechanism; "there are fewer and 
fewer condemned by common law and more and more condemned for 
political reasons". 118 The more deified the nation-state becomes the 
less questioned and the less questionable will be its tactics to maintain 
power. 
118 
The state as executioner continues to be a powerful symbol in our 
world, the deification of the nation-state has a continuing effect on the 
social process. 
If the future of capital punishment depended entirely on public 
opinion, executions would probably not only continue but, perhaps, 
increase in number. It is for this reason that some reform-minded 
jurists have been reluctant to join the supporters of abolition. The 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment of Great Britain expressed 
a fear of such an action; "though reform of the criminal law ought 
sometimes to give a lead to public opinion, it is dangerous to move too 
Camus, p. 227 
142 
far in advance of it". 119 Societies support capital punishment as a 
means of maintaining the social reality. Therefore, the incidence of 
executions tends to increase with those factors which reflect 
weaknesses in the definition of that reality. For example, extreme 
ideological flux, ethnic diversity coupled with discrimination, and the 
coercive dominance of an elite political group are each factors which 




The use of the death penalty on a world-wide scale has decreased 
markedly since World War II. A survey of 128 countries for the 
period 1958-1962 revealed only 40 countries which had performed an 
average of more than one execution per year, although 89 countries 
provided for capital punishment by law. Four countries accounted for 
about half the total number of executions for the period - from greatest 
to least, South Africa, Korea, Nigeria and the United States. 121 But the 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, Report, (London: Her 
Majesty's Stationers Office, 1953). Reprinted in Gertrude Ezorsky (ed. ), 
Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1972), p. 251. 
Bower, p. 181. William Bowers pinpoints five variable societal characteristics and 
uses them to provide a thorough empirical analysis of the propensity of nations to 
use the death penalty. See pp. 181-190. 
Ibid. pp. 179-180. This data does not include many former communist bloc 
nations which did not respond to the survey and which do not appear in the list of 
countries where capital punishment has been abolished or abandoned. See p. 178. 
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recent global trend towards abolition carries no guarantee that the 
death penalty will cease to be a tool of social maintenance. The flux 
of history can be expected to bring about situations in which social 
reality is seriously threatened. Therefore, given the necessary social 
conditions, capital punishment will continue as an aspect of the world- 
maintenance function of society. And, to the extent that the interests 
of religious groups are tied to those of the modern state, legitimations 
of the death penalty will be given by religion. Where religion has 
become differentiated from politics, on the other hand, secular 
ideologies will be the principle source of legitimation. 
The future of capital punishment may also be affected by a growth in 
global political awareness. Political developments which enhance the 
possibilities of international cooperation tend to create a view of the 
social reality which is more stable and less susceptible to the threat of 
anomy, at the very least a truly global social reality cannot perceive 
threats from `outside' the social context. An increase in the degree of 
non-violent influence which groups of nations exert over others can 
contribute to the movement to abolish capital punishment. 
In 1971, 
even such totalitarian governments as the Soviet 
Union and Spain 
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were being pressured by world opinion to commute death sentences. 122 
Camus expressed a hope that international cooperation would lead to 
the elimination of capital punishment: in the unified Europe of the 
future the solemn abolition of the death penalty ought to be the first 
article of the European Code we all hope for". 12' But, given the 
uncertain status of internationalism as a viable political option for our 





Up until this year, 1976, the future of capital punishment in the United 
States seemed doubtful. The last execution was carried out in 1967 by 
the State of California under the authorisation of Governor Ronald 
Reagan; since then, complex legal developments have resulted in a 
growth in the nationwide death row population which has exceeded 
some 600 inmates. 124 Some observers have wondered about the future 
of the maximum penalty under United States law. Amsterdam 
Amsterdam, p. 12 
Camus, p. 230 
Michael Meltsner, "Capital Punishment: The Moment of Truth", Juris Doctor, 2 
(November 1971) No. 2, pp. 4-5. An account of these legal developments and the 
wider social context which contributed to the moratorium on executions is 
available in Burton H. Wolfe, Pileup on Death Row, 
(Garden City, New York:: 
Doubleday, 1973 
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remarked that the moratorium on the death penalty had " taken the 
edge of abolitionist statements". 125 Michael Meltsner, a Columbia 
Law School professor, noted that "American society is in fact 
ambivalent about capital punishment: we can neither employ it on a 
systematic basis nor reject it as an unnecessarily harsh and degrading 





"There can be no doubt in any of our minds that within most of our 
lifetimes capital punishment will be dead. Abolition may come next 
year, in 1980 or in 2000; but, as surely as night follows day, it will 
come. What that means is that the ritual that remains to be played out 
is no longer justifiable in historical terms. How much more cruel, how 
much more barbarous is it to wipe out, to burn, to gas a few poor souls 
in the name of principles which the executioners themselves no longer 
believe in". 127 
Then, in 1976, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the death 
Amsterdam, p. 12 
Meltsner, p. 12 
Amsterdam, p. 12 
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penalty is not incompatible with the Constitution; this probably means 
that executions will resume after a nine-year period of abandonment 
of capital punishment. "' 
128 
The maintenance of the social reality requires that some acts be 
designated capital crimes and that the punishment should actually be 
carried out. Presumably, direct attacks upon the power of the 
political-military elite will continue to evoke the capital punishment 
response, although executions for these kinds of treasonous acts are 
relatively rare. The most prominent capital offence in the United 
States will continue to be murder, especially the murder of a 
representative of the state -a police officer, a prison guard, or a 
political leader. "Life for life, " the simple retributive model of justice, 
has become the primary legitimation of the contemporary application 
of the death penalty. Thinkers whose legal and penal philosophy is 
informed by an uncompromising commitment to the reform of the 
criminal see capital punishment as a contradiction of the social ideal; 
"The Death Penalty Revived", Time, 108 (July 12,1976) No. 2, p. 3 5. Subsequent 
to the ruling a stay of execution was issued which will be in effect until the court 
reviews its decision. 
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"the death penalty discredits the whole reformative process". 129 Such 
idealism can never accept the judgement that an individual should be 




Existentialist philosophy, as it is reflected in the thought of Camus, 
provides a new understanding of the criminal as an individual-in- 
society. This new view of the human as a social creature tends to 
defuse the absolute culpability of the criminal. Because of the genetic 
and environmental factors influencing crime, "the real responsibility 
of an offender cannot be precisely measured.... we come into the 
world laden with the weight of an infinite necessity". "' As it is not the 
nature of an individual to be absolutely responsible, so also it should 
not be the nature of society to render absolute judgements of the 
individual - justice and compassion cannot be separated. 
"Compassion does not exclude punishment but it suspends the final 
condemnation. Compassion loathes the definitive, irreparable measure 
that does an injustice to mankind as a whole because of failing to take 
into account the wretchedness of the common condition". 131 Even for 
Werkheiser and Barnhart, p. 13 
Camus, p. 209 
Ibid, p. 212 
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the person whose actions are perceived as the greatest threat to the 
social reality, the right to live is a "natural" right without which "moral 
life is utterly impossible". "' This existentialist understanding of the 
human person, to the extent that it becomes a philosophy of the future, 




In the secular era, the relationship of religion and capital punishment 
is less direct than in earlier times. Whereas religion had previously 
performed the world-construction and world-maintenance functions of 
the social process, this role had been transposed, because of 
secularisation, to the sphere of politics. Hence, capital punishment 
was provided for, administered and legitimated by the state and 
undergirded by political idealogy. 
Traditional religious symbols and legitimations continue to 
characterise the administration of the death penalty in secular 
Ibid, p. 221 
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societies. In a symbolic sense, capital punishment is still a propitiatory 
but it is secularised in contemporary society; criminals are put to death 
for the sake of maintaining the political order and the predominance 
of the state. In fact, the state has achieved a deified status. If 
propitiation is understood as a means of appeasing divine wrath, then 
the state is both the propitiator-executioner and the object of 
propitiation for which the deviant is executed. 
The future of capital punishment is somewhat ambiguous on the global 
level as in the United States. The social process surrounding the death 
penalty as world-maintenance can be expected to continue, in which 
case ideological flux and the characteristics of particular societies will 
determine the necessity and extent of executions. Finally, changing 
philosophical perspectives on society and the individual will likely 
have an effect on the future of capital punishment within society. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE DEATH PENALTY AROUND THE WORLD 
The death penalty is not a controversial issue in the Muslim world, but 
it is in many other nations of the world. The purpose of this chapter is 
to review briefly the use and non-use of the death penalty in a variety 
of nations of the world, and then to discuss the death penalty and the 
United Nations, and cultural relativism as well as the current 
international law. 
In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 
2857 (XXVI): 
"In order to guarantee fully the right of life, provided for in Article 3 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the main objective to 
be pursued is that of progressively restricting the number of offenses 
for which capital punishment may be imposed, with a view to the 
desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries. " Like other 
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United Nations resolutions, this resolution is not acceptable to all 
nations. Some members of the United Nations have shown a sustained 
interest in abolishing the death penalty; others will not abide by it and 
consequently, they do not want to abolish the death penalty, and yet 
some other members wish to retain and use the death penalty only for 
serious crimes. Since 1971, the United Nations has had published 
periodical reports about the countries that use or do not use the death 
penalty. Accordingly, the United Nations has classified countries into 
two major groups: Retentionist and Abolitionist. 
Retentionist refers to countries that retain and use the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes such as murder, rape, robbery, or embezzlement of 
very large amounts of money. Certainly the list of capital crimes in 
some countries is short, while in others it is long. 
Abolitionist, on the other hand, is classified into three categories: (a) 
Abolitionist which means the countries whose laws do not provide for 
the death penalty for any kind of crimes; (b) Abolitionist for ordinary 
crimes only, which means countries whose laws provide for the death 
penalty only for exceptional crimes such as crimes committed under 
152 
military law or crimes committed in exceptional circumstances, such 
as wartime; and © Abolitionist De Facto, which means the countries 
which retain the death penalty for ordinary crimes, but have not 
executed anyone during the last 10 years or more. 133 
Amnesty International (AI), the Nobel prize-winning human rights 
organization, keeps information on the death penalty around the world. 
Their most recent report on the death penalty tells us that most of the 
nations have abolished the death penalty for all crimes or for ordinary 
crimes. 
World approaches to the Death penalty: 
5.1. North America 
5.1.1. United States. 
The United States of America, the federal government and 37 states, 
still have the death penalty as part of their legal system. Indeed, 
Amnesty International reported that 23 prisoners were executed in 
133 "United Nations Action in the Field of Capital Punishment, " in United Nations 
Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, 12 & 13, Nov.. 1986, pp. 
2-4. 
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1990. At the end of that year, more than 2,300 people were under the 
sentence of death in 34 states and under United States (U. S .) military 
law. In fact, the majority of Americans strongly favour the death 
penalty. Although the U. S. has increased usage of lethal injection as 
a method of execution, there are many methods of execution; 
electrocution; lethal gas; hanging; shooting by firing squad. In most 
states (37), the only capital offense is aggravated murder (usually 
first-degree murder). 131 
5.1.2. Canada. 
Although Canada has abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes 
its laws do provide for the death penalty for exceptional crimes, such 
as crimes committed under military law, or crimes committed in 
exceptional circumstances, such as wartime. In 1976 the death penalty 
was abolished for capital murder and replaced with a mandatory 25- 
year prison sentence without parole. Because of the nature of its 
capital offenses (mutiny and treason), Canada's method of execution 
is shooting by firing squad. 
134 US Department of Justice, Source Book of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1986, pp. 100-1. 
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5.2. Western Europe 
5.2.1. United Kingdom. 
In 1965 Great Britain abolished the death penalty (The Murder Act) 
for murder for a 5-year experimental period, but the final law was 
passed in 1969. Although some members of the House of Parliament 
have tried many times to reintroduce the death penalty, the British 
Parliament has overwhelmingly defeated the measures. "In June 1988, 
the eighteenth attempt in the British Parliament to introduce capital 
punishment for some classes of murder was defeated by 341 votes to 
281.135 Amnesty International reported that "the last executions--of 
two men convicted of murder--were on 13 August 1964" (Al , p. 
226). 
The method of execution was hanging. But the death penalty has been 
retained (under the Treason Act of 1914 ) only for exceptional crimes, 
such as high treason, both in peacetime and in wartime, and piracy 
with violence ( under the piracy Act of 1837) in England and Wales. 
135 Hood, R. The Death Penalty, Oxford, 1989, p. 10. 
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5.2.2. Greece. 
Greece is one of the countries which is classified as abolitionist de 
facto. It retains the death penalty for ordinary crimes, but it has not 
carried out the death penalty during the last year or more. Indeed, the 
last execution was in 1972. The method of execution was shooting by 
firing squad. 136 
5.2.3. Germany. 
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) were unified in October 1990. The name of the 
united country is the Federal Republic of Germany. The FRG is one 
of the Western Europe states that have signed the six protocols to the 
European Convention on human Rights, article 1 of which states: "The 
death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such 
penalty or executed. "137 Germany has abided by that treaty and has 
abolished the death penalty. Indeed, the Council of the State in July 
136 Bedan, J. Capital Punishment in Europe, CUP, 1989, p. 11. 
137 Hood, p. l0. 
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1987 issued a law stating clearly that the abolition of the death penalty 
was in accordance with the recommendations " ... of the United 
Nations for the gradual removal of the death penalty from the lives of 
nations" (Al, 136 ). 
5.2.4. Hungary. 
Until recently, Hungary was a retentionist country. But in 1990, 
Hungary abolished the death penalty for all crimes. Before that, 
Hungary had many offenses that were punishable by death. The 
execution methods were hanging and shooting by firing squad. 
5.2.5. Turkey. 
Although Turkey is a full member of the European community, and in 
spite of all entreaties from the other European countries to the Turkish 
government to abolish the death penalty, Turkey still retains the death 
penalty. Indeed, in 1988 the European Parliament called on the 
government of Turkey "to take the necessary steps to commute all 
death sentences pending in the country until such time as this 
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abominable penalty is abolished"( Al, p. 221). The method of 
execution is hanging. 
5.2.6. Netherlands. 
The Netherlands, has abolished the death penalty. The Netherlands is 
a full member of the European Parliament and is one of the countries 
that has signed the six protocols, indicating its intention to ratify it and 
to abolish the death penalty. 
5.2.7. Norway. 
Norway abolished the death penalty for all offenses in 1979. In its 
proposal to parliament to abolish the death penalty for all offenses, the 
government stated that it is an inhumane, punitive measure, [and] that 
the government was taking a principled stand against the death penalty 
for humanitarian reasons (Al, p. 187). The last execution was carried 
out in 1876 and the method of execution was beheading. 
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5.2.8. Spain 
While Spain has abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, it 
retains this penalty only for exceptional crimes, as offenses against the 
state and offenses of a military nature during time of war. The last 
execution was 1975. The method of execution was shooting by firing 
squad. 
5.2.9. Austria. 
Austria abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1968. Article 85 
of the Austrian Constitution states, "The death penalty is abolished" 
( Al 
, p. 
103). The last execution was in 1950. 
5.2.10. Denmark. 
This country abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes in 1933, 
but its laws provided for the death penalty to be enacted for murder 
and crimes against the state. In 1954 Denmark reintroduced the death 




The death penalty has been abolished for ordinary crimes only. 
However, Italy retains the death penalty for a wide range of offenses 
against the state. The last execution was in 1947. The method of 
execution was shooting by firing squad. 
5.2.12. Luxembourg. 
Abolished the death penalty for all offenses in 1979. However, "the 
constitution does not explicitly rule out its use" (Al, p. 170). The last 
execution was 1949. and the methos of execution was beheading. 
5.2.13. San Marino. 
San Marino abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1865. The last 
execution was carried out in 1968. 
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5.2.14. Sweden. 
Sweden, did abolish the death penalty for all offenses until 1972. In 
fact, the Swedish Constitution states, "No law or other regulation may 
imply that a sentence for capital punishment can be pronounced" (Al, 
p. 211). Interestingly, the Swedish law applies not only to Swedish 
citizens, but to alien residents as well. 
5.2.15. Switzerland. 
Switzerland has abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes only, 
but the death penalty is applicable for "desertion to the enemy" (Al, 
p. 211). The last execution was in 1944. 
5.2.16. Other Western European Nations. 
Iceland has abolished the death penalty for all offenses in 1928, and 
the last execution was in 1930. In Portugal, the Constituent Assembly 
abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1976. The Portuguese 
constitution states clearly that " 1. That Human life is inviolable. 2. In 
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no case will there be the penalty of death" (Al, p. 193). The last 
execution was in 1849. The death penalty was abolished for all crimes 
in Finland in 1972. The last execution was in 1942. Belgium, on the 
other hand, has abolished the death penalty only in practice. Although 
Belgium retains the death penalty for ordinary crimes, no execution 
has been carried since 1950. The methods of execution were 
beheading by caladenia or shooting by firing squad. 138 
5.3. Eastern Europe. 
Many countries in Eastern Europe have abolished the death penalty. 
This is but one indication of the sweeping political changes taking 
place in these countries as the Communist (authoritarian) forms of 
government supported by the former Soviet Union give way to 
democracies. For example, in 1989, Romania abolished the death 
penalty for all offenses. Also, the Czech and Slovak Federated 
Republics ( formerly Czechoslovakia) abolished the death penalty; it 
was an "exceptional measure. " This was before the civil war. Russia, 
138 Hood, p. 11-14. 
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once the keystone of the former Soviet union, has restored the death 
penalty after previously having abolished it . 
5.4. Australia and New Zealand 
In 1984 the death penalty was abolished in Western Australia, the last 
Australian state to retain the death penalty for ordinary offenses 
(Queensland, 1922; Tasmania, 1968; Victoria, 1975; South Australia, 
1976). New Zealand, on the other hand, abolished the death penalty 
for all crimes in 1989. The last execution was in 1975. 
5.5. Africa 
Most African countries have maintained the death penalty. For 
examples, Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tonga, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire ý 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The methods of execution are hanging, 
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shooting by firing squad, and beheading by guillotine. Yet there are 
a few African countries whose laws do not provide for the death 
penalty for all crimes. For example, Mozambique abolished the death 
penalty for all offenses in 1990; Seychelles abolished the death penalty 
for all the crimes 11 11979; and Cape Verde abolished the death penalty 
for all the crimes M1981. Also, there are a few countries whose laws 
provide for the death penalty for ordinary crimes, but which have not 
executed anyone during the last 10 years or more. Examples are Niger, 
Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, and Togo. 139 
5.6. The Middle East 
Most of the countries in the Middle East retain and use the death 
penalty for ordinary crimes. The list of the capital crimes varies from 
one country to another, depending on the form of the government and 
its legal system. Certainly, there are "no official initiatives or plans to 
abolish the death penalty for any... offenses. "14o 
139 Hood, pp. 19-20. 
140 ibid pp. 16-17. 
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Indeed, some of these countries, such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, use the 
death penalty daily. Others, like Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen have maintained 
the death penalty for a wide range of crimes--sometimes over 25 
offenses. The methods of execution in these countries are hanging 
(public executions usually are attended by government officials); 
shooting by firing squad; and beheading by sword, especially in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen ( public execution ). Bahrain is the only country in 
the Middle East that retains the death penalty for ordinary crimes but 
has not executed anyone since 1977. Israel, on the other hand, has 
abolished the death penalty for crimes against the Jewish people. 
5.7. Asia and the Pacific 
Japan, in spite of its relatively low crime rate, retains and uses the 
death penalty for ordinary crimes. The law in Japan gives "several 
criteria for the imposition of a death penalty: that more than one 
person is killed; that the murderer does not show any repentance and 
has not been forgiven by the family of the victim"( Al, p. 158). 
Consequently, there has been a significant decrease in the number of 
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executions to one or two a year. 
"Japan 
... retains the death penalty at the same time that it manifests 
decreasing crime rate .... 
It is widely accepted among Japanese 
citizens that the safe, secure environment in which they live is very 
much a product of the deterrent effect brought by the retention of 
capital punishment. "141 The method of execution is hanging. 
Something worth mentioning here is that usually no public 
announcement is made of the executions and they are not reported in 
the press. Such secrecy [is necessary to protect] the family of the 
prisoner from the shame of having it known that their relative has been 
executed (AI, p, 158). 
China ( People's Republic) retains and uses the death penalty for all 
ordinary crimes. Unlike Japan, in China executions are widely 
"publicized in the national and local media and mass sentencing rallies 
attended by thousands of people have been held to expose offenders 
condemned to death to the public before being executed" (Al, p. 121). 
Usually, the method of execution is shooting by firing squad in public. 
141 McCuen & Baumgart, Capital Punishment in Asia, Mentor 1995, p. I 11. 
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Fiji abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes in 1979, but 
retains the death penalty for the crimes of treason and genocide. The 
last execution was in 1964. 
Papua New Guinea abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes in 
1974, but retains the death penalty for treason and attempted piracy 
with personal violence. The last execution was in 1950. 
The Philippines abolished the death penalty for all crimes is 1987. The 
law in Philippines states: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor 
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the 
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving 
heinous crimes, the congress hereafter provides for it" (Al, p. 191). 
Bhutan retains and uses the death penalty for ordinary crimes, but has 
not executed anyone since 1874. Likewise, Sri Lanka has not carried 
out any execution penalties. The method of execution is hanging. But 
Malaysia and Indonesia both retain and use the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes. The method of execution in Malaysia is hanging, 
while the method of execution in Indonesia is shooting by firing squad. 
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Nepal has abolished the death penalty for ordinary offenses, but 
reintroduced the death penalty in 1985 after bomb explosions in which 
several people were killed. India, on the other hand, retains and uses 
the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The methods of executions are 
hanging or shooting by firing squad. 
5.8. The Caribbean 
Haiti abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1987. Indeed, in 
"Article 20 of the section relating to the fundamental rights of citizens 
states. " The death penalty " is abolished in all cases" (Al, p. 144). 
Cuba, on the other hand, retains and uses the death penalty for 
ordinary crimes. The method of execution is shooting by firing squad. 
Although Bermuda retains the death penalty for ordinary crimes, it has 
not executed anyone since 1977. Like Bermuda, Grenada retains and 
uses the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The execution method is 
hanging. Guyana retains and uses the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes. The method of execution is hanging. Barbados retains and uses 
the death penalty for ordinary crimes since 1976. Trinidad and Tobago 
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retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The method of 
execution is hanging. 
5.9. South and Central America 
The death penalty issue is a controversial issue in Latin America. 
Indeed, for years the region was sharply divided. But recently, most 
of the countries of the region either have abolished the death penalty 
for all crimes or have not executed anyone for the last 10 years or 
more. In fact, only two countries retain and use the death penalty 
now. Seven nations have abolished the death penalty for all crimes: 
Colombia in 1910; Costa Rica in 1877; Dominican Republic in 1966; 
Ecuador in 1906; Honduras in 1958; Nicaragua in 1979; Panama in 
1972; Uruguay in 1907; and Venezuela in 1863. Five other countries 
have abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes only, but retain 
and use the death penalty only for exceptional crimes against the state. 
5.10. Trends and Conclusions 
Trends and Conclusions of the 176 nations in the world, only 92 
retentionist nations use the death penalty as possible punishment for 
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ordinary crimes (see Table 1 ). In most of these retentionist countries, 
especially the Republic of China, which experienced violent student 
demonstrations in the summer of 1989, Iraq after the Gulf War, Iran 
and its struggle with the Mojahedme Khelg Organization, and Yemen 
after the recent civil war, executions have become a daily routine. The 
44 abolitionist nations have abolished the death penalty for all crimes 
(see Table 2). There are 17 abolitionist nations that have abolished the 
death penalty for ordinary crimes only (see Table 3). and 25 
abolitionist de facto nations have not carried out any execution at all 
for the last 10 years or more (see Table 4). 
On average, at least two nations each year have legally abolished the 
death penalty, or had abolished it earlier for ordinary crimes, and then 
went on to abolish it for all crimes. Indeed, only Belgium and the 
United States (the federal government and 37 states) are among the 
Western nations that still retain and use the death penalty. Amongst 
these Countries are : Argentina in 1984; Brazil in 1979; EL Salvador 
in 1983; Mexico in 1971; Nepal in 1990; and Peru in 1979. Only two 
countries retain the death penalty for ordinary crimes, but have not 
carried out any executions for the last 10 years or more. They are 
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Bolivia and Paraguay. The other states that still use the death penalty 
for ordinary crimes are Chile and Guatemala. The methods of 




Countries and territories which retain and use the death penalty for ordinary crimes. * 
Afghanistan Cuba Lebanon Singapore 
Albania Dominica Liberia Somalia 
Algeria Egypt Malawi South Africa 
Angola Equatorial Guinea Malaysia Sudan 
Antigua and Barbuda Mali Suriname Ethiopia 
Mauritius Swaziland Bahamas Gabon 
Mongolia Syria Bangladesh Gambia 
Morocco Taiwan Barbados Grenada 
Tanzania Belize Guatemala Nigeria 
Thailand Benin Guinea Oman 
Tonga Botswana Guinea-Bissau Pakistan 
Trinidad & Tobago Bulgaria Poland Burkina Faso 
Guyana Qatar Tunisia Burundi 
India Russia Turkey Cameroon 
Iran Rwanda Uganda Central African 
Republic 
Iraq United Arab Emirates Jamaica Japan 
USA Chad Jordan Saint Lucia 
Chile Kenya Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Vietnam 
China (People's Republic) Korea (North) Korea (South) Yugoslavia 
Kuwait Saudi Arabia Zaire Congo 
Laos Sierra Leone Zambia Zimbabwe 
Yemen 
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Total: 85 countries and territories 
* Most of these countries and territories are known to have carried out 
executions during the past 10 years. One some countries Amnesty 
International has no record of executions but is unable to ascertain 
whethere or not executions have in fact been carried out. 
Source: Amnesty International, January 30,1991 
TABLE 2 
ABOLITIONIST FOR ALL CRIMES 
0"000""0"0"00900"00"000"""0000900""00009009"0080000" 
Countries whose laws do not provide for the death penalty for any 
crime 
Country Date of Abolition Date of Last Execution 
Andorra 1990 1943 
Australia 1985 1967 
Austria 1968 1950 
Cambodia 1989 ---- 
Cape Verde 1981 1935 
1910 1909 
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Costa Rica 1877 ---- 
Czech & Slovak 1990 1988 
Denmark 1978 1950 
Domincan Republic 1966 ---- 
Ecuador 1905 ---- 
Finland 1972 1944 
France 1981 1977 
Federal Republic of Germany 194911987*** 1949*** 
Haiti 1987 1972* 
Honduras 1956 1940 
Hungary 1990 1988 
Iceland 1928 1830 
Ireland 1990 1954 
Kiribati ---- ** 
Liechtenstein 1987 1785 
Luxembourg 1979 1949 
Marshall Islands ---- ** 
Micronesia ---- 
Mozambique 1990 1986 
Namibia 1990 1988* 
Netherlands 1982 1952 
(Continued on next page) 
Table 2, continued 
Country Date of Abolition Date of Last Execution 
New Zealand 1989 1957 
Nicaragua 1979 1930 
Norway 1979 1948 
Panama ---- 1903* 








San Marino 1865 1468* 
Sao Tome and Principe 1990 ** 
Solomon Islands ---- ** 
Sweden 1972 1910 
Tuvalu ---- 
Uruguay 1907 ---- 
Vanatu ---- 
Vatican City State 1969 ---- 
Venezuela 1863 ---- 
Total: 44 countries 
---- Date is not known 
* Date of the last known execution 
** No execution since independence 
*** The death penalty was abolished in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) in 1949 and in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1987. 
The last execution in the FRG was in 1949; the last date of execution in 
the GDR is not known. The FRG and GDR were unified in October 
1990. The name of the united country is the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
Source : Amnesty International, January 30,1991. 
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TABLE 3 
ABOLITIONIST FOR ORDINARY CRIMES ONLY 
Countries whose laws provide for the death penalty only for the 
exceptional crimes such as crimes under military law or crimes 
committed in exceptional circumsatnces, such as wartime. 
Country Date of Abolition Date of Last Execution 
Argentina 1984 ---- 
Brazil 1979 1855 
Canada 1976 1962 
Cyprus 1983 1962 
El Salvador 1983 1973* 
Fiji 1978 1964 
Israel 1954 1962 
Italy 1947 
Malta 1971 1943 
Mexico ---- 1937 
Nepal 1990 1979 
Papua New Guinea 1974 1950 
Peru 1979 
Seychelles ---- 
Spain 1978 1975 
Switzerland 1942 1944 
United Kingdom 1973 1964 
Total : 17 coun tries. Date is not known 
* Date of last known execution 
** No executions since independence 
Source: Amnesty International, January 30,1991. 
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TABLE4 
ABOLITIONIST DE FACTO 
.................................................... 
Countries and territories which retain the death penalty for ordinary 
crimes but have not executed anyone during the past ten years or 
more. 
Country Date of Last Execution Country Date of Last Execution 
Anguilla 1920s Hong Kong 1966 
Bahrain 1977 Madagascar 1958* 
Belgium 1950 Maldives 1952 
Bermuda 1977 Montserrat 1961 
Bhutan 1964* Nauru ** 
Bolivia 1974 Niger 1976* 
British Virgin Islands ---- Paraguay 1928 
Brunei Darussalam 1957 Samoa, Western ** 
Cayman Islands 1928 Senegal 1967 
Comoros ** Sri Lanka 1976 
Cote d'Ivoire ---- Togo ---- 





Total: 25 countries and territories 
* Date of last execution 
** No execution since independence 
---- Date is not known 
(In keeping with the system of classification used by the United Nations in its 
quinquennial reports on capital punishment, all of these countries and territories 
can be considered abolitionist de facto in that they have not carried out executions 
for the past 10 years or more. However, death sentences have continued to be 
imposed in a number of these countries and territories, and not all of them have 
a policy of regulalry commuting sentences). 
Source Amnesty International, January 30,1991 
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Many countries have wavered back and forth. For example, Brazil 
abolished the death penalty 1111890, restored it in 1969, and abolished 
it again in 1979. Likewise, Spain abolished the death penalty in 1932, 
returned it in 1934, and abolished it again in 1978. This succession of 
abolitions and restorations is a good indication of changing 
governmental styles: from democratic to dictatorship forms of 
governments and back again. The sweeping political changes that have 
taken place in Eastern Europe [from authoritarian ( Communist) forms 
of government supported by the former Soviet Union to democracies] 
have helped these countries to change their positions on the death 
penalty. 
TABLE 5 
Nations Studied Nations with a death 
penalty 
Patrick Study (1958-62) 128 107 (86%) 
Amnesty International (1979) 156 136 (87%) 
Wiechman (1980-85) 163 126 (77%) 
Amnesty International (1987) 172 110 (64%) 
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In fact, most of them have abolished the death penalty recently. No 
doubt the majority of nations have supported the death penalty. In 
comparing the usages of the death penalty from a historical viewpoint, 
the following data show consistent support for the death penalty. l42 
Which Crimes Carry a Death penalty ? Capital crimes vary from one 
country to another, depending on culture, religion, economics, politics, 
and form of government. In some countries the list of offenses 
punishable by death is short, while in some other countries the list is 
longer. For example, in Iraq and Iran, offenses that are punishable by 
death comprise over 25 crimes. In Saudi Arabia, however, the list is 
very short . 
Which Nations have the Death penalty ? Obviously, in general most 
of the nations in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and in 
the Caribbean retain the death penalty. Indeed, most of the nations that 
have used the death penalty have less freedom of the press, less 
concern with the value of human life, and more political instability. 
142 Wiechmann & Bae, The Penalty for Capital Crimes, Macmillan, 1991, p. 134. 
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5.11. The Death penalty and the United Nations. 
At the beginning, the United Nations's position on death penalty was 
a product of compromise among those nations that wanted to abolish 
it for all crimes; those countries that wanted to abolish it for ordinary 
crimes, but wanted to retain and use it for exceptional crimes against 
the state; and those that wanted to use it for all crimes. In 1966, the 
UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2200 (XXI ), Article 6 of 
the Covenant, which reads: 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence 
of death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in 
accordance with the law enforce at the time of the commission of the 
crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and 
of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgment rendered by a competent court. 
181 
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is 
understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State party 
to the present Covenant to derogate in any way for any obligation 
assumed under the provisions for the convention on the prevention and 
punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
4. Anyone sentenced to death penalty shall have the right to seek 
pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or 
commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on 
pregnant women. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the 
abolition of capital punishment by any State party to the present 
covenant. 
The United Nations has dealt with the issue of the death penalty in 
several documents. Indeed, in the last three decades, many resolutions 
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have been passed. Among them is General Assembly Resolution 2393 
(XXIII), passed on November 26,1968, which includes certain 
conditions which every nation that uses the death penalty as possible 
punishment should follow: 
(I) A person condemned to death shall not be deprived of the right to 
appeal to higher judicial authority or, as the case may be, to petition 
for pardon. 
(ii) A death sentence shall not be carried out until the procedures of 
appeal or, as the case may be, of petition for pardon or reprieve have 
been terminated. 
(iii) Special attention shall be given in the case of indigent persons by 
the provision of adequate legal assistance at all stages of the 
proceedings. 
In 1971, the General Assembly passed resolution 2857 (XXVI ): 
In order to guarantee fully the right to life, provided for in Article 3 of 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the main objective to be 
pursued is that of progressively restricting the number of offenses for 
which capital punishment may be imposed, with a view to the 
desirability of abolishing this punishment in all countries. 
The Economic and Social Council Resolution 1574 (L) of the same 
year made a similar declaration. The report of the Secretary General 
on Capital Punishment ( February 8,1980) pointed out that, The 
United Nations has gradually shifted from the position of a neutral 
observer concerned about, but not committed, on the question of the 
death penalty, to a position favouring the eventual abolition of the 
death penalty. From the moral standpoint, the United Nations has 
followed the guidance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
From the practical or utilitarian point of view, [ the United Nations 
has] called only for the "eventual abolition of capital punishment. 
As a result of these resolutions, and the work of the Amnesty 
International organization, which is unconditionally opposed the death 
penalty, the United Nations has had periodic conferences and has 
issued reports concerned with the status of the death penalty around 
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the world. 
5.12. The Death Penalty and Cultural Relativism 
In 1947 the newly formed United Nations' agency UNESCO was 
given the task of drafting an international bill whose sole purpose was 
to state a concept of human rights that could accommodate the 
differing political beliefs, economic systems, religions, and cultures of 
the member states of the United Nations. A year later, the manifesto 
was given the name of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
December 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes 
a list of 15 specific rights that it grouped under three headings: 
( a) rights to live, 
(b) rights to live well, 
(c) rights to social participation . 
This historic document was based on the general agreement that 
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claims protected by human rights derive from the requirements of 
"human dignity, " but it largely left open the question of what human 
dignity requires and how to best to secure it. Consequently, the 
member states of the United Nations are classified into three groups-- 
first-, second-, and third-world nations. 
The first-world nations (liberal, demoratic, developed) stress the 
priority of individual rights and powers that protect the autonomous 
choices of individuals free from interference by governments. Thus, in 
these nations, rights as freedom of religion and freedom of speech are 
given great weight, whereas economic rights are given less weight. 
The second-world nations (socialist, authoritarian, developed ), there 
are no fixed individual rights; instead, an individual's nature is as a 
social or communal being whose particular characteristics are formed 
by her social, economic, and historical conditions of his or her 
society. These nations stress economic rights more than liberty and 
freedom rights. 
The third-world nations (mixed economy, little or no ideology, but 
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developing) stress group rights and rights of national or ethnic self- 
determination. Indeed, rights in these nations are neither the natural 
possession of individuals nor are they historically conditioned goods 
granted by governments; rather, derive from the relationship 
between individuals and the cultures they inhabit and from the 
interaction between them. Because these countries have defined 
themselves in terms of ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic nations, 
great emphasis is placed on the individual's relation to traditionally 
defined communal groups and the rights of these groups to cultural 
self-determination. Consequently, the major compromise of the United 
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights was to include all 
three of these categories. 
The drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights confronted 
a serious problem to formulate a universal notion of human rights that 
could be accepted by all the member states of the United Nations, not 
merely a statement of rights reflecting Western culture and political 
values. Consequently, as part of its contribution to the human rights 
bill, the American Anthropological Association issued a statement on 
human rights that emphasizes culture rights. The statement asserts that 
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the rights of human individuals "must be based on a recognition of 
the fact that the personality of the individual can develop only in terms 
of the culture of his society" and urges that "respect for cultural 
differences" be a guiding principle in formulating any statement of 
human rights. 143 The statement goes on to point out that, "respect for 
differences between cultures is validated by the scientific fact that no 
technique of qualitatively evaluating cultures has been discovered. ""' 
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights embraces and 
recognizes the validity of many different ways of life: 
"Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they 
derive so that any attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the 
beliefs or moral codes of one culture must to that extent detract from 
the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to mankind as a 
whole. 11145 
Rather than imposing a single, rigid standard of ethical and political 
values, the relativism, pluralism of values, and cultural tolerance must 
143 Winston, S. The Philosophy of Human Rights, 1989. p. 104. 
144 ibid. p. 104. 
145 ibid, p. 119. 
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be adopted as the universal standard. 
From moral obligation, the United Nations has followed the guidance 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through Amnesty 
International, the Nobel Prize-winning human rights organization, and 
other organizations, the United Nations maintains information on the 
use and non-use of the death penalty throughout the world. Regularly 
the United Nations monitors death sentences and executions around 
the world and sometimes appeals for clemency whenever it learns of 
an imminent execution. By doing so, the United Nations recognizes 
the fact that some regional differences in capital crimes occur. 
"Homicide is most likely to be found as a capital offense in Africa, the 
Mediterranean, and Eurasia; stealing, in Africa and the Mediterranean; 
sacrilegious acts, in North America, Africa, and Oceania; and treason 
in Oceania. ""' 
il 
The laws vary from culture to culture; therefore, it is natural to assume 
that what is considered a capital crime will vary from culture to 
culture. For example, in the Arab world in general and in the Muslim 
146 Otterbein, K. F. The Ultimate Coercive Sanction, Haraf, p. 43. 
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in particular, the issue of the death penalty is not matter of data or 
statistics or the opinions of sociologists and criminologists; it is a 
matter of following God's law. For Muslims, no amount of negative 
data makes disobedience of God's word an acceptable alternative. 
Furthermore, the Muslims recognize that the Quran teaches that the 
fear of punishment does deter. 
5.13. The Death penalty Under the Current International Law. 
For the last half-century, the effort to transform the universal 
Declaration of Human Rights into real rights has taken the form of 
international treaties and covenants, which when ratified by sovereign 
countries acquire the status of international law. Indeed, "the 
international law of human rights derives principally from 
contemporary international agreements in which states undertake to 
recognize, respect, and promote specific rights for the inhabitants of 
their own countries. "147 The major treaties for the international 
protection of human rights are the International Covenant on Civil and 
147 Winston, p. 131. 
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Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). These two treaties together 
"legislate essentially what the universal Declaration had declared. 
""' 
Among the rights protected by the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights are the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Under 
this agreement, countries are "required to report on their compliance 
to a Human Rights Committee. As regards states that agree to optional 
provisions, the committee may also receive complaints of violation 
from other states or from individuals. "149 Thus, any individual whose 
rights is being violated has the right to send a petition directly to the 
International Human Rights Movement or to any international 
organization for that matter, such as the European Human Rights 
Commission, Amnesty International, for help. Basically, these 
organizations have the power to "inquire, intercede, quietly seek 
redress, later expose unrepaired violations to publicity. -)!, 150 
148 ibid. 




ISLAMIC LAW: SHARI'AH 
O ye who believe Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, 
even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether 
it be ( against) yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether 
it be ( against) rich or poor: For (against) rich or poor: for Allah can 
best protect both. (Quran, 4: 135) 
In today's Muslim world there is overwhelming public demand for 
reviving the Islamic judicial institution and re-enforcing the jurisdiction 
or the Islamic penal system. Islam is not only a religion which is 
concerned with the spiritual side of human life. It is, rather, an all- 
encompassing system of life which has adequate rules and regulations 
for all aspects of human life. The purpose of this chapter is to present 
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a brief overview of Islamic law ( shard 'ah), including its 
characteristics as well as its objectives. 
6.1. Islamic Law: Shari'ah 
For Westerners, law means a set of rules and regulations which 
govern relations among people; it is a set of rules and regulations 
which mirrors the ideas and ideals of a society, and is enacted by some 
authority like a legislative body; it is a code of regulations behind 
which stand the courts and the police force. But in the Muslim world, 
there is a concept of "certitude" (`ilm Al Yaqin) in matters of Good 
(hassn) and Evil ( qabih) Muslims strongly believe that man, because 
of his limitations, cannot understand what Good and Evil are. 151 
Therefore, man-made law is unacceptable; besides his limitations, 
man is incapable of rising above his evil propensities. Thus, just the 
idea that man has the ability and the capability to legislate for others 
is scarcely acceptable. Western laws are admittedly imperfect, and 
Western countries endeavour to perfect them by a continuing process 
of legislation. Islamic law, on the other hand, proceeds from a divine 
151 Fyzee, A. Outlines of Muhammadan Law, Oxford, 1974, p. 15. 
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source. It derives partly from the Quran, the very word of Allah (the 
Arabic word for God), and partly from the Prophet Muhammad's 
utterances, inspired by Divine Wisdom. It is regarded as perfect and 
eternal, designed for all people and for all time and places. Indeed, 
Muslims call their eternal law simply the "pathway": shari 'ah. In 
fact, the shari 'ah embraces all human actions. Consequently, the 
shari 'ah is not `law' in the modern sense; it contains an infallible 
guide to ethics. It is fundamentally a Doctrine of duties, a code of 
obligations. Thus, the shari 'ah combines the secular and spiritual 
aspects of life simultaneously. The purpose of the shari 'ah is to help 
all people to attain happiness in both worlds (in this world and the 
hereafter). Any violation of the shari 'ah invokes two punishments: one 
in this world and the other in the afterlife. For example, if one does 
bad deeds, he will be punished by the state for his action. But suffering 
a penalty, for instance going to jail or paying a fine, does not abolish 
his sin in the afterlife, unless he repents and asks Allah's forgiveness. 
Thus, Islamic law is different from Western law in that it combines 
religion with secular deeds and promulgates precepts not only for this 
worldly life but for the afterlife as well. "' 
152 Hasan, A. The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Research 
Academy, Pakistan. 1988, pp. 2-3. 
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Islam in Arabic denotes submission, specifically to the will of Allah. 
The doctrine of total submission to Allah may be traced to Hagar's 
encounter with Most High: "And she called the name of the LORD 
that spoke unto her, Thou God seest me: for she said, have I also 
here looked after him that seeth me? ""' Islam stresses the unity and 
sovereignty of Allah. However, since Allah is remote and invisible, 
man can only submit to His Will and not to His person. 1"4 
Islam is a way of life with a clear set of universally binding beliefs 
which designate every aspect of conduct. In spite of division among 
its adherents, Islam unifies every Muslim, binds them to each other 
with a common faith, and unites them around certain explicit tenets 
and practices. 
The basis of all Islamic law (shari 'ah) is the Quran, which is 
understood by Muslims to contain the last precise words of Allah, 
which were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic by Angel 
153 Gen. 16: 13 
is4 Surah Ikhlas. 
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Gabriel over a period of 22 years (A. D. 610-632). As the word of 
Allah, the Quran is immutable. Since its revelation, the text of the 
Quran has not changed even in minutest detail. The Quran is divided 
into 114 surahs ( chapters), which are in turn comprised of ayah, 
which is equal to a verse, and its exclusive content is instructions 
from Allah. For example, the Quran teaches that human beings are 
utterly responsible to Allah for all that they do or say. Disobedience 
can be forgiven through confession and prayer directly to Allah. Allah 
is the Creator and sustainer of His creation, and He defines right and 
wrong by decree. Only submission to the will of Allah is the norm for 
the Muslims to secure eternal salvation. 155 
The Quran contains two kinds of rules, general and specific. The 
general rules are far more numerous. The specific rules tend to deal 
with matters of worship or with matters relating to family, 
commercial, or criminal law. Other matters, including those in the 
area of constitutional law, governed by general rules. Since general 
rules, by their very nature, require interpretation before they can be 
applied to specific contexts, they are the source of a fair amount of 
155 Doi, A. R. Introduction to the Quran, Islamic publications, Nigeria, 1971, pp. 40-45. 
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flexibility. Therefore, the Quran's predominant reliance on general 
rules has been viewed by fagih (jurists) as an indication of divine 
mercy and a wish to facilitate for Muslims the practice of their laws 
throughout the ages. "' 
A faqih is a jurist or a person skilled in Islamic law (shari 'ah). One 
needs to distinguish between `ilm which means knowledge, andfiqh, 
which requires both intelligence and independent judgment. Thus, a 
man may be an `aiim ( learned one), but to be a qualified faqih, he 
must possess the capacity to distinguish the correct and binding rules 
of Islamic law from the weak and non binding opinions. A fagih not 
only addresses such basic matters as distinguishing between specific 
and general rules, but goes farther to derive from the general rules, of 
the Quran and the other sources of Islamic law the rules best suited to 
the relevant epoch and community. A noteworthy classical example of 
how the fagih derives and follows the instructions of the Quran and 
the prophet's Tradition (hadith) is as follows: "The Prophet sent 
Mu'adh, one of his Companions, as governor of a province and also 
appointed him as the distributor of justice. No trained lawyers existed 
i 56 Hasan, A. op. cit. 
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then and the Prophet asked: 
"According to what shalt thou judge? " He replied: 
"According to the Tradition of the Messenger of God. 
"And if thou findest nought therein? " 
"Then I shall strive to interpret with my reason. " 
And thereupon the prophet said: "praise be to God who has favoured 
the Messenger who is willing to approve. " This is an excellent 
example that shows and emphasizes the principle that the exercise of 
independent judgment, within certain limits, is not only permissible but 
praiseworthy. 15' 
According to this example, the Quran is the first and the main source 
of Islamic law. Every human action without exception has its 
qualification in Islamic law and would fall under one of the five rules 
(al-ahkam al-khamsah). These five rules cover all human actions and 
deeds, whether they are devotional, civil, criminal, private or public. 
The Islamic theory, God is the Sovereign of the Community of 
believers; He is its ultimate Ruler and Legislator. The Revelation and 
is' Fyzee, op. cit. p. 19. 
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Divine Wisdom are the primary sources of the developing public 
order, presuming to meet the community's growing needs and 
expectations. 
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These legal norms ( al-ahkam al-khamsah) are as follows: 
1. Strict Command (fard or wajib), which means an obligation which 
is strictly enforced by law (for example: prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, 
etc. ). If a person avoids it willfully, he will be punished however he 
or she performs it regularly, he or she will be rewarded. 
2. Strictly forbidden ( Karam), which means unlawful. These are 
actions which should be avoided if at all possible (for example 
stealing, lying, drinking alcohol, using drugs, etc. ), if they are done 
without extenuating circumstances, Allah's punishment will be earned; 
if avoided, there will be reward. 
3. Approved action ( mustahab), which means recommended. 
Included are all acts which individuals are advised to do for their 
"' Khuddari, M. The Islamic Conception of Justice, John Hopkins, 1984. p. 3. 
199 
personal benefit. Examples of this kind would be: washing the mouth 
out when making ablution, rinsing the nose, additional prayers during 
Ramadan, etc. 
4. Refrain, dislike ( makruh), which means to be discouraged. It is 
better to avoid these actions; if avoided, a person receives a reward; 
yet if committed, there is no punishment either. It includes all acts 
which individuals are advised to refrain from for their personal benefit. 
5. Indifferent ( mubah), which means permissible. It includes all acts 
about which shari 'ah is neutral. Muslim faqihs (jurists) have agreed 
upon a number of basic principles of shari 'ah. 
6.2. Change in Time, Place and Circumstance 
A major principle of Islamic jurisprudence is that laws may change 
with the passage of time and the change of place or circumstance. 
Properly understood, this principle permits afaqih (jurist) to examine 
a specific ayah ( verse) in light of both the attendant circumstances of 
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its revelation and its meaning to determine the scope and significance 
of the ayah in general, or with respect to a specific situation at hand. 
A corollary of this principle is that a change in law is permitted 
whenever a custom on which law is based changes. 159 
6.3. Necessity/ Avoidance of Haram 
This principle has also been stated in terms of choosing the lesser of 
two evils. Several Quranic ayats (verses) as well as the hadith clearly 
permit otherwise prohibited actions in the case of necessity or threat 
of severe harm. Some ayats ( verses) state that Allah will forgive 
anyone who breaks the law under duress. A famous saying of the 
Prophet is that Islam is a religion of facilitation and not complication. 
6.4. Cessation of Cause 
Whereas Islamic law applies to specific factual situations, the 
is9 Hasan, A. op. cit. p. 13 . 
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existence of the law itself is dependent on the continued existence of 
that factual situation. For example, the Quran encouraged Muslims to 
give a certain group of Arabs, called al-muallafutu qulubuhum, a 
share of the charitable donations paid by Muslims. This group 
consisted of leaders of local communities who were either not 
Muslims or whose belief in Islam was weak. The share was assigned 
to them in order to bring them closer to Islam. But after the death of 
the Prophet, Khalifah Umar Ibn AL-Khatab refused to continue the 
practice on the basis that it was predicated on Islam's initial weakness. 
Since Islam had become strong, the Khalifah Umar concluded that the 
practice was no longer justifiable. 16o 
6.5. Public Interest161 
Islamic laws must remain in accord with public interest. If they do not 
they must be re-examined and re-formulated. Furthermore, if the 
public interest changes, Islamic laws must do so accordingly. Despite 
160 ibid. pp. 23-67. 
161 Ibn Taymiya, Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of Hisba, Islamic Foundation, 
1982. pp. 19-59. 
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the fact that from its dawn, Islamic law caused a clear change in the 
Arabian Peninsula's religious life, Islam is not a religion of abrupt 
change. Islam itself professes to be a continuation of the teachings of 
Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other prophets. Islam also proclaims that 
the Prophet Muhammad is the last of these prophets. Furthermore, the 
Allah of Islam is the same as the God (Jehovah, Yahweh) of Judaism 
and Christianity. 
The Quran was not revealed all at one time. Rather, it was revealed 
gradually in accordance with the needs and capabilities of society. 
For example, Arabs consumed substantial amounts of alcohol in pre- 
Islamic times. Hence, the Quranic prohibition was only advisory: they 
ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: "In them is great sin, and 
some profit, for men; But the sin is greater than the profit. " They ask 
thee how much they are to spend. Say: "What is beyond your needs. " 
Thus doth Allah make clear to you His signs: in order that ye may 
consider. " (Quran 2: 219). Then it was made binding, but only at the 
time of prayer, "0 ye who believe! Approach not prayers in a state of 
intoxication, until ye can understand all that ye say" ( Quran 4: 43). 
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Later the prohibition became absolute. "0 ye who believe! Intoxicants 
and gambling, sacrificing to stones, and ( divination by) arrows, are 
an abomination of Satan's handiwork: Eschew such (abomination) , 
that ye may prosper" (Quran 5: 90). 
Gradualism is an important feature of Islamic law. It applies to many 
aspects of Islamic life, but not all. There was no gradualism, for 
example, in Islamic rejection of idol worship or the belief in more than 
the one god. These matters are so fundamentally inconsistent with 
Islam that a gradual approach was inapplicable to them. From this, one 
can conclude that legislative power rests initially with Allah, but only 
in sofar as general principles, creeds and rituals are concerned. Some 
of these general principles are: 
The principle of Justice. 
Legal norms are to be applied equally for everybody regardless of 
race, religion, colour, and social status. "Allah commands justice, 
kindness and giving their due to kinsfolk. And He forbids all shameful 
deeds (lewdness, indecency), and abomination (anything which normal 
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human nature rejects) and wickedness. He instructs you in order that 
you may take heed" (Quran 16: 90). Again, Allah through His Holy 
Book instructs the judge to be just: "Allah orders you to restore things 
entrusted to you to those to whom they are due; and when you judge 
between man and man, that you judge with justice" (Quran 15: 58). 
Indeed, Allah orders judges to stand out firmly; "0 you who believe! 
Stand out firmly for justice as witnesses to Allah, even as against 
yourselves or your parents or your kin, and whether it be against rich 
or poor--Follow not the lusts (of Your hearts) lest you swerve. And 
if you distort justice, verily Allah is well acquainted with all that you 
do" (Quran 49: 13). 
Respect for life and human dignAy. 
According to Islamic law, everybody is born innocent and remains in 
this status until proven otherwise. "0 mankind, we have created you 
from a single [pair] of a male and a female and made you into nations 
and tribes, that you may know each other. Verily, the most honoured 
among you in the sight of Allah is [he who is] the most righteous of 
you. And Allah had full knowledge and is well acquainted with all 
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things" ( Quran 39: 13). 
"And do not take life, which Allah has made sacred, except for a just 
cause" (Quranl7: 33). Thus Islamic laws are prescribed in the interest 
of the people and for their own protection. Their goal is to preserve 
not only their own lives and dignity, but also their properties and 
freedom. Generally speaking, all Muslims believe that Islamic laws 
were provided by Allah through His Messenger, the Prophet 
Muhammad, to govern the life of the people individually and 
collectively, meaning, in respect of personal and communal affairs. 
One can conclude that the most important characteristic of Islamic 
laws is that they are part and parcel of the religion itself. It comes from 
within--from the depth of the Muslims' faith and their sentiments 
concerning Islam. 
Unlike the Western legal system, where legislators write the laws and 
the people comply with the laws only to avoid penalties and 
punishment, Islamic laws are self-motivating; they must be observed 
by the Muslims internally. This means that Muslims must obey these 
laws because the legislator is Allah Himself; and the punishments are 
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not earthly, but in Heaven. This factor also leads Muslims to refrain 
from violating these laws. Consequently, unlike in the western 
societies, the rate of crimes is usually very low. Thus, it is not the 
police, or j all, or for that matter any kind of punishment, that counts; 
Muslims demonstrate without doubt that the internal observance of 
these laws is the most effective way to protect society from any kind 
of crimes. Certainly, such strict observance of these laws is the 
outcome of a strong faith in Allah and a strong belief in the idea that 
all these laws for the benefit of all people and that they are divine 
laws. Khadduri (1984 ) points out that: 
The principle and maxims of justice derived from the Revelation and 
Divine Wisdom were considered infallible and inviolable, designed for 
all time and potentially capable of application to all men. In principle, 
the law laid down by the Divine legislator is an ideal and perfect 
system. 162 Submission to these laws comes from the meaning of the 
word Islam. Islam means submission to Allah. Consequently, the 
notion of submission to Allah, through accepting the fact that Allah is 
the Creator, is the most fundamental requirement of Islam. Indeed, 
162 Khadduri, p. 3. 
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Muslims strongly believe that all things between earth and heaven are 
Muslims by the nature of their submission to divine laws. Yet man is 
different from the rest of the creatures in one respect. Unlike animals 
and other creatures, man possesses free will to a large degree. 
Therefore, man has the ability and capability to observe the unity of 
the universe while submitting to Allah. To do so completes that unity 
and integrates all into the concerted movement of things toward Allah 
in accordance with His Will. Characteristics of the Islamic Law: 
Shari 'ah. 
D1Vlill 
Allah has disclosed Himself through revealed law and communicated 
His will and justice to all people through His Messenger, the Prophet 
Muhammad, while the Western laws in general have been made by 
men ( legislators ). Each part of Islamic law reflects with clarity the 
genius of its legislator, whereas the Western laws reflect the 
limitations, weaknesses, and the shortcomings of their legislators. 
Consequently Western laws are constantly in a state of change and 
modification, or what is usually called legislative evolution in response 
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to certain changes in society and communities. Although Islamic law 
has been in existence for more than fourteen centuries, during which 
time philosophical ideas, sciences, and societies have changed greatly, 
yet this law is still valid and perfect, due to the fact that it reflects its 
creator. It reflects Allah's inimitable knowledge of all that is in being. 
It was compiled by the All-knowledgeable, the All-capable Allah in a 
way that not only suited the past, but also suits the present, and will 
suit the future. 
Despite all the changes that have occurred during the past fourteen 
centuries, Islamic law, owing to its excellence, continues to be 
applicable, and has proven to be in advance of any social standard at 
any time. Quranic injunctions are still more convincing when viewed 
today. For instance, Allah says: "And consult the people [Islamic 
laws] in their affairs .... 
" (Quran 3: 159). And "Their affairs are 
[conducted] by mutual consultation" (Quran 42: 38). Further: "Help 
you one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one 
another in sin and rancour" (Quran 5: 2). 
These verses from the Quran show the extent of generality and 
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elasticity beyond which one cannot go. Islam declares that there is no 
sovereignty except that of Allah. Consequently, it does not recognize 
any law-giver other than Him. The concept of Oneness (tawhid ). 
Which is found in Holy Quran, is not limited to reciting an article of 
faith, performing rituals, or defining dogmas. These have a place in 
Islam, but the concept of oneness embodies Allah's absolute legal 
sovereignty in the same sense in which that term is understood in 
jurisprudence and political science. This aspect of legal sovereignty of 
Allah is clearly emphasized in the Quran by its insistence that tawhid, 
the concept of oneness, embodies both the dogmatic aspect of the 
divine unity and the recognition of Allah's absolute legal sovereignty. 
These two aspects are so vitally interrelated that negating either of 
them ends in the negation of both. 
Islam leaves no room for the impression that the divine law means 
merely the law of nature and nothing more. On the contrary, Islam 
builds the entire edifice of its ideology on the basis that man should 
derive his ethical and social life from the law which Allah has 
communicated through His prophets. It is this submission to the 
divinely revealed injunctions and the surrender to its injunctions which 
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distinguishes the Islamic legal system from the Western legal systems. 
It denies, from the beginning, that man is right to conduct his ethical 
and social life apart from the divine will. Nasr ( 1981 ), one of the 
Muslim scholars, writes: "Divine law is an objective transcendent 
reality, by which man and his actions are judged, not vice versa .. 
To attempt to shape the Divine law to the "times" is, therefore, no less 
than spiritual suicide because it removes the very criteria by which the 
real value of human life and action can objectively be judged and thus 
surrenders man to the most infernal impulses of his lower nature. 163 In 
the Islamic view, opting for the divine legal system frees man from 
being a victim of other men's desires, weakness, and self-interest. It 
is geared to protecting him from being prey to any attempt of others to 
gain advantage by means of legislation for the benefit of a certain 
individual, family, class, race, or party. The ordainer of the Islamic 
legal system is Allah, the Lord of all. He does not legislate for His 
own sake or for that of one class of mankind in preference to another, 
one race in preference to another, or one party in preference to 
another. In the Islamic penal system all punishments and retribution 
163 Nasr, H. Islamic Thought and Life, George Allen, 1981. p. 26. 
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derive ultimately from Allah. Human agencies may be entrusted with 
authority to inflict punishments in certain cases, but Allah's overriding 
power to punish remains unaffected. The ways and means of divine 
punishment are numerous and varied. The divine penal system differs 
from man-made penal systems in its nature. In man-made penal 
systems the threat of penalty is physical, while in the divine penal 
system, physical and metaphysical punishments are combined. The 
latter warns offenders who could escape the eyes of the law in this 
world that Allah's surveillance is everywhere, and a severe 
punishment awaits them on the day of judgment. 
This is innate in the individual--his conscience--prior to his external or 
physical form. Unlike man-made laws, therefore, the impact of Islamic 
law on those who believe in it beyond the physical experience of 
punishment, beyond the feeling of being observed by policemen or any 
other agencies. The impact of Islamic law on the community consists 
in an internal observance of the law as a safeguard against committing 
violations against it. The law itself addresses consciences and spiritual 
sensitivity rather than being a matter of orders and commands 
regarding this temporal life. Islamic law purports to prevent evil acts 
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not only by the observation of man by fellow man, but also by the 
observation of man by Allah. That is because hiding violations is easy, 
but Allah, who knows what man conceals in his heart, is aware of 
every violation as it occurs against His law. 
A Muslim man who is in a position to make mischief without being 
caught and punished almost always will abstain from such deeds for 
fear of punishment in the afterlife and in order not to provoke the 
anger of Allah upon himself. Such a belief helps in curtailing crimes 
and maintaining security and order in society. Man can be deceived, 
but the situation is different when the one who intends to violate the 
divine law remembers that Allah is observing him wherever he goes. 
Thus, if somebody is capable of committing a crime without being 
subjected to any legal prosecution, he will have no restraint, either 
moral or religious, to stop him from commiting his crime. This is a 
reason why in Western nations applying man-made legislation, crimes 
rates are very high. The basic concept of law in Islam is very much 
related to its concept of good (hussnn) and evil ( qabih). Muslims 
believe that man, in his weakness, cannot understand what is good and 
evil without being guided by divine revelation. Good and evil, as 
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Muslims define them, must be taken into consideration in deciding any 
legal matter in Islam. 
Who has the right to determine what is good and what is evil? The 
people's opinions in determining this matter differ from one to another 
according to their different philosophical and ideological beliefs. This 
matter is solved, as far as Muslim jurists are concerned, by divine 
inspiration, not by human beings alone. That is to say, good and evil 
are determined only by Quranic and prophetic texts. From these two 
major sources, the injunctions of the Quran and the Sunnah, whatever 
Muslims consider good or evil is deduced either directly or by way of 
inference. 
Universal and Comprehensive 
Islamic law is characterized by its unique universality and 
comprehensiveness. It was disclosed by Allah to His Messenger 
Muhammad for the propagation of Islam to all peoples, Arabs and 
non-Arabs, Easterners and Westerners. It's a system of 
legislation 
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relevant to each family, each community, each nation, and in fact, it is 
the universal legislation which human canons of law could perceive 
but could not make. Allah says: "Say [ye, Muhammad]: 0 men! I am 
sent unto you all as the Apostle of Allah" ( Qruan 7: 158), and "It is 
He who hath sent His Apostle with guidance and the Religion of Truth 
to proclaim it all Religion" ( Quran 9: 33). Although Allah revealed the 
Quran in a short period or time, His law is complete and 
comprehensive. If any judge, Eastern or Western, scrutinizes the 
Islamic law, he or she will find it complete and comprehensive. 
Indeed, the four main divisions of Islamic law embrace and organize 
all aspects of life: (a) ibadat, or rituals; (b) mu 'amalat, civil law 
(commercial activities, acquiring, holding and disposal of property, 
etc. ); (c) munakahat, or family law (marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
etc. ); (d) `uqubat, or penal law. In fact, Islamic law was not revealed 
just for certain cases; and certain laws were not revealed just for 
certain cases or certain times. It is intended for all people, regardless 
of their religion, colour, language, or origin. It was valid fourteen 
hundred years ago; it is valid today, and it will be valid until the end 
of this world. 
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Code of life 
In order to comprehend the elasticity of the Islamic laws, it is 
necessary to understand, to some extent, how much such a system 
impinges upon Muslim social life. Is its influence limited only to 
fundamentals and basic principles, or does it control all details and 
routine matters of the life of Muslims ? It is a fact that no one who 
possesses deep knowledge about Islam will claim that the Quran and 
Sunnah cover all the minute details of the Muslim's social life. The 
role of the two main sources of the Islamic law is to outline 
fundamental principles and to demarcate ideological boundaries. 
Having done that, the sources allow full freedom to pursue lives within 
that framework, keeping strictly in view the true spirit of Islam which 
leads towards its ultimate objectives. 
The most important principles embodied in the Quran and the Sunnah 
are: 
(a) equality and human brotherhood; 
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(b) forbidding aggression and promoting peace; 
©proteeting human free will in business and promoting the role of 
private ownership and the obligation to fulfill contracts; and 
(d) distinguishing between public and private rights in matters relating 
to penal systems. 
The unalterable elements of Islamic law are those unambiguous laws 
revealed in the Quran as reported in the authentic Sunnah, for 
example, those in which drinking alcohol, interest-taking, gambling, 
stealing, and killing are prohibited. 
Muslims believe that Allah is the only perfect Being and that His law 
participates of His perfection. It cannot be otherwise, for it is 
impossible. Allah is the knower of all things. His law is 
comprehensive, universal, and for all times. It combines not only what 
law is, but also what law ought to be. The Islamic law is a complete 
code of life. It embraces the legal and social orders, which take 
into 
consideration not only the well-being of humanity in this world, 
but 
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also in the hereafter. It deals with all aspects of life. It is, thus, an 
organic whole, parts of which cannot be treated or dealt with in 
isolation from one another. To function successfully, the whole system 
must be applied to human life in order that its merits may be 
demonstrated. 
Muslims claim that Islamic law has its own ethical norms of good and 
evil, virtue and vice, and standards by which it assesses and evaluate 
all human actions and transactions, thereby ensuring the uniformity of 
the society. It has the character of a religious obligation to be fulfilled 
by its followers voluntarily without external enforcement. Believers in 
Islam comply with its commands even if they reside outside of the 
Islamic countries. They believe that its jurisdiction cannot be limited 
by geographical boundaries. Islamic law takes into consideration, 
primarily, the rights of the community. The personal rights of 
individuals are protected in so far as they are not in conflict with the 
rights of the community. In the case of the antinomies (paradoxical 
contradictions ) which surround human life, Islamic law always 
adopts the middle course. It brings about reconciliation between such 
antinomies which otherwise would obstruct the operation of the 
law 
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and interrupt the social order. 
6.5. Objectives of the Islamic Law 
Generally speaking, the objectives of Islamic law are numerous: to 
organize and guide the community, to show the people the right way 
to behave and the right way to treat each other, and to establish order 
and security. 
Furthermore, Islamic law organizes matters concerning individuals, 
societies, governments and administrations, and political affairs as 
well as other matters concerning nations and their relations with others 
during war and peace. Because of this, the provisions of Islamic law 
were far more advanced than the standards of other communities at the 
time Islamic law was inspired. It is still ahead of our time. It is 
exemplary of perfection; its main objective is to lead all people, 
regardless of their origin, race, religion, or language, to do good deeds 
( `aural salih ) and to avoid bad deeds ( `aural quabih) in order to 
achieve happiness and a noble standard that is required by Allah's 
law. There are two kinds of objectives: general and specific. 
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General Objectives 
Islamic law, as a integrated body consisting of social and spiritual 
factors, seeks to accomplish tranquillity and peace of mind for its 
subjects. Its approach to achieving its goals differs from that of 
Western legal systems, incorporating both spiritual and social means. 
The former represents the internal sentiment of human motives which 
govern and control the latter, because the social aspects of any society 
are, presumably, a reflection of its internal spiritual and moral norms. 
Thus, the main and overall objective of Islamic law is to construct 
human life on the basis of purity and virtue by eliminating and 
preventing social vice. That is to say, the major objective of Islamic 
law is in joying what good (al `amrbi al-ma'r-ufj and forbidding what 
is evil ( al -' amr Al - munkar). The term ma 'ruf denotes all the 
virtues and good qualities which have always been accepted by the 
human conscience. Conversely, the term _munkar 
denotes all the sins 
and evils which have always been condemned by human nature. 
Islamic law gives a clear view of what is virtue and what is vice and 
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describes them as norms according to which the behaviours of 
individuals are categorized. The objective of the law is to construct 
the entire scheme of human life in a manner which makes virtues 
flourish and vices die. To accomplish this end, Islamic law embraces 
within its code all the factors that encourage growth of the good and 
the virtuous, and it strongly recommends the removal of impediments 
thereto. 
Muslims believe that through His revealed laws, Allah has provided 
man with regulations to guide him in living and associating with others 
properly and peacefully. The objectives of Islamic law are based upon 
the fact that man has the right to fulfill all of his genuine needs and 
desires and to make every conceivable effort to promote his own 
interests to achieve success and happiness. All this he should do in a 
manner compatible with Allah-revealed laws, a manner that does not 
jeopardize of their rights and duties. Islamic law does not only make 
demands. There should be all possible social cohesion, mutual 
assistance, and cooperation among human beings in the achievement 
of these objectives. The basic approach of Islamic law, in respect to 
matters in which good and evil, gain and loss are inextricable 
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intertwined, is the choice of little loss for the sake of greater gain and 
the sacrifice of a small benefit to avoid greater harm. 
Specific Objectives 
According to Muslim belief, the ultimate objectives of Islamic law are 
known to Allah alone. However, jurists who have carefully studied 
Islamic jurisprudence have determined five basic objectives which 
enshrine basic values and are to be protected by the law. These are: 
life, intellect, property, honour, and conscience. Islamic law, generally 
speaking, seeks to protect and promote these five values as basic 
human rights. 
Protection of Human life. 
The first and foremost value is human life. All sources of Islamic law 
strictly prohibit transgression against human life, whether in the form 
of unnecessary killing, suicide , 
infanticide, or abortion. Islam regards 
life as a trust of Allah granted to a human being; hence, a person 
cannot rightfully destroy it, whether it is his own or someone else's 
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life. In fact, Islamic law prohibits the unecessary destruction even of 
animal life. Thus, killing or mistreating animals just for sport or 
amusement is against the spirit of Islamic law. Further, Islamic law 
does not allow capital punishment except within the framework of the 
due process of law, thus protecting the life of the greatest portion of 
society. Therefore, if a person has committed murder knowingly and 
willingly, he should receive capital punishment for the benefit of 
society. 
Protectin of Human Intellect. 
The second value which is emphatically protected by Islamic law is 
the human intellect. The human mind and intellect are the highest 
values after life; they are the characteristics which distinguish human 
beings from the lower animals. The intellect is, again, an Allah-given 
gift that should not be destroyed or weakened. Subjecting 
it to 
destruction or weakening violates Islamic law and is legally and 
religiously punishable. This is the reason that Islamic 
law strictly 
prohibits intoxication. All addictive substances, 
intoxicating drugs, 
and alcoholic beverages are totally forbidden 
by the law. Ironically, 
223 
many societies in the modem world have recognized the resultant evils 
because of which Islamic law prohibits all addictive drugs, but they 
lack the willpower and courage to forbid them. In the United States of 
America, for instance, it is estimated that there is one death every 20 
minutes which may be attributed to alcohol. More than $120 billion is 
lost every year on alcohol and alcohol-related problems. Alcohol and 
other intoxicants are drastically destroying many lives, minds, 
families, and resources, but few have the courage to say "no" to them. 
Legislators, instead of totally banning these devastating substances, 
have only restricted drivers from operating motor vehicles while being 
intoxicated. It is to be hoped that this recent step will lead to further 
effective ones, not only through moral and motherly perorations, but 
also by forceful legislation. 
Protecting of Human Property 
The third value which is objectively protected by Islamic law is 
property. Islamic law tends to protect possessions of all kinds. Sources 
of Islamic law vehemently condemn misdealing with one's own wealth 
and property, let alone that of someone else. Stealing, pickpocketing, 
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robbery, gambling, and cheating are taken to be outrageous crimes. 
The goal of Islamic law in punishing those who are found guilty of 
committing these crimes is to create a healthy atmosphere for 
economic and commercial development and competition without 
resorting to dubious means. 
Protecting of Human Honour. 
The fourth value which Islamic law stands to protect is honour. Human 
dignity and decency are highly regarded, morally and legally. Man by 
definition, regardless of his origin, colour, race, or belief, has been 
honoured by Allah. Man inherited this honour merely by Allah's 
vicegerent on earth. Undermining human dignity is a violation of the 
divine will. 
"We have honoured the sons of Adam; provided them with transport 
on land and sea; Given them for sustenance things good and pure; and 
conferred on them special favours, above a great part of our Creation. " 
( Quran 17: 70). Islamic law prohibits all types of depreciation or 
degradation of human dignity. From this perspective, Islamic law 
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demands and stresses proper dress and proper behaviour both in public 
and in private for men and women. Marriage, Islam is convinced, is 
the only honorable outlet for the human sexual urge. Sex outside 
marriage is a depreciation of the humanity of the human being. It is 
vehemently condemned by decent people and is punishable by law in 
Islam. 
Islamic law is also opposed to pornography and the exploitation of the 
female. Those who deal in pornography are viewed as evil-minded and 
avaricious. They make a living at the expense of human dignity by 
destroying the moral fabric of the society. They commit crimes in the 
name of freedom and art, claiming that society will be dull and devoid 
of pleasure unless such behaviour is allowed. In fact, they destroy 
families and promote violence, delinquency, rape, and murder in 
plying their trade. Islam forbids these immoralities and calls for 
honorable and dignified enjoyment, and healthful and moral 
entertainment. 
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Protecting of Human Conscience 
Islamic law seeks to protect the human conscience. The word 
conscience in this regard stands for freedom of religion and worship. 
Islamic law is against imposing any dogma of faith upon human 
beings. It is against compulsion and coercion in religious matters. 
Islamic law wishes to create an atmosphere of freedom, for whenever 
there is freedom, there is a greater chance for the teachings which 
Islam espouses to reach the masses. 
These are the basic values that Islamic law objectively stands to 
protect. Anyone who studies Islamic Law will find that, basically, all 
of its sources are oriented either towards protecting these rights or 
towards promoting and perpetuating their existence. It is also 
remarkable that within each and every branch of Islamic law, there are 
specific objectives. The objective of Islamic penal law, for example, 
is to deter those who have a tendency towards committing crimes. 
Thus it puts away the evil from the midst of society. While such 
putting away of evil is applied in the case of the most effective and 
total elimination, namely capital punishment, the principle underlying 
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the elimination of evil provides a theory of punishment applicable to 
all criminal sanctions. It means that the act of punishment is not so 
much directed toward the individual offender, who is not unavoidably 
its victim, as it is a demonstration of disapproval of that particular 
mode of conduct. 
Retribution ( qisas) is inflicted on the offender not so much for his 
own sake as for the deterrence of others. From the viewpoint of the 
divine penal system, the deterrent aspect of qisas is the most 
important. People who hear and see or read about an individual 
heavily punished or being executed for his offense are supposed to be 
deterred from committing the same or a similar offense, thereby 
incurring the risk of receiving similar punishment. Hence, the need for 
the criminal to be executed in a particular place in front of the masses, 
or to be placed on a stage after having been put to death, and to 
publicize the execution as widely and impressively as possible. 
Every legal system is necessarily a purposeful enterprise. According 
to the theological school, law is but the product of human reason and 
is intimately related to the notion of purpose. Although this is not quite 
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true as far as divine law is concerned, all divine legal systems regard 
justice as the supreme task for human life. Public morality is one of the 
most important of human elements to be protected by law. Any legal 
system which is heedless of morality is not worthy of enduring and 
cannot survive for long; it will ultimately be cast aside. 
The Islamic laws are meant to help all people to obtain happiness in 
this life and in the life hereafter. Thus, all deeds in life have their 
connection to worship. Any worship or civil, penal, constitutional, or 
international act has its repercussions on this life; it might be the 
fulfilment of a task, the establishment or nullification of a right, the 
imposition of a penalty, or incurring a responsibility. Yet, any such act 
which has its effects in worldly life has another consequence in the life 
hereafter. For instance, a criminal is punished by death or by the 
chopping off of his limbs, or by any other kind of punishment, all 
these are worldily punishments to be added to even more severe 
punishment on the Day of Judgment. 
"Allah says, The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and 
His Apostle and strive with might and aim for mischief through the 
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land is, execution, or crucifixion, or cutting off hands and feet from 
opposite sides, or exile from the land. That is their disgrace in this 
world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter" ( Quran 5: 
33). 
Further, scandalous tale bearing, and the accusation of a chaste 
woman are punishable both in this world and in the hereafter. Allah 
says, "Those who love [to see] scandal published broadcast among 
believers will have a grievous penalty in this world and in the 
Hereafter" ( Quran 24: 19). 
And again, Allah says: 
"Those who slander chaste women, indiscreetly but believing, are 
cursed in this life and in the Hereafter: For them is a grievous penalty. 
On the day when their tongues, their hands and their feet will bear 
witness against them as to their actions. On that day Allah will pay 
them back [all] their just dues, and they will realize that Allah is the 
[very] Truth, that makes all things manifest" ( Quran 24: 23-25). 
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Intentional murder has two penalties: retaliation in this world and 
torture in the hereafter. Allah says, "ye who believe, retaliation is 
prescribed to you in cases of murder" (Quran 2: 178). And "If a man 
kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is hell, to abide therein 
[forever]" (Quran 4: 93). Indeed, one cannot find a judgment in 
accordance with Islamic law without entailing a consequence in the 
hereafter. Such a law that combines the secular and religious has not 
been haphazardly legislated. It is, in fact, a result of the general logic 
of Islamic law, which considers this world merely a temporary one, 
while the hereafter is the eternal one. Islamic law assumes that man is 
solely responsible for his actions in this life and that he shall always 
have his recompense for the same at least on the Day of Judgment. If 
he does a good deed, it is for his own credit, and if he does bad, he 
shall pay for it in both worlds. Once Ali Ibn Abi-Talib asked the 
Prophet Muhammad about his lifestyle. The Holy Prophet answered: 
Knowledge is my capital; intellect is the basis of my religion; the love 
of Allah in my foundation; the yearning after Him is my vessel; 
remembering Him is my companion; confidence in Him 
in my treasure; 
science is my armament; patience is my garb; satisfaction 
is my booty; 
Truth is my intercessor; obedience is my love; striving along 
Allah's 
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way is my ethics; and the delight of my heart lies in prayer. 
When all Muslims acquire such a personality that they all behave in 
a certain recognizable manner, the society so formed would have a 
collective Islamic personality and would be distinguished by its high 
moral standards. In such a society, crime would be extinct and people 




Application of Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia 
7.1. The Role of Usul al Fiqh in Saudi Decision-making 
Saudi Arabian law is based on Islamic law, therefore it is impossible 
to separate the two. This chapter therefore provides the basic 
principles which underpin the decision-making process in Saudi 
Arabia. The process has evolved over a period of fourteen hundred 
years since the advent of the Prophet Muhammad's mission. Essential 
to the process is usul al filth, which has been most mis-understood in 
the West. 
Usul al filth, or the roots of Islamic law, expound the indications and 
methods by which the rules are deduced from their sources. These 
indications are found mainly in the Quran and Sunnah, which are 
principal sources of the shari 'ah. The rules of fiqh are thus derived 
from the Quran and sunnah in conformity with a body of principles 
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and methods which are collectively known as usul al fiqh. Some 
writers have described usul al fiqh as the methodology of law, a 
description which is accurate but incomplete. Although the methods 
of interpretation and deduction are of primary concern to usul alfiqh, 
the latter is not exclusively devoted to methodology. To say that usul 
al figh is the science of the sources and methodology of the law is 
accurate in the sense that the Quran and Sunnah constitute the sources 
as well as the subject matter to which the methodology of usul alfiqh 
is applied. The Quran and Sunnah themselves, however, contain very 
little by way of methodology, but rather provide the indications from 
which the rules of shari 'ah can be deduced. The methodology of usul 
alfiqh really refers to methods of reasoning such as analogy (qiyas), 
juristic preference (istihsan), presumption of continuity (istishab), 
and rules of interpretation and deduction. These are designed to serve 
as an aid to the correct understanding of the sources and ijtihad. 
To deduce the rules offgh from the indications that are provided in 
the sources is the expressed purpose of usul alfiqh. Fiqh as such 
is 
the end product of usul al fiqh; and yet the two are separate 
disciplines. The main difference between figh and usul alfiqh is that 
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the former is concerned with knowledge of the detailed rules of 
Islamic law in its various branches, and the latter with the methods 
that are applied in the deduction of such rules from the sources. Fiqh, 
in other words, is the law itself whereas usul al fiqh is the 
methodology of the law. The relationship between the two disciplines 
resembles that of the rules of grammar to a language, or logic (mantiq) 
to philosophy. Usul alfiqh in this sense provides standard criteria for 
the correct deduction of the rules of fiqh from the sources of the 
shari 'ah. An adequate knowledge of the fiqh neccessitates close 
familiarity with the sources. This is borne out in the definition of figh, 
which is `knowledge of the practical rules of shari 'ah acquired from 
the detailed evidence in the sources. ' The knowledge of the rules of 
figh, in other words, must be acquired directly from the sources, a 
requirement which implies that the faqih must be in contact with 
sources of the fiqh. Consequently a person who learns the figh in 
isolation from its sources is not afaqih. The faqih must know not only 
the rule that misappropriating the property of others is forbidden but 
also the detailed evidence for it in the source, that is, the Quranic ayah 
(2: 188). This detailed evidence, as opposed to saying merely that theft 
is forbidden in the Quran. 
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Knowledge of the rules of interpretation is essential to the proper 
understanding of a legal text. Unless the text of the Quran or the 
Sunnah is correctly understood, no rules can be deduced from it, 
especially in cases where the text in question is not self-evident. 
Hence rules by which one is to distinguish a speculative text from the 
definitive, the manifest (zahir) from the implicit (nass), the general 
('amm) from the specific (khass), the literal (haqiqi) from the 
metaphorical (majazi) etc., and how to understand the implications 
(dalalat) of a given text are among the subjects which warrant 
attention in the study of usul al fiqh. An adequate grasp of the 
methodology and rules of interpretation also ensures the proper use of 
human reasoning in a system of law which originates in divine 
revelation. For instance, analogy (qiyas) is an approved method of 
reasoning for the deduction of new rules from the sources of shari 'ah. 
How analogy should be constructed, what are its limits, and what 
authority would it command in conjunction, or in conflict, with the 
other recognised proofs are questions which are of primary concern to 
usul al fiqh. Juristic preference, or istihsan, is another rationalist 
doctrine and a recognised proof of Islamic law. It consists essentially 
of giving preference to one of the many conceivable solutions to a 
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particular problem. The choice of one or other of these solutions is 
mainly determined by the jurist in the light of considerations of equity 
and fairness. Which of these solutions is to be preferred and why, and 
what are the limits of personal preference and opinion in a particular 
case, is largely a question of methodology and interpretation and 
therefore forms part of the subject matter of usul al-filth. 
The principal objective of usul al figh is to regulate ijtihad and to 
guide the jurist in his effort at deducing the law from its sources. The 
need for the methodology of usul alfiqh became prominant when 
unqualified persons attempted to carry out Utihad, and the risk of error 
and confusion in the development of shari 'ah became a source of 
anxiety for the Ulema. The purpose of usul alfiqh is to help the jurist 
to obtain an adequate knowledge of the sources of shari 'ah and of the 
methods of juristic deduction and inference. Usul alfiqh also regulates 
the application of qiyas, istihsan, istishab, istislah, etc., whose 
knowledge helps the jurist to distinguish as to which method of 
deduction is best suited to obtaining the hukm shar'i of a particular 
problem. Furthermore, usul alfiqh enables the jurist to ascertain and 
compare strengths and weaknesses in Utihad and to give preference 
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to that ruling of ijtihad which is in close harmony with the nusus. 
7.2. Classification of Hadd in Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabian criminal law recognises seven major offences, each of 
which has a penalty prescribed in fixed terms in the Quran or the 
Sunnah. These offences are known to the faqih as the offences of 
hudud. In Islamic law all duties and obligations are divided into two 
categories: one is known as haqq Allah, and the other as haqq adami. 
As used in the Islamic legal sense, the word hadd (pl. hudud) means 
a punishment which has been prescribed by God in the revealed text 
of the Quran or the Sunna, the application of which is the right of god 
or haqq Allah. 
In the penal context, a punishment which is classified as haqq Allah 
embodies three main aspects. The first is that this punishment is 
prescribed in the public interest; the second is that it cannot be 
lightened nor made heavier; and third is that, after being reported to 
the Qadi, it is not to be pardoned either by him, by the political 
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authority, or by the victim of the offence. The unchange ability of the 
hadd punishment is supported by the interpretation of the Quranic 
verse, "these are the limits of Allah. Do not transgress them. " (Quran 
2: 229). 
The offences generally recognised as offences of hudud are the taking 
of a life, intoxicants (including drugs), theft, armed robbery, illicit 
sexual relations, slanderous accusation of unchastity, and opostasy. 
7.3. Retribution and Hadd Punishments 
In Saudi Arabia punishments have a clear retributive characteristic. 
The retributive function of hadd punishment is the one most 
commonly discussed by Saudi jurists, in addition to its deterrent f 
function, to which we will shortly refer. Retribution is mentioned in 
the Qur'an as the purpose of punishment both in this world and in the 
Hereafter. 164 It is interesting to note that the Arabic word for 
retribution, jaza, in Quran' is usage means both punishment and 
164 Quran. 5: 33. 
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reward. 165 This indicates that both punishment and reward are used as 
means for the same end, an approach which may be compared with a 
similar function of punishment and reward in modem philosophy. 
In the Saudi Arabian penal system two points should be noted in 
respect to retribution as a feature of the hadd punishments: the 
severity of the punishment, and the prohibition of any mediation in 
respect to it; in other words, its mandatory infliction when the crime 
has been proved. 
The penalties prescribed in Islamic law for the crimes of hudud are the 
most severe punishments known to mankind for such crimes. Still 
more severe punishments, however, were prescribed in English law, 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, although 
today they no longer exist. The punishments described in Islamic law, 
on the other hand, which are still accepted by hundreds of millions of 
people, are implemented in Saudi Arabia, and, what is more, the 
demand of their application in other Muslim countries becomes 
stronger from time to time. According to some scholars, the severity 
165 Quran 3: 45. 
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of punishment is based on psychological considerations. In order to 
combat the criminal's inclination to break the law, Islam prescribed 
severe punishments which draws attention to the consequences of the 
crime, acting as a deterrent to its commission. The same explanation 
is given by `Uda in his book on Islamic Criminal Legislation. 
However, severity of punishment is a controversial point. On the one 
hand, some philosophers hold that "treatment" rather than punishment 
is what the criminal needs; on the other, some judges demand the 
reintroduction of severer penalties, including corporal punishment, in 
Western countries as the only means of controlling the increasing 
crime rate. No matter what view one holds on this point, there is no 
doubt that retributive punishment can be nothing but severe. It is for 
this reason, I think that the Muslim jurists justify the hadd 
punishments in terms of retributive penalties. 
Nevertheless, the degree of severity is not and cannot be agreed upon. 
Saudi Arabian jurists justify the severity of the hadd punishments 
because they are prescribed by God; consequently, they cannot be 
objected to and are eternally to be considered the most suitable 
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punishments for the crimes for which they are prescribed. To 
emphasize the fact that God created people, defined what is right and 
what is wrong for them, and determined the suitable punishments for 
wrong-doing, they quote the Qur'anic verse. "Should he not know what 
He created? And He is the Subtle, the Aware" (LX: 14). Hence, to try 
to justify the hadd punishments in secular or, in other words, modern 
terms would take us beyond the scope of this study and might fail to 
achieve any meaningful consensus. 
The second aspect in which hadd punishments seem to be retributive 
is the obligatory nature of the execution once the crime has been 
proved. In a well-known Hadith, the Prophet prohibited any 
meditation in carrying out the hadd punishments and indicated that 
even if his daughter Fatimah had committed a hadd crime, he would 
impose punishment on her like anyone else. 
We interpret this prohibition of mediation or the requirement of 
obligatory implementation of the punishment as a retributive feature 
in hadd punishment. In other words, if mediation were allowed of 
the hadd punishments could be replaced by any other punishments, 
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their retributive effect would no longer exist. Hence, it may be said 
that the severity of the punishment and the requirement that it must be 
carried out, combine to give the punishment as full a retributive effect 
as possible. 
Thus far only the role of retributive theory in relation to the general 
rules regarding hadd punishments has been discussed. But its clearer 
and more important influence appears in the approaches and views of 
jurists concerning some more detailed aspects. One of these relates 
to the question of imposing cumulative sentences on one offender 
(ta 'adud al- 'uqubat). Sentences may be cumulative when the same 
person has committed various offences before he stands trial or before 
being punished for any one of them. The offences committed by the 
same individual may either be of the same kind, e. g. theft, highway 
robbery and housebreaking, or of a different kind, e. g., theft, adultery, 
and drinking alcohol. In the first case it is agreed that the offender 
deserves one punishment for all his offences, while in the second case 
such agreement is lacking. Three schools, the Hanafi, Maliki, and 
Hanbali hold one position on this matter, while the Shafi 'i school takes 
a different view. With its non-recognition of the practice of abrogation 
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(jabb), to which we will return later, the Shaft's school understands 
the primary role of retributive theory in this context, maintaining that 
the offender deserves as many sentences as his offences. All the 
sentences earned are to be carried out, starting with those imposed for 
offences classified as haqq adami. 
If, however, the offender has been sentenced to death for homicide 
(which likewise is haqq adami), then this sentence is to be carried out 
last; that is, the death penalty should be the last punishment, 
disregarding the classification of the offence for which it has been 
imposed. To explain this view, the Shafi'i scholars give the 
hypothetical example of an unmarried man who makes an unproven 
accusation of fornication and who commits zina, theft, armed robbery 
and homicide (for which two latter charges he has been sentenced to 
death). In this case, they say, the punishments are to be imposed 
starting with the lightest. Thus the offender should be punished first 
for the unproved accusation of fornication, second for zina, third for 
theft, and then he is to be executed for homicide, his execution 
covering the crime of armed robbery as well. 
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The Shaft's' view reflects their strong belief in retribution as the 
philosophy underlying the concept of hadd punishment. Their view 
is an application of the principle ofjus talionis as explained by the 
retributionists, that is, "A man must be punished if he has performed 
an act for which he deserves a penalty. Further, he must not be given 
a lesser penalty than he deserves for his action. " 
The retributive theory also predominates in the Shafi 'i and Hanbali 
positions relating to punishing an insane man whose guilt has been 
established by testimony. The assumption is, of course, that the 
offender has committed the offence while in full possession of his 
faculties and that he was sane when tried and sentenced. The onset of 
his insanity was after the pronouncement of the sentence but prior to 
its implementation. The Shafi'is and Hanabalis hold that in such a 
case the offender should be punished because he committed the 
offence while sane and therefore responsible for his action. 
7.4. The Concept of Expiation 
It has been said that retribution is often confused with expiation. The 
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expiatory view reflects the belief "that in suffering his punishment the 
offender has purged his guilt, has `paid for' his crime, and that his 
account with society is therefore clear. This is the attitude for example 
which lies behind the commonly expressed reluctance to hold a man's 
record against him after his discharge from prison. " The concept of 
expiation in Islamic law however has a different aim. Its purpose is 
not to clear the person's account with society but with God. The 
Arabic word for expiation is kaffara, which is mentioned in the 
Qur'an in relation to such matters as accidental homicide, swearing a 
false oath, and failing to observe religious duties during the hajj or 
pilgrimage. But these cases, except for that of accidental homicide, 
are clearly not connected with the penal system of Islam; rather, they 
are all concerned with mans relationship to his Creator. Even in the 
context of the hadd punishments, when expiation is mentioned, it 
refers to man's relationship with God and not with his fellow citizens 
or society. It is narrated that the Prophet said "Whoever commits a 
crime deserving hadd and receives its punishment, this will be its 
expiation, " that is to say, the offender who has been punished in this 
world will not be punished in the Hereafter. Thus it is obvious that the 
concept of expiation known in Western law, for it is one which is 
246 
essentially religious and which cannot be considered as part of the 
theory of punishment in its legal context. 
7.5. Deterrence and Hadd Punishments 
According to Professor Blanshard, "Whatever else it may be, 
punishment is commonly supposed to be a deterrent of crime. "166 
Deterrence is often characterized as a justification for punishment 
which looks to the future, i. e., to the prevention of crime. In this 
respect it is in contrast to the theory of retribution, which is often said 
to be a justification for punishment which looks to the past, i. e. to the 
offence as an event isolated from possible future events. 
Retributionists, however, may argue that their theory does not hold 
that an individual's punishment is wholly justified by an event in the 
past. It includes the contention that a man's punishment provides 
satisfaction to the victim of his offence and to others. This 
satisfaction, in the deterrence theory, is of relatively small 
importance. What is taken to be of supreme importance is that 
punishment prevents offences. 
' Blandshard, B. "Retribution Revised, " in Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment, 
Madden, p. 59. 
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The deterrent effect is known to have a dual impact. There is the 
general deterrent, i. e., the preventive effect of a penal system (or a 
particular aspect of it) on criminality in the population at large, as well 
as the particular deterrent, i. e., the inhibitive effect of the punishment 
of an individual. General deterrence is achieved by giving the actual 
punishment when it is inflicted, the widest possible publicity; 
individual deterrence involves making the offender reluctant to offend 
again, rendering it difficult to distinguish it from reformation which is 
supposed to achieve the same end. In some theories, a line is drawn 
between moral improvement or reformation which induce the offender 
to repudiate crime on moral grounds, and prevention which merely 
frightens him off. But others regard this frightening-off process as 
coming under the heading of deterrence. 
Be that as it may, this is one instance of the lack of clarity of the 
boundary lines between the different theories of punishment, and it is 
this question of the frightening-off of the individual as a means of 
protecting society from crimes which raises major criticism against 
deterrence. It can also be suggested that the aim of deterrent 
punishment is to instil in the individual a respect for the 
law based on 
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his fear of the punishment which will follow if he transgresses. It can 
also be raised that the critical question of whether legally correct 
behaviour maintained for such reasons is worth having. The element 
of fear does already enter to a very considerable extent into the social 
training of all humans. This point was emphasized by Archbishop 
Temple when he said that this fear in no way derogates from the value 
of the sentiments we afterwards build on these foundations. They may 
begin as rationalisations for our real motives of fear, but they develop 
into sincerely held moral principles, to which, when they are matured, 
we cling in the face of the most appalling temptations and difficulties. 
However, this is only one objection to the deterrent theory; 
philosophers often are engaged in putting forward and replying to 
many other objections. Although it may be interesting to participate 
in some of these arguments, It is the inclination of this researcher is 
to conclude that, in spite of all the objections against the deterrence 
theory, it is still widely recognized as a valid justification for 
punishment. 
The recognition of the deterrence aspect in the Islamic penal system 
249 
is deeper and stronger than in other systems. Here deterrence is 
recognized as the predominant justification for punishments, 
particularly for hadd punishments. Mawardi, certainly influenced by 
the place given to the deterrence theory in Islamic legal works, 
defined the hudud as "deterrent punishments which God established 
to prevent man from committing what He forbade and neglecting what 
He commanded". If, as it was argued, deterrence is to be achieved by 
means of severe punishments, then we need not say much about the 
deterrence theory as the justification of punishment in Islamic law. 
But the fact is that punishment is justified because, according to the 
deterrence theory, it prevents the commission of further offences, both 
by the offender and by other members of the society. The dual notions 
of general and special deterrence are known to Muslim jurists and 
supported as one of the basic motivations behind the hadd 
punishments. 
The most common example given by contemporary Muslim writers as 
evidence of the deterrent effect of the hadd punishments 
is the 
enormous decrease in the crime rate in Saudi 
Arabia since their 
reintroduction in that country. During the 
ottoman administration of 
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the Arabian Peninsula, the hadd punishments were not applied. In 
the late 1920's, when the Saudis took over, they reintroduced them, 
ordering judges to implement the teachings of the Hanbali school in 
entirety, including those relating to penal law. Soon after this order, 
the crime rate fell noticeably. It is said, for example, that official 
figures, as presented at the end of this chapter indicate that the hadd 
punishments are extremely low in Saudi Arabia. 
In this context it is interesting to note that a punishment similar to that 
prescribed in the Qur'an for theft has halted all types of theft in the 
Irish province of Ardoyne (Belfast). This was administered by the 
IRA and reported, understandably, as `Rough Justice' in The Times. 
Moreover, and rather astonishingly, an American philosopher stated 
that touching a hot stove and getting painfully burned causes one 
automatically to refrain from touching a hot stove again. So, if pick- 
pockets were similarly painfully burned or cut by the purse they reach 
for, they would similarly stop picking pockets. It is the need for 
deterrent punishments and the belief in the validity of the deterrence 
theory which underlies both the American philosopher's view and the 
experience of the Irish Republican Army. The success of the 
Saudi 
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Arabian experience is also frequently cited as evidence of the 
effectiveness of hadd punishments. 
Leaving aside the practical aspects, the jurists of all schools of Islamic 
law have laid great stress on the deterrence theory. According to Ibn 
al-Humam, the well-known Hanafu jurist, the hadd punishments are 
prescribed as general deterrents; but when an individual experiences 
punishment for one of the hadd offences, the aspect of individual 
deterrence comes into play. The same view is expressed by many of 
the commentators on the Qur'an. It is also agreed in Saudi Arabia, 
that all hadd punishments should be carried out in public in order to 
achieve the fullest deterrent effect. Because the Qur'an commands 
that the punishment for adultery be carried out in public, the jurists 
extend this command to all other hadd punishments. This, as 
mentioned above, is a clear application of the deterrence theory. 
7.3. The Punishment For Theft 
The punishment for theft is prescribed in the Quranis verse, "As for 
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thieves, both male and female, cut off their hands. It is the recompense 
of their own deeds, an exemplary punishment from Allah... " (5: 38). 
The jurists have defined theft as taking someone else's property by 
stealth. There is almost complete agreement on this definition among 
jurists, but they are not so unanimous concerning the value of the 
stolen property, how the hand should be cut off, and the question of 
the places from which the property is stolen, i. e. the problem of 
location. However, in Saudi Arabia these issues have been 
determined by the Qadis. 
Statistics from a limited number of Saudi records suggests that capital 
punishment in Saudi Arabia is certainly a deterrent, over a period of 
ten years the number of thefts/rapes number 765 in a population of 17 
millions, with 562 of those being carried out by non-citizens. When 
the figures are compared against educational class it is noticeable that 
those with the least education commit the most crimes, although 
amongst Saudis, those with average education commit 
the most 
crimes. Most drugs are found at seaports (50%), then comes 
boarders 
(40%), and lastly airports (15%). It is noticable that the 
figures reflects 
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that 66% of all crimes are committed by Muslims, 14% by 
Christians, and 20% by those of other religions. 
167 
7.4. Drugs 
By analogy Saudi Arabia has designated the taking, or being in 
possession of drugs a capital offence. Therefore it is surprising that the 
highest penalties in the Kingdom is for drugs, both among Saudis and 
non-Saudis, although, non-Saudis certainly commit more offences. 
7.5. Murders 
Statistics reveal that the level of murders in Saudi Arabia remains the 
lowest, although recently it has began to rise because of the large 
numbers of refugees entering the country. 
Unboubtedly the greatest crime known to mankind is murder. It has 
been punishable under all systems of law since early in the history of 
mankind and throughout the ages up to the present. The punishment 
16' Information obtain from records of Saudi Arabian Ministry of Information. 
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prescribed in Saudi Arabia is in accordance with Islamic law which 
account for the low homocide rate. The penalty as mentioned in 
previous chapters is referred to as gisas; that is inflicting on a criminal 
an injury exactly equal to the injury that was inflicted on the victim. 
In studying the law of qisas, the most important point is the 
classification of the act of homocide; that is, is it a crime in which the 
state must intervene by means of punishment, or is it a civil wrong or 
tort, for which a remedy is available to the wronged individual if he so 
requests? The place given in Islamic law to the individual's wishes in 
the context of qisas distinguishes the Islamic treatment of homocide 
from its treatment under modem legal systems. For, under Islamic law 
homocide appears to be essentially a civil wrong, the remedy for 
which is the concern of the victim or his relatives, rather than a crime 
in the strict sense. Such is one's first impression of the subject when 
one reads the Islamic law texts. But a close investigation may 
lead to 
a slightly different conclusion. 
In the Quran: 
44 
and if anyone is slain wrongfully, we 
have given his heir 
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authority... " (Quran 17: 33) 
To explain this authority which pertains to the heir, the majority hold 
that it is the authority to kill the murderer. On the other hand, some of 
the commentors on the Quran explain it as the heir's right to demand 
the execution of qisas or to remit it. But the execution itself is the 
state's responsibility and not anyone else's. From this point of view 
qisas is also the duty of the Muslim community, which cannot carry 
it out except through a representative, who would be, in this case, the 
judge or ruler. To explain this concept, the duties of the community are 
two-fold. First, there are the duties obligatory for each individual, such 
as prayer, fasting and the payment of zakat; second, there are those 
carried out by a representative acting on behalf of the community, 
since it is impossible for each Muslim to perform them individually. 
One such duties is the carrying out of qisas when it is demanded. 
7.6. Law of Evidence 
The relationship between the infliction of punishment and the evidence 
required to prove crimes is a very clear one. Where the court is not 
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absolutely certain of the guilt of the accused, the punishment cannot 
be inflicted. Methods of proof in Saudi Arabia reflect the legislator's 
desire to widen or limit the number of cases in which a particular 
punishment may or may not be inflicted. 
The aim of the law of evidence in Saudi Arabia is based on Islamic 
legal theory in general which is the establishment of the truth of claims 
with a high degree of certainty. Thus the usual evidence is the oral 
testimony of two adult Muslims who must be known to the judge as 
having the highest degree of moral and religious probity ('adala). This 
common standard of proof should be, as a general rule, complied with 
all criminal and civil cases. However, there are some recognised 
alternatives to it in both civil and criminal procedures. 
The alternative methods of proof in criminal cases are the criminal's 
admission or confession (iqrar), the judge's personal observation 
('ilm 
al-qadi), and circumstantial evidence (al-gara'in). The pre-Islamic 
method of proof in cases of homocide known as oath 
(qasamah) is not 
a recognised system under Islamic law. The most 
important exception 
to the ordinary standard of proof in criminal cases 
is that of requiring 
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four males witnesses to prove the offence of adultery of fornication 
(zina). 
Testimony (shahada) 
Most criminal charges are to be proved by the oral testimony of two 
adult male Muslims. Among hadd crimes, this rule applies to the 
crimes of sariqa qadhf and hiraba, and it applies to the most serious 
ta'zir offences. Qisas for crimes of homocide cannot be applied unless 
the crime is proved in the same manner. 
Confession (iqrar) 
An alternative method of proof in criminal cases is the confession by 
the criminal. It is agreed that the criminal's confession is sufficient for 
the establishment of his guilt and that, on the basis of the confession, 
the appropriate punishment can be inflicted. A single confession is 
sufficient in all criminal cases other than zina. 
Confession should be made in detail, showing that the confessor is 
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aware of what he has done and proving that his action was in fact the 
crime for which a punishment is prescribed. If a summarised 
confession were acceptable, someone might confess that he had, for 
example, committed zinc while he actually had not, resulting in his 
being punished unjustly. Accordingly, a detailed confession is required 
and it is the judge's duty to ask the confessor about the minute details 
of his offence. Associated with this principle is the rule that a 
confession must be made in clear and explicit words since an indirect 
confession is not accepted as proof in criminal cases. 
A confession in criminal, but not in civil, cases can be withdrawn 
even after sentence has been passed or during its execution. In cases 
of its withdrawal after sentencing, a hadd punishment should no longer 
be carried out, although a ta'zir punishment may be imposed even 
after withdrawal of the confession. The reason is that the withdrawal 
of the confession causes doubt (shubha), rendering the 
hadd 
punishment non-applicable. Therefore, judges usually gives the 
confessor a chance to retract the confession particularly 
if it a crime 
considered to be haqq Allah. 
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The recommendation is based on the fact that in such cases the 
criminal's repentance is better than his punishment. 
Judge's personal observation (`ilm al-qadi) 
The Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali schools forbid the judge to give 
judgement according to his personal observation in all criminal cases 
(with the exception of to 'zir cases, according to some), holding that he 
cannot act except according to the evidence delivered before him; his 
own observations are no more valuable than those of any single 
witness. At the same time, the judge is not allowed to add his own 
testimony to that of other witnesses in order to complete the number 
of witnesses required in a given case, because it is impossible to be 
judge and witness at the same time. 
7.7. Conclusion 
Thus far we have dealt with the theory of punishment in Islamic law 
in an attempt to understand its main characteristics and underlying 
principles. The findings of this research may be summarised by saying 
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that Islamic law possesses a unique concept of punishment, a concept 
which in a sense cares very little for the criminal and his reform, anc 
concentrates on preventing the commission of offences. This relates 
to that part of the penal system in Islamic law known as hadd 
punishments. In this area nothing is left to the legislator in the Muslim 
society; he cannot add anything to, subtract anything from, any of the 
rules laid down in the Qur'an and the Sunna relating to these 
punishments. Equally noteworthy is the Islamic manner of dealing 
with the crime of homicide, with its dualistic notion of punishment for 
a crime and compensation for a tort. Thus, the concept of to 'zir, or 
discretionary punishments, with the wide authority given to the ruler 
or legislator to establish crimes and their punishments, and with its 
direct concern with public morality, presents a permanent base on 
which the needs of the Muslim society can be met.. On the other hand 
the restrictions relating to inflicting the punishments, especially hadd 
punishments, in terms of difficulty of proof, recommendation of 
forgiveness, and the possibility of repentance, greatly limit the number 
of cases in which these punishments can be applied. It can 
be 
generally said that punishment in Islamic law is primarily 
based on the 
concept of deterrence and retribution, but scope exists 
for reformative 
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elements as well, particularly within the provisions of to 'ztr. 
However, in connection with the theory of punishment, the most 
controversial aspect discussed in contemporary Islamic circles is 
whether it is not the possibility of applying the Islamic penal system 
in modem societies. Those who are involved in the dispute comprise 
two groups, one of which may be called "the advocates" of the 
application of the Islamic penal system, and the other may be called 
"the opponents". The discussion has not always been objective, for 
the opponents often accuse the advocates of being backward, narrow- 
minded, reactionary even barbarous. At the same time, the advocates 
are not less aggressive than their attackers; their list of accusations 
includes lack of faith, ignorance, and being under foreign, particularly 
Western, influence. 
Apart from this exchange of accusations, both parties present a 
considerable variety of evidences for and against this case. The 
advocates, to defend their view, adduce many arguments, of which the 
two most important are the following; that the Islamic penal system 
is 
a part of the law of God which must be obeyed and enforced: and 
that 
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the application of this system has proven to be successful in the past, 
as well as in modem times. Here they usually quote the example of 
Saudi Arabia, to which we have already referred. As a matter of fact, 
both these arguments are correct, but the question is whether or not 
they justify the application of the Islamic penal system in 
contemporary Muslim societies. 
On the other hand, the most important arguments against the case are 
that the penal system known to Islamic law is not, like other Islamic 
legal rules, of any use to present-day society because of its antiquity 
and lack of sophistication; and that the Islamic penal system in 
particular cannot be applied today as it is very severe, barbarous and 
inhuman. No doubt the punishments recognised in Islamic law are 
very sever, but all the other allegations have been adequately replied 
to by the other side. However, it is not my intention here to go 
through all the details of this discussion, but simply to state briefly its 
main points in order to approach the problem. 
In dealing with the application of the Islamic penal system, the starting 
point is the understanding of its place within the Islamic 
legal 
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framework as a whole, or rather within Islam itself. It is very well 
known that Islam provides a complete system for regulating every 
aspect of human life. The rules, obligations, injunctions and 
prohibitions laid down by, or derived from, the Quran and Sunna 
produce a complete picture of the Muslim community from which no 
part can be removed without the rest being damaged. Equally, no 
isolated part of this scheme can make any sense or be of any use. 
Within any legal system the philosophy of punishment is an integral 
part of the system which cannot be understood or applied except 
within its principles, in order to protect the values recognised by it. If 
this is correct, and its is undoubtedly correct, then it must be 
completely wrong to borrow the penal philosophy of one legal system 
and adapt it to another which is based on different principles and 
values, or, in relation to the issue at hand, to apply the concept of 
punishment laid down by Islamic law to a community in which any 
part of the Islamic scheme of life is lacking. 
To turn to contemporary Muslim societies, one can hardly say that the 
Islamic way of life is adopted among them, or even well-understood. 
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There is no exception to this statement, even in the widely-cited 
examples of some Muslin countries. Again, this is not the place to go 
into details, but anyone who has even a superficial knowledge of 
Muslim societies would agree with this. 
It is therefore nonsense to say that we must apply the Islamic penal 
system to present-day Muslim societies in their present circumstances. 
It is nonsense to amputate the thief's hand when he has no means of 
support but stealing. It is nonsense to punish in any way for zina (let 
alone stone to death) in a community where everything invites and 
encourages unlawful sexual relationships. Above all, it is nonsense to 
say that the penal code now in operation in a country such as Egypt is 
almost legitimate, under the doctrine of ta'zir recognised in Islamic 
law. Such a code simply has no connection with Islamic law and does 
not seek its legitimacy in the recognition of it, but in its suitability to 
the present circumstances of society. Those who try to justify some 
of the current systems in Muslim countries only prove their lack of 
understanding in the Islamic concept of life as laid down in the Quran, 
the Sunna, and the Scholars' teachings. 
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From this perspective, i. e. the impossibility of isolating any part or 
parts of the Islamic scheme of life, one can say that the application of 
the Islamic penal system under present circumstances would not lead 
to the achievement of the ends recommended by this system. This 
leads us to consider two points made by the advocates of its 
application. The first is that the Islamic penal system has proved to be 
successful in the past as well as in the present in preventing crime, or 
at least in minimising the crime rate. As for the past, although one of 
its great advocates claims that the Islamic penal code was in vogue up 
to the beginning of the nineteenth century, this claim can hardly be 
proved. Abu Yusuf, the second founder of the Hanafi school tells us 
in his famous text, Al-Kharaj, about the extent of the application of 
the Islamic penal system during the era of Harun al-Rashid, the 
Abbasid Caliph. His statement leaves the reader with the clear 
understanding that by his time, the Islamic penal system was 
far from 
being enforced. Abu Yusuf died in the year 182 A. H. This means that 
in less than two centuries after the Prophet's time circumstances 
had 
made it necessary to relax the enforcement to the 
Islamic penal 
system. This was due to the fact that the society 
for which this system 
was framed no longer existed after the widespread expansion 
of Islam 
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among peoples of totally different values. It is the very same 
consideration, that is, the non-existence of the society visualised by 
Islam, which leads us to say that the application of the Islamic penal 
system today would not achieve its aim. The well-known example of 
its successful application in Saudi Arabia can only be used as evidence 
for this view. 
The second point we may consider is the claim that the Islamic penal 
system is preferable to any other because Islam, and the Muslim 
jurists, discovered and legalised all the theories known to modern 
penal codes and legislations. This early advancement, say the 
advocates, is a point in favour of the application of the penal system. 
This point has often inspired articles, speeches and even text books. 
To me, it has no relevance to the application of the penal system of 
Islamic law. It may be of great value in research concerned with legal 
or social history, but it certainly has nothing to do with the application 
of a legal system. The only justification for adopting one legal system 
and not another is that the one in force provides the community with 
all possible "good" and protects it from all possible "bad". Without 
doubt the Islamic legal system had such qualifications in the past, 
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when circumstances were appropriate for its enforcement. More over 
there is doubt, at least to Muslims, that the will of God as revealed in 
the Quran and the trustworthy Sunna has an eternal value and the 
capacity to safeguard the community's interests. But first, before we 
can demand the enforcement of the Islamic penal system, it must be 
proved beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt that the Islamic society 
visualised in the Quran and the Sunna has become an existing fact. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Islamic law is an ideal legal 
system, i. e., it is not a law of custom which grew up within the society 
in which it was applied; rather it is a legal system which was 
formulated in order to realise an ideal society, the Islamic society. 
This idealism is clear enough from the Quranic injunctions and 
prohibitions concerned with the social life of Muslims. Nevertheless, 
it is even clearer in the jurists' works, not only social but also on legal 
and even political issues. Islamic law measures the realities in society 
according to Islamic standards and approves or disapproves them. 
This is not because of what people do or abstain from doing, 
but 
because things are intrinsically "good" or "bad". Apart from the rules 
of public interest (maslaha), necessity 
(darorah), misuse of right 
(isaat Ist 'mal al-hagq), and other similar rules, this emphasis on 
ideal 
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concepts is the general tendency in Islamic law. One can therefore say 
again that if an ideal society does not exist, Islamic law as expressed 
in the jurists' manual cannot be applied. Even historically this was so, 
as for example, in the establishment of the court of the official in 
charge of crimes (wali al jara'im) who was to deal with criminal cases 
on a different basis both in matters of procedure and substance than 
the usual court of the qadi. 
We conclude, therefore, that the Islamic penal system, or rather 
Islamic law, is to be applied only within the above-mentioned Islamic 
society. Whenever that society comes into existence, the Islamic legal 
system will be able to operate without any need for "the advocates" 
and in spite of all the objections of the opponents. Whether or not this 
society will come in to being is a matter beyond any personal 
judgement, but is the duty of every capable Muslim to work as hard as 




FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Capital punishment, the execution of deviant persons by the members 
of a social group, has been part of the social process from the time of 
the first human community up until today. Viewed from the 
perspective of the sociology of religion, capital punishment is the 
response of a society to perceived threats to the all-encompassing 
sacred reality on which that society is based. The death penalty is 
justified by religion for the sake of world-maintenance. Both capital 
crime and capital punishment create marginal situations which must be 
righted through the means available to society. Historically speaking, 
execution has been one such means in almost every age and every 
social grouping. It is the purpose of this study to offer an 
interpretation of the historical manifestations of capital punishment 
from the scholarly perspective of sociology of religion. 
The construction and maintenance of social reality, through the 
definition of capital crime and through the infliction of capital 
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punishment, has been a hedge against real and imagined threats to the 
human community. In the sense that the social reality has been 
granted absolute status it has become a sacred reality and the 
executions which have been performed for the sake of its maintenance 
have been religious acts. Hence, it is the thesis of this study that 
Capital punishment in its origins development, and present 
ideological dimensions. is a type of propitiatory rite which serves to 
maintain a socially constructed reality. An execution is, in a sense, a 
"propitiation for the sake of a social order. 
Chapter One of this study presents three broadly conceived questions 
for an inquiry into capital punishment from the perspective of the 
sociology of religion. A restatement of each of these questions with 
the findings and conclusions resulting from the study will serve as a 
summary of the foregoing chapters. 
(1) What theoretical insights into the relationship of religion and 
capital punishment in society are available from the 
perspective of sociology of religion? 
The sociology of religion, as an academic discipline, constitutes a 
conceptual framework and vocabulary within which various aspects 
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of social interaction can be understood. Through this discipline, it is 
possible to construct a socio-religious or politico-religious definition 
of capital punishment. The execution of persons creates a marginal 
situation as does every human confrontation with death. The members 
of a society must be motivated to kill, to put to death one who is in 
their midst, for the sake of an all-encompassing sacred reality. 
Religion helps to provide this motivation be justifying and legitimating 
the execution as a collective deed which can be understood within that 
sacred reality. This function is one aspect of the maintenance of the 
social world in the face of threats to its continuity. Deviance, in 
modem terms either sin or crime, presents such a threat and, therefore, 
evokes the response of punishment. In addition to the world- 
maintenance function, religion sets the boundaries of the social reality 
by defining the limits of human behaviour; divine laws determine 
which acts are serious enough to be deemed capital crimes. Religion, 
therefore, functions within the social process surrounding capital 
punishment in two ways: 
1) world construction: the definition of capital crimes and 
2) world maintenance: the legitimation of capital punishment. 
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(2) In what sense is capital punishment related to the religious 
phenomenon of propitiation? 
The earliest historical records show evidence that societies first 
executed sinners or criminals in order to appease the divine wrath 
which their deviant behaviour had evoked. In terms of the social 
process, death is the ultimate symbol in relation to which reality is 
defined. Capital punishment, in its origins, was a type of propitiatory 
death for the sake of deity. Actions which contravened divine laws 
were considered mysteriously charged with evil power. The deviants, 
whose actions were thought to have brought on a curse which might 
affect the entire social world, were ritually executed as a means 
propitiating the wrath of the god(s). Criminals were first put to death 
for the sake of maintaining the sacred reality and defending the 
community from the evil consequences of deviant behaviour. Priests 
served to facilitate the ritual death by acting as the first judges and the 
first executioners. Later, during the stage of the great universal 
religions, this type of propitiatory death became a means of delivering 
the violater to the cosmic judgement in the transcendent realm. Still 
later, the process of secularisation affected a shift in the symbolisation 
of propitiation, the ritual execution was performed 
for the sake of the 
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state as deity and by the state as executioner. 
(3) How has capital punishment developed historically especially 
in the secular era, as a social mechanism which serves to 
maintain collectively defined sacred reality? 
From its origins as a type of propitiatory rite, capital punishment has 
developed historically in ways which correspond to the changing 
social construction of reality, as sacred reality has changed so have the 
religious phenomena which buttress that reality changed. Generally, 
those acts which have constituted the greatest threat to the sacred or 
absolute reality have been deemed capital crimes. Certain crimes have 
been more prominent at certain times for particular societies. Thus, 
crimes against religious and political power, crimes against dogma and 
ideology, and crimes against life and property have all been punished 
by death. In the secular era, the historical period for which the most 
data is available, the use of the death penalty has reflected the 
particular needs of political groups for social maintenance. Race, 
ideology, and especially direct challenges to the power of the state 
have been factors in the widespread use of capital punishment. Finally, 
based on the socio-religious definition of capital punishment, one can 
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predict that the future of the death penalty will be determined by the 
flux of the social processes of world construction and world- 
maintenance which define the sacred or absolute reality. 
The socio-religious insights into the nature of capital punishment 
presented in this study suggest some implications for further research. 
For instance, the numerous mythical and historical records of earliest 
times which are concerned with the killing of human persons could be 
subjected to analysis within the conceptual framework of sociology of 
religion. Comparative studies of this type might reveal much 
regarding the social processes at work in the first cultures and thereby 
offer clues to the origins of other societal phenomena. Myths could 
also be examined for a clearer understanding of propitiation as social 
maintenance, the ritual trappings of mythical executions could be 
analysed as examples of religio-magical phenomena. In addition, a 
vast amount of historical evidence regarding capital punishment 
is 
available for the analysis of execution as a social response to marginal 
situations. The definition of capital crime is itself an 
indicator of the 
social characteristics which were predominant at various points 
in 
history. The changing nature of the social process 
is reflected in 
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changes in the types of acts which are designated as capital crimes. 
Furthermore, there is an abundance of data available regarding capital 
punishment in recent times. Accurate lists of capital crimes and 
thorough descriptions of socio-political situations make it possible to 
chart in detail the patterns of the social construction of reality in 
various nations. Extensive data also provides for comparative and 
cross-cultural analyses of capital punishment. For example, the 
empirical study of William Bowers168 could be duplicated for a wider 
sampling of social groupings and for some other time periods. 
As well as the implications for the sociological analysis of the 
relationship of religion and capital punishment, there are implications 
for the ethical debate regarding the death penalty. The view of the 
origin of capital punishment as a type of propitiatory rite raises the 
question of the morality of religious modes of thinking which offer 
seemingly unverifiable justifications for killing. This is an aspect of 
the larger ethical issue of the interplay of religion with other sectors of 
society. How thoroughly should religion be integrated into a social 
process which requires the legitimated, official exercise of violence? 
168Bowers, W. J. Executions in America, Lexington, USA, 1974.. 
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At the very least, religionists who argue in favour of the death penalty 
could be challenged with the fact of the extensive complicity of 
religion in the administration of capital punishment. Those who 
exercise religious power and who offer religio-ethical judgements of 
capital punishment should be heard as the vocational descendants of 
the original priest-executioners. Traditional religious legitimations of 
capital punishment should be explicitly located and, so also, the 
popular, secular extensions of these legitimations. Furthermore, 
ethical discussion of capital punishment should be connected with the 
larger issue of the status of the nation-state in the contemporary world. 
Religious ethics should be concerned to evaluate the effects of the 
deification of the state and its use as an ultimate symbol. Finally, the 
ethical debate might return to the basic question of the nature of the 
human person for afresh view of the rationale of punishment, 
especially irreparable punishment, in the social world. If capital 
punishment is, indeed, a propitiatory rite for the sake of a social order, 
then ethics must attempt to decide if the social gain of execution 
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